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Analytical Jurisprudence and the Concept of 
Commercial Law 
John Linarelli* 
Commercial lawyers working across borders know that 
globalization has changed commercial law.  To think of commercial law 
as only the law of states is to have an inadequate understanding of the 
norms governing commercial transactions.  Legal comparativists have 
argued unpersuasively for a transnational conception of commercial law 
based on common content among national legal systems.  Some have 
argued for a transnational conception of commercial law, but their 
grounds of justification have been unpersuasive, often grounded on 
claims about the common content among national legal systems.  Legal 
positivism is a rich literature on the concept of a legal system and the 
validity conditions for rules in legal systems, but it has not been used to 
understand legal order outside or beyond the state.  This article aims to 
use legal positivism to conceptualize a transnational commercial law 
order.  Prevailing positivist accounts at least implicitly condition legal 
order on state sovereignty.  This article offers a cosmopolitan conception 
of legal positivism, in which the state is no longer an enabling condition 
for law.  The cosmopolitan conception provides the means by which to 
adequately describe a transnational commercial law order.  There are 
limits to the conceptual analysis this article provides, one of which is 
that it does not purport to evaluate the justice or morality of 
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transnational legal order.  But the cosmopolitan conception of legal 
positivism elucidated in this article stands on its own as a way of 
understanding a number of transnational legal orders other than 
commercial law.  The attractiveness of the account is that it describes 
law as a human social practice even when it is not solely the product of 
the state, so that we do not have to rely on natural law theories to 
understand legal rules that states do not maintain. 
[T]he dense thicket of rules that sustain our life together . . . includes 
some of the most mundane things imaginable:  postal and telephone 
conventions, airline safety and navigation standards, the law of 
international trade, the practices that define the convertibility of 
currencies, transnational banking arrangements, weights and 
measures, time zones, international quarantine arrangements, and so 
on.  Philosophers and political theorists are not much interested in 
these unexciting issues.  We have nothing to say on currency rates, 
bills of sale, the maintenance of sea lanes, cell-phone standards, or 
the Warsaw Convention governing the liability of airlines to their 
passengers.  We don’t like commerce (because we are largely 
ignorant of it), and we would prefer not to have to write about it. 
Jeremy Waldron1 
There is no real jurisprudence of commercial law.  We are presently 
prisoners of the conception that commercial law embodies the law 
merchant and that the Uniform Commercial Code merely furnishes 
businessmen with a clear statement of their rules. 
Hal Scott2 
1. Jeremy Waldron, Cosmopolitan Norms, in SEYLA BENHABIB, ANOTHER
COSMOPOLITANISM 83 (2006). 
2. Hal S. Scott, The Risk Fixers, 91 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1978).
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INTRODUCTION 
H.L.A. Hart spent his career rethinking legal positivism around a set 
of claims understandable to analytical philosophers, dealing with 
substantial questions on the relationship between law and morality, and 
examining the deep structure of tort and criminal law, as well as serving, 
towards the end of his career, as Principal of Oxford’s Brasenose 
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College.3  Never did he concern himself with a subject as mundane as 
commercial law.  Many view Hart as the greatest legal philosopher of the 
twentieth century in the analytical tradition.4  To borrow without any 
suggestion of precision from the philosophy of science literature, Hart’s 
contribution could be described in Thomas Kuhn’s terminology as a 
paradigm shift in the way philosophy of law is done.5  He made the first 
move in analytical legal philosophy from law’s authority coming from 
the force of the state, accounts of his predecessors Bentham and Austin,6 
to a theory based on rules and social acceptance of legal obligation.  His 
account is more suitable to understanding the relationship of citizens in 
contemporary democracies to their legal systems.  Though their aims and 
accounts differed substantially, Hart’s approach is as paradigmatic in the 
twentieth century as Rousseau’s was in the eighteenth.  Hart’s concept of 
law is reminiscent of Rousseau’s discrediting of force as a source of 
political morality, that “might does not make right.”7  To put Hart in 
more contemporary terms, claiming that force is the source of authority 
for a legal system is to fail to understand the distinction between 
authority and force, between standing to claim and power to dictate.  To 
Hart, being obliged to obey the command of a terrorist holding a gun to 
one’s head differs from having an obligation to obey the law.8 
3. See NICOLA LACEY, A LIFE OF H.L.A. HART: THE NIGHTMARE AND THE NOBLE
DREAM 2 (2004). 
4. For example, Brian Leiter, characterizing Hart as “the giant of 20th century
jurisprudence,” explains that Hart brought jurisprudence “into the mainstream of English-
speaking philosophy.”  BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 2 (2007). 
5. See, e.g., THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2nd
ed. 1962). 
6. See JEREMY BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL (H.L.A. Hart ed., Athlone Press
1970); JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1998). 
7. Rousseau said in the Social Contract:
The strongest is never strong enough to be the master forever unless he 
transforms his force into right and his obedience into duty.  This leads to the 
right of the strongest, a right that is apparently taken ironically and in principle 
really established.  But won’t anyone ever explain this word to us?  Force is a 
physical power.  I do not see what morality can result from its effects.  Yielding 
to force is an act of necessity, not of will.  At most, it is an act of prudence.  It 
what sense could it be a duty?  . . .  Let us agree that might does not make right, 
and that one is only obligated to obey legitimate powers. 
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 48-49 (Roger D. Masters ed., Judith 
R.  Masters trans., St. Martin’s Press 1978).  A similar discussion is in Plato’s Republic, 
in which Socrates and Thrasymachus debate the nature of justice.  See generally 1 PLATO,
REPUBLIC in PLATO COMPLETE WORKS (John M. Cooper ed., 1997). 
8. Hart said:
The plausibility of the claim that the gunman situation displays the meaning of 
obligation lies in the fact that it is certainly one in which we would say that [the 
victim], if he obeyed, was “obliged” to hand over his money.  It is, however, 
equally certain that we should misdescribe the situation if we said, on these 
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From Hart sprung the contemporary analytical jurisprudence 
canon.9  Hart argued that the practical authority of law comes from other 
rules, in particular, from the systemic relationship of primary rules 
imposing legal obligations on persons to secondary rules of recognition, 
change, and adjudication.10  Hart said nothing about the need for a state 
or sovereign to back law’s authority.  State law could be said to be at best 
a central case of the sort of institutional normative order Hart identifies.11  
Hart’s concern was in producing an understanding of the concept of law, 
but he did not claim that law is the only institutional normative order 
complying with his description.  Hart’s description of the union or 
primary and secondary rules describes other “non-legal” institutionalized 
normative systems, such as those of sporting organizations, clubs, 
universities, churches and business firms.12  Some scholars have claimed 
that the requirement of the state is in Hart’s account and that it is a 
requirement of legal positivism generally; others have claimed to the 
contrary.13  Some of the critical literature is more in the nature of 
facts, that [the victim] “had an obligation” or “duty” to hand over the money. 
So from the start it is clear that we need something else for an understanding of 
the idea of obligation.  There is a difference . . . between the assertion that 
someone was obliged to do something and the assertion that he had an 
obligation to do it. 
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 82 (2nd ed. 1997). 
9. It is not feasible here to recount that substantial literature.  For surveys, see
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (Jules Coleman, Scott J. 
Shapiro, & Kenneth E. Himma eds. 2002); A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY (Dennis Patterson ed. 1999); Leslie Green, Legal Positivism, STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-positivism/ (last 
visited June 20, 2009). 
10. Philosophers call the kind of authority a legal rule or moral principle has over us
practical authority.  Practical authority issues a reason for action.  It is action guiding. 
Legal philosophy asks questions about why the law is binding on us.  Practical authority 
is to be distinguished from theoretical authority, which issues reasons to believe.  The 
concept of practical authority does not require any special citation in a philosophical 
work.  To see the concept in action in a recent influential work of moral philosophy, see 
STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND PERSON STANDPOINT: MORALITY, RESPECT, AND
ACCOUNTABILITY 11 (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 2006).  The question of 
the practical authority of law has been one of the central questions of legal positivism. 
How are we to understand the claim to obedience that law makes on persons?  See Leslie 
Green, Legal Obligation and Authority, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-obligation/#2 (last visited June 20, 2009). 
11. NEIL MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART 34, 136 (Stanford: Stanford University Press
2007). 
12. Id., at 21; JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 123-48 (1990).
13. See, e.g., A. CLAIR CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY:
TRANSNATIONAL MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 7, 60-67, 74-76 (2003) (legal 
positivism under stress); Ralf Michaels & Nils Jansen, Private Law Beyond the State?: 
Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 527 (2006) (limited 
discussion of why there is “no good reason” why a rule of recognition or other 
grundnorm requires a state).  Gunther Teubner’s work in legal pluralism and law as an 
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assertion than justification.  But the critics are on to something that 
seems to threaten the core of legal positivism.  What else, in a positivist 
account of the law, would posit law for the norm users in a legal system 
other than the state and its government?  It seems a reasonable 
conclusion to draw that the existence of a state is an enabling condition 
for law in the positivist account.14  Joseph Raz, perhaps the most 
influential of the Oxford analytical philosophers after Hart, seems to at 
least implicitly agree in his work, but he also, like Hart, does not 
explicitly specify the need for a state.15  It could just be that the 
requirement of the state is such an obvious background condition for 
legal positivism that it does not need to be articulated as an express 
condition.  In this article I give legal positivism the benefit of the doubt 
to see where it leads. 
While analytical jurisprudence developed into an intricate set of 
claims in its own literature, another literature, grounded in commercial 
law and comparative law, made its way through journals in this country 
and globally, on the nature of commercial law and whether non-state 
actors have a role in the production of a contemporary law merchant.16  
This is the literature on the notion of transnational commercial law.  It 
contains substantial and seemingly interminable discussions between 
commercial law nationalists and commercial law cosmopolitans. 
Lawyers, judges, famous international commercial arbitrators, and legal 
scholars have been going back and forth for decades on whether the law 
merchant exists and if so, what it is comprised of, what kind of respect it 
deserves, and how should it come into play in commercial disputes.17  
autopoietic system states generalizations about how the law merchant meets Hart’s 
conditions for a legal system, but his work is not analytical philosophy and might be seen 
as a critique of Hart’s work as too nationalist.  Gunther Teubner, “Global Bukowina:” 
Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3, 8 (Gunther 
Teubner ed. 1997); Gunther Teubner, Breaking Frames: The Global Interplay of Legal 
and Social Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 149 (1997).  William Twining can be read as 
broadly sympathetic to Hart, but he is a legal pluralist and skeptical about legal 
positivism.  See WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALISATION AND LEGAL THEORY (2000). 
14. I borrow the enabling condition concept from Thomas Nagel’s Storrs Lecture at
Yale Law School.  Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFFAIRS 113 (2005).  Nagel uses the concept to identify what he calls a political 
conception of justice, in which states, governments and sovereignty are enabling 
conditions for justice.  He contrasts the political conception of justice with the 
cosmopolitan conception of justice. 
15. To require a state for a legal system might contradict the purported political
neutrality of legal positivism.  Why analytical jurisprudence resists this concession is 
puzzling.  Justice theorists have not.  See generally JOHN RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES
(2001). 
16. Rather than try to cite that voluminous literature here, I note for the reader that it
is cited throughout the article. 
17. For discussions of the controversial aspects of claims that a modern law
merchant exists, see infra notes 145-287 and accompanying text.  YVES DEZALAY &
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The substantial disagreement over this question has no end in sight.18  
Lord Mustill, a British Law Lord and an accomplished international 
commercial arbitrator, and also outspoken critic of the idea that a law 
merchant exists, has asked: 
What is the jurisprudential basis of the lex?  It is remarkable that 
given the volume of academic writing on the topic—a volume which 
considerably exceeds that of the [arbitral] awards which purport to 
put the doctrine into practice—there is even now no consensus on the 
intellectual basis of the doctrine.  Is the lex a law, properly so called, 
or is it a body of rules which the parties choose (expressly or 
impliedly) to apply to their individual contract?  If it is a law, from 
where does it draw its normative force?19 
To my knowledge, no one has answered Lord Mustill’s question about 
the jurisprudential basis or normative force of the law merchant. 
The aim of this article is to assess whether analytical jurisprudence 
can provide an adequate descriptive account of a transnational 
conception of commercial law, which includes the law merchant as well 
as state-based sources of law.  This is the first account of the analytical 
jurisprudence of commercial law.20  To my knowledge, no one has used 
analytical jurisprudence to develop insights about either commercial law 
BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 39-48 (1996); Jan H. Dalhuisen, 
Legal Orders and Their Manifestation: The Operation of the International Commercial 
and Financial Legal Order and its Lex Mercatoria, 24 BERKELEY J. INTL L. 129 (2006); 
Gunther Teubner, Global Bukowina, supra note 13. 
18. Ralf Michaels explains:
For some time, positions on the question of whether an anational law merchant 
existed or exists were matters of faith rather than academic rigor, and some 
participants in the debate seemed driven more by the wish to defend their own 
fields than by a disinterested search for adequate theories.  Scholars and 
especially practitioners in the debate seemed driven more by the wish to defend 
their own fields than by a disinterested search for adequate theories.  Scholars 
and especially practitioners in commercial and arbitration law promoted lex 
mercatoria not least because their fields seemed to benefit from it.  Scholars of 
conflict of laws, by contrast, abhorred the idea of a non-state law demanding 
recognition, not least because they feared for central tenets of their field. 
Empirical issues mattered surprisingly little in this debate. 
See Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14 INDIANA J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 448-49 (2007). 
19. Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Michael Mustill, Contemporary Problems in International
Commercial Arbitration: A Response, 17 INT’L BUS. LAW. 161-63 (1989); see also Rt. 
Hon. Lord Justice Michael Mustill, The New Lex Mercatoria: The First Twenty-Five 
Years, in LIBER AMERICORUM FOR THE RT. HON. LORD WILBERFORCE (Maarten Bos & Ian 
Brownlie eds. 1987). 
20. A limited attempt to identify principles underlying commercial law can be found
in Roy Goode, The Codification of Commercial Law, 14 MONASH. U. L. REV. 135 (1988), 
a very different project from mine. 
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or the law merchant.21  There has been limited brief discussion of Hart’s 
work in the literature, but no philosophical account centering on it.22 
21. Commercial law involves both contract and property; areas such as sales are
based in contract but are means to transfer property and areas such as secured credit and 
negotiable instruments are based in property but are created by contract.  A significant 
literature provides philosophical accounts of contract and property.  These do not extend 
to offer a satisfactory philosophy of commercial law.  Private law categories of contract, 
property, tort, and restitution serve as a base for many commercial law concepts, just as 
equity and fiduciary duty does for corporations, but the fields can be conceptualized as 
entirely distinct, and have been so conceptualized in Europe.  Failing to make the 
distinctions often leads to errors, as, for example, in thinking of commercial law as an 
extension of contract law, and not understanding that a substantial part of commercial law 
is about personal property.  For a survey on the philosophy of contract law, see Jody S. 
Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 9, at 687.  Kraus contends: “As in private law 
scholarship generally, economic analysis is the dominant paradigm in contemporary 
contracts scholarship.  But alongside the vast body of economic contracts scholarship 
produced over the last thirty years, a core body of philosophical contracts scholarship has 
steadily developed in relative obscurity.”  Id. at 687.  For a selective sample of 
contemporary literature see, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Contract Theory, in THE BLACKWELL 
GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 138 (Martin Golding & William 
A. Edmundson eds., 2005); STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY (2004); THE THEORY
OF CONTRACT LAW (Peter Benson ed., 2001); LARRY A. DIMATTEO, EQUITABLE LAW OF
CONTRACTS: STANDARDS AND PRINCIPLES (2001); MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1993); JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF
MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE (1991); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A 
THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1982); Larry A. DiMatteo, The History of 
Natural Law Theory: Transforming Embedded Influences into a Fuller Understanding of 
Modern Contract Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 839 (1998); Peter Benson, Abstract Right and 
the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of Contract: Hegel and Contemporary 
Contract Theory, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1077 (1989); Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory 
of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986).  Philosophical accounts of property have 
mainly to do with the justification of private property.  For a survey, see Peter Benson, 
Philosophy of Property Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 9, at 752; see also NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY (Stephen R. Munzer ed. 2001); JEREMY WALDRON, THE 
RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1991); STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY
(1990). 
22. For mentions of Hart in connection with the law merchant, see Michaels &
Jensen, supra note 13; Stephen Perry, Hart on Social Rules and the Foundations of Law: 
Liberating the Internal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1171, 1184 (2006).  To Perry, 
the “rules of the old law merchant,” by which I assume he means the medieval law 
merchant, were “a borderline case of a legal system” in which “all the primary rules 
identified as valid by a rule of recognition might consist of preexisting customary rules 
that hold among . . . some segment of the population.”  He notes that the law merchant 
served as both legal and social rules among merchants.  His discussion of the law 
merchant is incidental; Joanna Jemielniak, Legitimization Arguments in the Lex 
Mercatoria Cases, 18 INT’L J. FOR THE SEMIOTICS OF LAW 175 (2005); Robert Cooter, 
Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating 
the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1654 (1996) for an economic take on 
Hart’s concept of a legal system; Abdul F.M. Maniruzzaman, The Lex Mercatoria and 
International Contracts: A Challenge for International Commercial Arbitration?, 14 AM.
U. INT’L L. REV. 657, 699 (1998), in which the author says that “[i]t is beyond the scope 
of this present paper to examine the status of the lex mercatoria as a legal order or legal 
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Commercial lawyers and analytical legal philosophers are very different 
sorts, working in divergent traditions.  The traditional work of the 
commercial lawyer has been in doctrinal analysis.  Commercial law 
doctrinalists do important work, which needs to be respected, though it 
may have influenced lawyers to focus on an incomplete set of sources for 
commercial law, making them too reliant on national law and national 
projects of unification as the sole or main sources of commercial law. 
Newer commercial law scholarship is based predominantly in law and 
economics, and is increasingly empirical.23  The legal pluralism literature 
offers substantial insights on the law merchant.24  Apart from the legal 
pluralism literature, which can be classified as law and society 
scholarship, the law and society movement has been influential on the 
margins of commercial law scholarship,25 and some of the economic 
research, particularly that which relies on qualitative data and is in the 
new institutional economics tradition, shares affinities with sociological 
methods.26 
system in the light of contemporary analytical theories of legal systems propounded by 
such noted theorists such as Kelsen, Hart and Dworkin,” but then concludes that “[f]or 
our present purpose, it will suffice to say that lex mercatoria, in the Austinian positivistic 
perspective, does not entirely conform to some important features of a legal system, 
namely the characteristics of institutionalization and coerciveness, though it qualifies for 
the normative character.” (footnotes omitted).  Why the author bothers with Austin, 
whose philosophy is only of historical interest, he does not say; Raj Bhala, Applying 
Equilibrium Theory and the FICAS Model: A Case Study of Capital Adequacy and 
Currency Trading, 41 ST. LOUIS L. J. 125, 202 (1996).  Bhala concludes that Hart is to be 
distinguished from Austin because he makes “room for law to be created without formal 
enactment of a sovereign, and many laws confer power on private parties to engage in 
self-regulation.”  Bhala refers to the law merchant as an example.  His aim is not 
philosophical justification, so he offers none.  As explained supra note 13 Teubner offers 
generalizations about how the law merchant meets Hart’s conditions for a legal system, 
but his work is not analytical philosophy and might be seen as a critique of Hart’s work 
as too nationalist.  Teubner, Global Bukowina, supra note 13; Teubner, Breaking Frames, 
supra note 13. 
23. See, e.g., Bernstein, infra note 184 and the work of Ronald Mann as perhaps
early pioneering work in the new wave of empirical commercial law scholarship working 
broadly within the law and economics approach.  http://www.law.columbia.edu/fac/ 
Ronald_Mann (last visited December 24, 2008). 
24. See Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155 (2007) 
(summarizing the legal pluralism literature, providing ways of addressing conflicts 
among norms, and describing legal practices that manage legal pluralism); Teubner, 
Global Bukowina, supra note 13; Teubner, Breaking Frames, supra note 13; 
BONAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARDS A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE (2nd ed. 
2003); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCEITY 125-27 
(2001); Michaels & Jensen, supra note 13; Michaels, supra note 18. 
25. But see Garth & Dezalay, supra note 17, which suggests an important role for
law and society methods in commercial law scholarship, at least for transnational 
conceptions of commercial law. 
26. See supra note 23.
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Legal scholars have relinquished the task of “jurisprudential” 
thought about commercial law to law and economics.  A significant 
addition to the literature on commercial law theory in the past five or so 
years bears the title, The Jurisprudential Foundations of Corporate and 
Commercial Law.27  It contains an excellent set of primarily law and 
economics papers, but the use of the words “jurisprudential foundations” 
is misleading, unless we are willing to concede that economics is almost 
all there is to commercial law.28  One of the major gaps in the philosophy 
of law canon is the near total absence of a philosophical account for 
commercial law.  This article aims to fill that gap. 
I should be clear at the outset that I am not convinced that legal 
positivism can do the job.  This article is partly an exercise in 
understanding the limits of prevailing accounts in analytical philosophy 
and how they may fail to offer adequate descriptions of law in 
globalizing contexts.  Putting the two subjects of transnational 
commercial law and legal positivism together creates tension.  Though 
positivism claims not to rely on the political concepts of state and 
sovereignty, I test to see how far I can use it to conceptualize an area of 
law that has globalized to a pervasive degree.  Positivism claims to be 
descriptive but risks no longer being adequate if it cannot describe the 
spread of norms outside of state control and their relationship to norms 
within state control.  The field of inquiry that may better perform that 
task is legal pluralism.29  I may refer tangentially to some descriptive 
claims by legal pluralists, but this article is not scholarship in legal 
pluralism. 
Part I is a brief introduction to what legal philosophers do when 
they do conceptual analysis.  This article is pitched not only to legal 
philosophers, but also to commercial lawyers and to scholars working on 
commercial law and the law merchant in other disciplines.  Part I is 
needed because there has been some expression of skepticism of the 
relevance of philosophy and conceptual analysis to the law.  Obviously, 
Part I deals with substantial questions with roots deep within the 
discipline of philosophy, and it can offer only a sketch of these questions 
and their answers. 
Part II identifies the plausible sources of commercial law.  These 
sources provide the primary rules in Hart’s legal positivism.  In 
providing that identification, we must identify the law merchant as a 
27. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 
(Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds.2007). 
28. The first sentence of the Kraus and Walt book states: “Efficiency is the dominant
theoretical paradigm in contemporary corporate and commercial law scholarship.”  Id. at 
1. 
29. See supra notes 13, 24 and accompanying text.
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possible source of commercial law.  Part II examines competing claims 
about the law merchant.  It is needed to stipulate the potential scope of 
the question of how we are to understand what commercial law is. 
Lawyers and legal scholars have spilled quite a bit of ink on a number of 
issues about the law merchant.  These include whether there is anything 
to commercial law other than official state law; if the law merchant does 
exist, then what falls within its scope; whether the law merchant has a 
connection to the medieval lex mercatoria, whether the law merchant 
should govern as norms that private actors prefer to govern their private 
relationships and in what circumstances; whether courts have 
incorporated the law merchant into the common law; whether the law 
merchant should be incorporated into state law, and so on.  Part II 
introduces these and other claims.  A point that comes out of Part II is 
that prevailing accounts of the law merchant proponents, who are the 
leading proponents to date of a transnational commercial law order, 
cannot succeed on their own terms in showing that the law merchant is a 
valid source of law in a transnational commercial law order.  The law 
merchant proponents confuse analogous content of legal norms with the 
validity of those norms in a legal system. 
Part III elucidates the central claims of my account.  In Part III I 
ask, using the teachings of legal positivism, whether a system of 
transnational commercial law exists.30  In trying to answer that question, 
I examine the role of the plausible commercial law sources identified in 
Part II.  Part III is an attempt to elucidate a transnational commercial law 
order.  To do this, Part III first identifies two conceptions of legal 
positivism, one a political conception in which states are supreme, and 
the other a cosmopolitan conception in which states coordinate with 
30. I prefer to use “transnational” rather than “international” because the latter
carries with it the notion of the law governing states.  In 1956, Philip Jessup made 
prominent the term “transnational law,” which he defined as “all law which regulates 
actions or events that transcend national frontiers.”  PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL
LAW 2 (1956), quoted in Gralf-Peter Calliess, The Making of Transnational Contract 
Law, 14 INDIANA J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 469 (2008).  A distinction is to be made, 
however, between the concept of transnational law and the concept of the law merchant. 
Transnational law includes all law, regardless of source, regulating conduct that crosses 
national borders.  I have tried in Part II to clarify the concept of the law merchant to 
comprise only a part of transnational law, as commercial law that is not produced by 
states.  The law merchant is thus only one source of transnational law.  See Norbert Horn, 
The Use of Transnational Law in the Contract Law of International Trade and Finance, 
in THE PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 67 (Klaus Peter Berger ed. 2001) (suggesting 
similar definitions).  For an example of the interchangeable use of the terms 
“transnational commercial law” and “new law merchant,” see Christopher R. Drahozal, 
Contracting Out of National Law: An Empirical Look at the New Law Merchant, 80 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 523 (2005). 
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other institutional normative orders.31  My account of a cosmopolitan 
conception of legal positivism tries to dissolve the notion of the state as 
an implicit enabling condition for the law.  A cosmopolitan conception of 
legal positivism, one which removes the state as an enabling condition32 
for a legal system, requires that any candidate for the designation of a 
legal system meet five conditions:  (1) acceptance by the participants in 
the legal system, the norm users,33 of the rules of the order as valid, 
binding, and authoritative; (2) systemic qualities of normative 
consequence within the putative legal system that make the normative 
order the system represents intelligible or comprehensible to the 
participants; (3) secondary rules and secondary rule officials, though they 
can be distributed across different state and non-state hierarchies; 
(4) shared agency between secondary rule officials demonstrating 
sufficient mutual responsiveness and joint commitment for a legal 
system; and (5) primary rules dealing with issues that legal systems 
usually deal with, such as property, contract, and dispute resolution. 
Part III elucidates a transnational commercial legal order around 
these conditions.  I think reasonable arguments can be made that these 
conditions are met for commercial law, but that some considerable 
objections become evident.  The first condition has to do with acceptance 
of a transnational legal order by merchants or professionals.  Merchants 
certainly do accept the rules produced by state and non-state institutions, 
but whether they accept these rules as comprising a transnational system 
of commercial law is doubtful.  The second condition is possibly met 
because there do seem to be some systemic connections in the production 
of state and non-state rules to make commercial law a sensible system for 
the regulation of commercial activity.  Those systemic connections are in 
the complementary ways in which state and non-state institutions 
produce complementary rules that one set of institutions does not make, 
and the other fills the gaps.  The third condition seems to be met. 
Secondary rules and secondary rule officials exist in abundance, in both 
state and non-state institutions to produce a variety of important 
commercial law rules.  As to the fourth condition, Michael Bratman’s 
descriptions of shared agency, in particular his notion of a shared 
intentional activity,34 help answer whether the fourth condition informs 
us of a transnational commercial law order.  There seems to be some 
31. I adapt these two conceptions of legal positivism from Nagel’s description of
two competing conceptions of justice, one political and the other cosmopolitan.  Nagel, 
supra note 14. 
32. Nagel uses similar terminology for different purposes.  Nagel, supra note 14.
33. The “norm users” terminology is from NEIL MACCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS OF
LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL THEORY 20-22 (2007). 
34. See infra notes 329-36 and accompanying text.
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mutual responsiveness and joint commitment of secondary rule officials, 
though, I conclude, some judges and other secondary rule officials tend 
to not remain steadfast nationalists.  The fifth condition is met because 
the primary rules of commercial law deal with social practices that legal 
systems regulate. 
As Part III explains, in addition to the problems a transnational 
conception of a commercial legal order has in meeting all of the five 
conditions, the case is weakened by at least two objections.  One 
objection, the limited domain objection, is that legal systems have not 
been understood as covering a limited sphere of social activity, in 
particular here, commercial life.  Surely no legal system is 
comprehensive in the sense of regulating all human action.  Legal 
systems do not (or should not?) regulate action relating to what liberals 
might call the private side of morality, for example.35  But the limitation 
of a legal system to that of commercial law may go too far; it leaves 
untouched by the law vast areas of human action that legal systems 
almost always regulate.  To limit scope to just commercial law may be 
too implausible.  A second objection, the unity objection, is that it seems 
more plausible to claim that transnational commercial law is better 
understood as a distribution of multiple normative communities across 
state borders that are independent but which coordinate, but to claim that 
they form a unified whole may go too far. 
In the end, while we may encounter obstacles in conceptualizing a 
unified system of transnational commercial law, conceptual analysis is 
about getting clear on our concepts, and in that process of clarification 
we come to improve our understanding of the ways commercial law 
operates on a transnational scale. 
I. THE SO WHAT QUESTION 
Some legal scholars have raised worries about whether philosophy 
can deliver the goods.  The main worry is whether philosophy can be 
prescriptive.36  Law professors, particularly in the U.S., want to know 
35. John Rawls makes similar arguments with his notion of public reason.  JOHN 
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1995). 
36. Philosophers have no difficulties with lack of prescription.  Kwame Anthony
Appiah can get away with saying in the preface of his influential book on the ethics of 
identity: 
My last and most forceful disclaimer . . . is addressed to those who are looking 
for practical guidance, for specific recommendations about precisely what laws 
and institutions will best heal our social and political ills.  Alas, I am a poor 
physician: I’m interested in diagnosis—in etiology and nosology—but not in 
cures.  If an agenda, a set of action items is what you’re after, my one bit of 
practical advice is that you look elsewhere. 
KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY xvii (2005). 
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how a particular theory or approach tells us about whether the law is 
satisfactory, good, right, should be changed, and so on.  Philosophers 
would likely call this task social critique, and some might have the 
opposite worry of the legal scholar—whether philosophers should 
engage in it.37  Brian Bix has expressed frustration with his colleagues’ 
obsession with public policy prescriptions: 
It is important to note the inclination, quite strong among American 
legal academics—less so among theorists from continental 
Europe . . . to want always to know the normative (“bottom line”) 
consequences for any theory they consider.  They find analytical 
legal philosophy . . . deeply frustrating because of its refusal to offer 
prescriptions based on its theoretical claims. 
The response one often finds when presenting an analytical legal 
philosophy paper is something along the lines of, “If your theory has 
no consequences for what we do, for how we practice law, what good 
is it, and what is the point of doing such work?”  In general, I have 
little sympathy for the normative fixation of American legal scholars. 
Of course, critique and prescription are extremely important, but 
there is ample room for knowledge for its own sake—in legal history 
and the history of ideas, for example; and in metaphysics—even if no 
immediate pragmatic use of that knowledge is forthcoming.38 
Bix uses the word “normative” to distinguish between normative and 
conceptual analysis of the law.39  Normative analysis is analysis to 
understand what law’s content is or should be.  When philosophers do 
37. For a summary of the views of several moral philosophers, see  T.M. Scanlon,
The Aims and Authority of Moral Theory, 12 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1992). 
38. Brian Bix, Joseph Raz and Conceptual Analysis, APA NEWSL. ON PHIL. AND L. 1,
3 (2007). 
39. I bracket the claim that the normative can be separated from the conceptual or
the descriptive.  The fact-value distinction has been the subject of a considerable 
philosophical literature.  Hannah Pitkin, for example, provides a Wittgensteinian take on 
the problems with the distinction.  HANNAH F. PITKIN, WITTGENSTEIN AND JUSTICE 177-
178, 219-231 (Berkeley: University of California Press 1993).  Any time one examines 
rules, or reasons for action, the untenability of the distinction is particularly problematic. 
A rule is a description of how one ought to do something.  See id. at 228.  Another way to 
access the critique of the fact-value distinction is through hermeneutics.  For general 
discussions of these issues, see ALEXANDER ROSENBERG, PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 
(2nd ed. 1995); MARTIN HOLLIS, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE: AN INTRODUCTION
(1994).  So, for example, arguments that judges should “say what the law is rather than 
what it should be” are hopelessly confused, because the very pronouncement of what “is” 
pronounces what “ought to be.”  The problems with inserting the fact-value distinction 
into the judicial process or any sort of adjudicatory process are many.  Hart and other 
legal positivists, going back to Bentham, accept the distinction between what the law is 
and what it ought to be.  H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 
71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958).  It is beyond the scope of this article to take on these 
substantial questions. 
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normative jurisprudence, they inquire whether the law’s content meets or 
should meet some normative criterion fixed by theories of justice, 
deontological ethics, or consequentialist theories such as utilitarianism. 
An economic theorist claiming that the law should be efficient is doing 
normative economics, usually normative welfare economics.  When 
philosophers do analytical jurisprudence, they are not doing normative 
analysis, but conceptual analysis.  When philosophers do conceptual 
analysis, however, they look for law’s normativity, but in a different 
way.  They want to describe how that normativity works in the legal 
system.  They look for it in the existence of conditions that makes law 
what it is, and not in its content.  So, philosophers look to why law 
makes a claim of obedience on persons, not on what the content of that 
claim of obedience is or should be. 
What is conceptual analysis?  Ludwig Wittgenstein, one of the most 
influential figures in twentieth century analytical philosophy, said that 
philosophy is an “activity of clarification.”40  According to Joseph Raz, 
“conceptual analysis concerns the logical features of concepts.”41  To 
combine Wittgenstein’s and Raz’s insights, we use conceptual analysis to 
get clear on the meaning of concepts.42  The idea is that we should strive 
to understand the meaning of, say, legal obligation, right, duty, justice, 
and so on to the humans who actually use the concepts in their everyday 
speaking of a public language.  But as Raz explains, we must not be 
“slaves of words.”43  Language reveals beliefs and attitudes.44  In 
conceptual analysis, we want to get to the propositional content of those 
beliefs and attitudes in the way the speakers of a language use the 
language.  Analytical philosophy, at least in the way it is done here, is 
not concerned with the discovery of external entities or properties 
independent of human existence.  “Obligation,” legal, moral or 
otherwise, is not some metaphysically real thing, furniture of the 
universe.45  It is what it means to us, and we access what it means to us 
40. P.M.S. HACKER, INSIGHT AND ILLUSION 151 (Rev. ed. 1986); MARIE MCGINN,
WITTGENSTEIN AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 12-16 (1997). 
41. RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS, supra note 12, at 10.
42. The suggestion here is not that Wittgenstein and Raz agree on the task of
philosophy.  Wittgentein raised doubts about whether conceptual analysis was worth 
doing.  Brian Leiter, Introduction in THE FUTURE FOR PHILOSOPHY 3 (Brian Leiter ed., 
2003).  Raz, on the other hand, is one of the most preeminent of analytical legal 
philosophers who use conceptual analysis. 
43. JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 41
(1979). 
44. Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, Hard Positivism, and the Limits of Conceptual
Analysis, in BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL
REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 123-25 (2007). 
45. The phrase “furniture of the universe” is often attributed to J.L MACKIE, ETHICS: 
INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG (1990), though it does not appear in the book.  It is 
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through the analysis of concepts we use in ordinary speech.  To continue 
with the example of the concept of obligation, Hart used conceptual 
analysis to distinguish between being obliged and having an obligation.46 
I want to go back to what I will call Bix’s point, because I have to 
convince the skeptical legal scholar that this article is worth reading. 
Bix’s point centers on the “so what” question.  The question lawyers are 
prone to ask about philosophy of law is “so what.”  So what does 
philosophy tell us about commercial law that we do not already know? 
What is the point of having a philosophy of commercial law?  After all, 
isn’t commercial law all about economics, since it concerns interactions 
that are inherently economic in character?  Philosophy can tell us a great 
deal about commercial law. 
If some legal scholars lose patience with philosophical analysis, 
then it is up to those of us who do it to show why our work deserves 
respect, though I concede the point that in the interdisciplinary world in 
which American law professors are situated, that is difficult.  Those who 
work in legal philosophy are in a good position to use their skills to 
engage in wide reflective equilibrium and take into account all 
considered judgments, economic, doctrinal, ethical, critical, and so on, in 
reaching conclusions about the law.47 
commonly used to refer to approaches to practical philosophy in which concepts are 
understood as metaphysically real. 
46. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 8, at 82-84; WILLIAM LUCY, 
PHILOSOPHY OF PRIVATE LAW 4 (2007). 
47. Legal philosophers working in the Rawlsian tradition talk of “working out”
claims and justifications using what Rawls described as reflective equilibrium.  Rawls 
distinguished between narrow and wide reflective equilibrium.  When we engage in 
narrow reflective equilibrium, we work back and forth between moral judgments about 
particular situations and general reasons and principles.  We attempt to link moral 
judgments to the general reasons and principles.  So, two considered moral (legal, 
political) judgments might be that “people have a right to avoid a contract procured 
through fraud” and “banks should not honor checks they know to have been altered 
through forgery.”  These particular judgments are linked to general principles like “all 
persons have the right to be treated fairly and honestly by other persons,” with the 
concepts of fairness and honesty having working out understandings, which in turn link 
to more abstract principles such as “the state should secure for its citizens all purpose 
means to achieve whatever good life they happen to choose.”  When we engage in wide 
reflective equilibrium, we probe and question our general reasons and principles, and do 
not accept them as givens.  In wide reflective equilibrium, we “widen the circle of 
justificatory beliefs.”  NORMAN DANIELS, JUSTICE AND JUSTIFICATION: REFLECTIVE 
EQUILIBRIUM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 1 (1996).  It is “the process of bringing to bear the 
broadest evidence and critical scrutiny one can, drawing on all the different moral and 
non-moral beliefs and theories that arguably are relevant to our selection of principles or 
adherence to our moral judgments.”  Id. at 1-2.  “The key idea underlying the method of 
[wide] reflective equilibrium is that we ‘test’ various parts of our system of moral beliefs 
against other beliefs we hold, seeking coherence among the widest set of moral and non-
moral beliefs by revising and refining them at all levels.”  Id.  In wide reflective 
equilibrium we can consider not only moral theories but social science theories and 
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Bix is right:  prescription need not always be the end product of all 
inquiries about the law.  For example, an approach to doing doctrinal 
analysis is to defer to the policy choices of courts, legislatures, and other 
official sources, and to seek to clarify the law, while carefully avoiding 
any effort to prescribe what is beyond what is intended by official 
sources to be the meaning of the law in question.48  The aim of empirical 
studies of the law is often ground clearing and clarifying, designed to 
reveal how our folk intuitions about the effects of the law or about social 
problems are wrong.  More generally, conceptual analysis shares with 
science the aim of discovery of truth.  Some important empirical work in 
commercial law fulfills precisely such descriptive or truth-seeking 
purpose, though prescription inevitably follows from description, 
because the description has found something wrong.  If a bankruptcy 
scholar concludes that the Bankruptcy Code is not doing what it is 
supposed to be doing, with the “supposed to be doing” previously 
decided under some pre-existing normative framework, then a proposal 
for changing the law inexorably follows.49 
Conceptual analysis need not, as a matter of necessity, only produce 
knowledge for its own sake and lack prescriptive significance in all 
cases.  It can be prescriptive, in the sense that it requires us to consider 
new perspectives, new ways of seeing what has always been there and 
always been familiar and obvious.  Wittgenstein tells us that philosophy 
provides us with “observations which no one has doubted, but which 
have escaped remark only because they are always before our eyes.”50  
So, it has always been an obvious feature of commercial life that norms 
empirical findings.  Id. at 6.  We thus can use economics.  So, in our examples above, we 
might want to determine whether our considered moral judgments about fraud and 
forgery cohere with efficiency, least cost avoider arguments, and so on.  
48. If normativity is as pervasive as I suggest, neutrality as to the meaning of the law
seems implausible.  But consider the discussion in a research colloquium at the 
University of East Anglia Law School some years ago.  The colloquium was on Jill 
Morgan’s article on whether the UK Human Rights Act applies to the registered social 
landlords in the UK.  Registered social landlords are quasi-public entities that are 
managing the increasingly privatized public housing stock in the UK.  Jill Morgan, The 
Alchemists’ Search for the Philosophers’ Stone: The Status of Registered Social 
Landlords under the Human Rights Act, 66 MOD. L. REV. 700 (2003).  In the workshop, I 
asked whether the Act should apply to these public authorities.  The answer I got back 
expressed some doubt about whether such questions are within the scope of legal 
analysis.  To an American legal academic, the answer might seem non-responsive.  The 
answer, however, is acceptable to many legal scholars outside of the United States, who 
engage in the sort of rigorous doctrinal analysis underlying Morgan’s answer.  This is not 
meant as a criticism of that approach. 
49. See, e.g., ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME
TRAP (2004); TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK,
THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT (2000). 
50. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS ¶ 415 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 2001). 
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come from outside of official, nation-state dominated legal sources, but it 
has been difficult for lawyers to recognize the full implications of such 
norms and how they might work in commercial dispute resolution. 
Conceptual analysis might shed light and lead to prescription.  It has the 
potential to offer important insights about commercial law, and these 
insights have the potential to change the way we “do” commercial law as 
an activity in the world.  A positivist account of a domestic legal order 
that no one disputes exists at a mature level of development might offer 
few new insights, but when we use analytical jurisprudence to discover 
whether a legal order exists in the first place, from sources we always 
knew existed but which present themselves to us in a new light once we 
apply philosophical techniques to them, then we might learn a great deal, 
enough so that prescriptions may indeed follow inevitably from our new 
insights.51  When we elucidate the concept of commercial law in a 
transnational context, we have the potential to make a significant 
contribution to the discussion of whether the law merchant is law, a 
question that has puzzled lawyers across the globe for a long time. 
Gunther Teubner, who has written some of the most theoretically rich 
and sophisticated work on the status of the law merchant as law, explains 
that “[t]he debate on lex mercatoria is one of the rare cases in which 
practical legal decision-making becomes directly dependent on legal 
theory.”52  Our new insights could change the way we understand 
commercial law. 
That this chapter provides a conceptual analysis of the concept of 
commercial law does not mean that no empirical propositions enter into 
the analysis.  What is to follow has elements of what has become known 
as applied philosophy.  The work that is to be done might eventually 
become what is known as social theory.53  To get clear on what 
commercial law is, we shall have to understand institutions that produce 
commercial law.  To understand these institutions we need to dig deep 
into what philosophers call social practices.  When we seek to describe 
51. A potentially fruitful line of inquiry would be to use analytical jurisprudence to
promote understanding of legal orders in developing countries.  This line of inquiry has 
not been pursued, likely because legal philosophers and law and development scholars 
work in divergent fields of legal scholarship. 
52. Teubner, Global Bukowina, supra note 13, at 8; see also Michaels, The True Lex
Mercatoria, supra note 18, at 449-52 (discussing Teubner’s theory).  Teubner uses 
systems theory and autopoiesis to understand the lex mercatoria and the globalization of 
law generally.  See GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM (Wiley-
Blackwell 1993). 
53. The sociologist Anthony Giddens characterizes social theory as an umbrella: “It
is a body of theory shared in common by all the disciplines concerned with the behaviour 
of human beings.  It concerns not only sociology, therefore, but anthropology, 
economics, politics, human geography, psychology—the whole range of the social 
sciences.”  ANTHONY GIDDENS, PROFILES AND CRITIQUES IN SOCIAL THEORY 5 (1982). 
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social practices, we cannot deny that we are uncovering facts, which may 
then be classified as empirical work, though it is nothing more than what 
lawyers might do when they describe and evaluate legal institutions. 
When we inquire of the social practices of our putative legal orders, we 
want to understand what commercial law is; is it only the declarations of 
government officials who work for nation-states, or is it something else 
or more? 
II. COMMERCIAL LAW SOURCES AND COMPETING CLAIMS ABOUT THE
LAW MERCHANT
This part identifies, in a Hartian conception of legal rules, the
primary rules of commercial law.  At least a plausible claim can be made 
that to limit oneself to considering only the municipal law of nation-
states, with extensions of that law based on treaties and conventions 
entered into by states, as the only possible sources of commercial law, 
can lead to a serious misunderstanding of the nature of commercial law. 
I make the case here for identification only of plausible sources.  I do not 
want to beg the question of what commercial law is, as that question 
would have to be conceptually justified, which is the subject of Part III. 
What would be the reasons for a municipal law restriction? It would 
seem to be in the nature of an arbitrary stipulation, unrelated to the law 
and its structure, but instead based on historical artifact, politics, and 
nationalism.  States are arbitrary and involuntary associations.54  
Domestic legal systems exist within what Gunther Teubner calls a “high 
degree of institutional insulation”55 and that insulation is the product of a 
political conception of the law centering on nation-states.  Says Teubner, 
“[f]or nation-building in the past, unity of the law was one of the main 
political assets—a symbol of national identity. . . .”56  These claims are 
not unique to Teubner,57 though he makes them in the context of 
54. Nagel, supra note 14, at 128, 133, 146.
55. Teubner, Global Bukowina, supra note 13, at 3, 8.
56. Id.
57. Teubner, Global Bukowina, supra note 13, at 3.  The connection of law and
codification to national identity is not unique to Teubner.  See, e.g., MICHAEL JOHN,
POLITICS AND LAW IN LATE NINETEENTH-CENTURY GERMANY: THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL 
CODE 6-7 (1989) (“Codification was . . . widely regarded as an integral part of the process 
of state formation. . . .  From the start of the nineteenth century, codification was linked 
to nationalism.”); R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, EUROPEAN LAW IN THE PAST AND THE FUTURE:
UNITY AND DIVERSITY OVER TWO MILLENNIA 94 (2002), in the context of Germany: 
No matter how strongly scholars disagreed about the merits of native vs. 
Roman law, their contest would not have been so dramatic if other, i.e., 
political, considerations had not been involved.  The quarrel was so violent 
because it concerned political feelings.  It was all about the very touchy issue of 
national against foreign law: what could have been more burning in the young, 
proud nation state?  National pride, the ethnic interpretation of history and the 
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supporting his claim that the law merchant is part of what he calls global 
law without a state.58  Teubner seems to be making a point about the 
historical conditions for unifying European law in the nineteenth century 
using the great civil codes of the time,59 but his points are sufficiently 
universal so that they can be reasonably applied to the American 
experience. 
Related to the problem of arbitrary association is incompleteness:  If 
we only consider domestic and state-created international sources for 
commercial law, a plausible argument could be made that we have a 
seriously incomplete picture of what commercial law consists in, and our 
answers to legal problems might be wrong.  Indeed, norms that non-state 
actors create might be more important to commercial actors than state-
created norms.60  The incompleteness point should be obvious to lawyers 
but I hope to make it clearer below. 
Think of commercial law from the standpoint of the actors in the 
world who use it.  Firms are increasingly multinational.  This chapter is 
not the place to discuss law and globalization in a comprehensive way, 
but let’s think of these questions from the interests of the sorts of clients 
our law graduates may represent.  For firms to rely solely on U.S. 
markets is a risky strategy.  A recent report in the Wall Street Journal of 
Hershey’s exposure to the risk of being only in the domestic market 
illustrates the problem of a “domestic only” strategy.61  The business 
community saw Hershey’s strategy as so unusual that it is news reported 
in the Wall Street Journal.  Hershey is aware of its problems and is 
trying to expand to global markets through a potential business 
combination with Cadbury PLC, but that will be difficult because 
Hershey, relying only on U.S. markets, cannot finance such a 
combination and still retain control.  Hershey’s market, the U.S. market, 
is the largest domestic economy in the world by far, but still, to rely only 
on a domestic market for sales is risky.  Hershey’s competitors generate 
substantial revenues in markets globally, which they use to finance their 
operations. 
Global business is such a common phenomenon today that MBA 
programs often require MBA students to complete a course in global 
romantic Volkgeist theory formed a potent current from the late eighteenth 
century onwards. 
58. Teubner, Global Bukowina, supra note 13; Teubner, Breaking Frames, supra
note 13. 
59. See JOHN, supra note 57.
60. Berman, supra note 24, at 1177-78.
61. Julie Jargon, Can Hershey Survive Candy Wars?  Trust’s “No Sale” Leaves
Company Relying on U.S. as a Global Giant Looms, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2008, at B1. 
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strategic management.62  As one of the core readings in such courses, 
written in 1989, explains to first year MBAs: 
Many forces are driving companies around the world to globalize by 
expanding their participation in foreign markets.  Almost every 
product market in the major world economies—computers, fast food, 
nuts and bolts—has foreign competitors.  Trade barriers are also 
falling. . . .  Japan is gradually opening up its long barricaded 
markets.  Maturity in domestic markets is also driving companies to 
seek international expansion.  This is particularly true of U.S. 
companies that, nourished by the huge domestic market, have 
typically lagged behind their European and Japanese rivals in 
internationalization.63 
Firms are way ahead of law reformers and governments in 
understanding the need for thinking of commercial law transnationally. 
While Teubner tells us of the problem of institutional insulation, Hershey 
illustrates for us the problem of economic insulation.  Karl Llewellyn and 
Grant Gilmore, the legal realists who were the prime movers of the UCC 
at its inception, with their emphasis on facts and context, would be 
international (or transnational!) lawyers in the twenty-first century. 
What has been said so far in justification of a cosmopolitan 
perspective on commercial law comes only from North American or 
“large market” perspective.  We can leave aside our biases and examine 
the issue from the standpoint of “small market” countries, be they a 
developing country, such as Uganda, or an industrialized country, such 
as Ireland.64  The conclusion is the same, but the facts make it all the 
more inevitable.  These countries do not have the luxury of institutional 
or economic isolation.  For a small market industrialized country, 
international transacting is a necessity; the country does not produce 
sufficient goods and services to maintain economic autonomy, and the 
country likely depends on exports to generate wealth for its citizens, 
since its domestic market is too small to do so.  A developing country 
62. See, e.g., Wharton Business School’s curriculum, in particular its Global
Strategic Management course.  Core Curriculum, MBA Resource Guide, The Wharton 
School of the University of Pennsylvania, http://www.wharton.upenn.edu/mbaresource/ 
curriculum/core/index.cfm#mgmt655 (last visited July 3, 2008). 
63. George S.  Yip, Global Strategy . . . In a World of Nations?, 31 SLOAN MGMT.
REV. 29 (1989).  This article is required reading in Professor Stephen J. Kobrin’s Global 
Strategic Management course at Wharton.  http://www-management.wharton.upenn.edu/ 
OLD%20WEB/CourseScreens/Syllabi/Spring2005/655_Kobrin_Spring05.pdf (last 
visited July 3, 2008). 
64. Angelo Forte, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods: Reason and Unreason in the United Kingdom, 26 BALT. L. REV. 50, 58
(1997) (Scottish and English interests diverge on the ratification of the Vienna 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods or CISG). 
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faces similar issues, but we must add to the mix its institutional 
deficiencies.  Developing countries often lack adequate judicial, law 
enforcement, and regulatory institutions.  Purchase a book on Ugandan 
contract law, and it is likely that the book is full of English case law.65  
Legal systems of many developing countries are simply too undeveloped 
to have generated a body of principles over the course of time, and 
lawyers in the country must be versed in the laws of other countries, 
usually that of the country’s old colonial ruler.  Public procurement 
officers for developing country governments must be well versed in 
international sale of goods law and other areas of international 
commercial law because supplies and services of any good or service of 
even a modicum of complexity or value have to be imported. 
Construction contracting is a substantial series of international legal 
events in developing countries. 
Commercial lawyers, regardless of national origin, thus should have 
a thoroughly cosmopolitan perspective.  If I am right, no rigid 
distinctions exist between the domestic and the international when 
conceptualizing commercial law as a legal category, though in the sphere 
of application to discrete legal problems for clients, certainly some 
problems will be wholly domestic in scope. 
If we are to consider all possible sources for commercial law 
regardless of state borders, then at least eleven possible sources of 
commercial law exist:  (1) municipal or domestic commercial legislation; 
(2) judgments by municipal courts interpreting domestic legislation; 
(3) municipal case law; (4) commercial treaties or conventions between 
and among states; (5) interpretations of international commercial treaties 
or conventions by municipal courts; (6) law merchant that private 
legislatures or rule-making bodies create, for either domestic or 
transnational transactions, which I call legislated law merchant; 
(7) interpretations of legislated law merchant by municipal courts; 
(8) interpretations of legislated law merchant by arbitrators; 
(9) “unwritten” law merchant or custom, which evolves but is not 
promulgated in a discrete rule-making event.  I call this form of law 
merchant “evolved” or “customary” law merchant to distinguish it from 
legislated law merchant.  As with the legislated version of the law 
merchant, the evolved version of the law merchant may be for wholly 
domestic markets or for transnational markets, though my examples 
below relate only to transnational markets; (10) interpretation and 
creation of evolved or customary law merchant by courts and arbitrators; 
and (11) general or fundamental principles of law.  All of these need 
more explanation and clarification, particularly the law merchant 
65. DAVID J. BAKIBINGA, LAW OF CONTRACT IN UGANDA (2001).
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categories, which may not be self-evident.  At this point, the list is 
stipulative and broad in the sense that it contains possible sources.  And, 
given the breadth of the list, the discussion to follow can only be an 
incomplete sketch of the sources.  One sense in which it is stipulative is 
its segregation of similar concepts, such as municipal case law and 
evolved law merchant, and municipal legislation and legislated law 
merchant.  These segregations are designed to achieve clarity, and to 
avoid making assumptions about what requires conceptual justification. 
As well, the identification is conservative, staying close to the traditional 
conception of legal categories as they are understood in municipal legal 
systems.  In addition, the discussion to follow merges some of these 
categories when they relate to each other. 
Some of what I am about to say about the noncontroversial 
categories of commercial law may seem basic, but I want to lay out each 
of the categories, to make clear distinctions between them.  This is 
necessary because the literature on the law merchant is often lacking in 
the sort of clarity strived for in analytical philosophy, and some writers 
have conceptualized the law merchant in loose and contradictory ways.66  
As a result, the use of the phrase “law merchant” might be very different 
as between different lawyers, arbitrators, and legal scholars. 
A. Domestic Commercial Legislation 
First and most obviously is domestic legislation.  The Uniform 
Commercial Code is an example of domestic legislation.  The American 
commercial law codification movement began in earnest in 1892 with the 
creation by the American Bar Association, at the urgings of the New 
York Legislature, of the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL).67  Of course, the need for codification 
in the United States was obvious.  M.D. Chalmers, one of the prime 
movers of English commercial law codification, said in 1903:  “In the 
United States, the case for codifying mercantile law is stronger than in 
England.  I am told that an American lawyer who wishes to keep abreast 
of the current of judicial decision has to take in some fifty-eight volumes 
of Law Reports ever year.”68  Two waves of legislation69 culminated in 
66. See infra notes 329-36 and accompanying text.
67. Uniform Law Commission: The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=0& 
tabid=11 (last visited July 3, 2008); see Mitchell Franklin, On the Legal Method of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 16 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 330 (1951). 
68. M.D. Chalmers, Codification of Commercial Law, 19 L. Q. REV. 10, 17 (1903).  I
trust the reader sees why Chalmer’s quote may be amusing to lawyers today! 
69. See Robert Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code,
58 COLUM. L. REV. 798 (1958). 
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the Uniform Commercial Code, the definitive version of which appeared 
first in 1957 and then with minor changes in 1958 and 1962.70 
English law went through a codification movement in the nineteenth 
century similar to the movement that occurred in the United States, but 
unlike in the United States, which opted for wholesale reform through 
the Uniform Commercial Code, many of the English commercial 
statutes, with some piecemeal modification, remain in force today.71 
Countries in the civil law tradition also have commercial codes. 
France’s is the Code de Commerce of 1807, redrafted in 2000 and the 
Germany’s is the Handelsgesetzbuch of 1900.72  Some countries, such as 
Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, have abolished commercial 
codes and regulate commercial transactions through their civil codes.73 
It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the differences in 
codification as between common law and civil law countries.  Significant 
differences cut across several levels.  A code in a civil law country is a 
very different institution from a code in a common law country.  In 
addition, a commercial code in a civil law country exists within an 
established hierarchy in which it is subservient to the civil code in the 
event the two codes are inconsistent.74  The UCC differs substantially 
from a commercial code in a civil law country. 
Covered here are only the potential sources of commercial law, but 
nothing has been said about scope.  The question of scope identifies even 
more differences as between civil law and common law 
conceptualizations of commercial law.  What activity does the notion of 
commercial law cover?  The question becomes important when we 
attempt to compare commercial law notions in common law and civil 
law traditions.  The civilians use the general criterion of commerciality to 
determine what gets classified as commercial law.75  Because the notion 
of commerciality governs what gets classified as commercial law, 
70. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 3-5 (5th
ed. 2000). 
71. ROBERT BRADGATE, COMMERCIAL LAW 10 (3d ed. 2000).
72. JAN H. DALHUISEN, DALHUISEN ON TRANSNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL AND TRADE LAW 17 (3d ed. 2007). 
73. Id. at 22.
74. Tomes have been so written.  For an introductory treatment, see JOHN HENRY
MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF
WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 26-33 (2d ed. 1985). 
75. DALHUISEN ON TRANSNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL
AND TRADE LAW, supra note 72, at 16-22; Jim C. Chen, Code, Custom, and Contract: 
The Uniform Commercial Code as Law Merchant, 27 TEX. INT’L L. J. 91, 94 (1992) (“The 
UCC is not a code in the Continental sense.  Short of a ‘preemptive, systematic, and 
comprehensive enactment of a whole field of law,’ the UCC deviates from the 
Continental model of a strictly commercial code with special procedures and rules 
tailored for merchants.”) (citations omitted). 
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commercial codes in civil law countries cover only the transactions of 
merchants and professionals.  Common law countries do not rely on such 
over-arching ideas unconnected to solving a particular problem for a 
client, and with no conceptual difficulty classify transactions involving 
consumers, even when consumers are on both sides of the transaction, as 
commercial law.  Indeed, a common law lawyer might find time spent 
trying to understand these demarcation issues as a waste of time because 
it is not action guiding in the context of solving a particular legal 
problem.  In the United States, consumer bankruptcy is a core 
commercial law subject, but in a civil law country, it would not be so 
classified.  The UCC is full of provisions relevant to consumer 
transactions and whether those provisions provide adequate protection to 
consumers is a question of considerable debate.76  As well, a substantial 
and primarily federal legislation protects consumers, and American law 
professors have no qualms about the inclusion of this legislation within 
the commercial law curriculum.77  The American commercial lawyer 
might spend much of her time inquiring about the effects of the law on 
consumers and still call herself a commercial lawyer.78  In the United 
States, commercial law scholars see as alien to their work divisions that 
would put consumers in a different legal category on their own.  Still that 
does not mean that consumers are treated the same as merchants, and 
American lawyers tend to classify consumer issues for special coverage 
both inside and outside of the Uniform Commercial Code.79  The Article 
76. See, e.g., Charles W. Mooney Jr., The Consumer Compromise in Revised U.C.C.
Article 9: The Shame of it All, 68 OHIO ST. L. J. 215 (2007); Caroline Edwards, Article 2 
of the Uniform Commercial Code and Consumer Protection: The Refusal to Experiment, 
78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 663 (2004). 
77. The federal legislation and implementing federal regulation by the Federal Trade
Commission, where applicable, includes the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 2301-2312, and implementing regulations, 16 C.F.R. Parts 700-03; the Consumer 
Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r and the Unfair Credit Practices 
Regulations, 16 C.F.R. §§ 444.1-.5.  The Consumer Credit Protection Act includes the 
Truth in Lending Act (Title I), the Fair Credit Reporting Act (Title VI), the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act (Title VIII), and the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (Title IX); 
see, e.g., Donald F. Clifford, Non-UCC Statutory Provisions Affecting Warranty 
Disclaimers and Remedies in Sales of Goods, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1011 (1993). 
78. Bankruptcy and consumer debt have been the subject of a substantial literature.
Bankruptcy law has been the focus of particular attention in recent years.  This is not the 
place for an exhaustive survey.  For a sample of the bankruptcy literature, see CHARLES J.
TABB, BANKRUPTCY ANTHOLOGY (2002).  The 2008 financial crisis will prompt an even 
more intense consumer focus.  See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making 
Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1649 (2009). 
79. Francis J. Facciolo, Father Knows Best: Revised Article 8 and the Individual
Investor, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 615 (2000); Marion W. Benfield, Consumer Provisions in 
Revised Article 9, 74 CHI. KENT L. REV. 1255 (1999); Jean Braucher, Deadlock: 
Consumer Transactions Under Revised Article 9, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 83 (1999); Fred 
Miller, Consumers and the Code: The Search for the Proper Formula, 75 WASH. U. L. Q. 
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2B project failed largely because it was seen as treating consumers 
unfairly.80  Even in English law, commercial and consumer law tend to 
be seen as distinct fields of inquiry; English statutes might not break out 
quite as clearly as they do in on the continent, but generally English law 
more clearly demarcates between the law governing merchants and the 
law protecting consumers than in the United States, at least as academic 
lawyers conceptualize the field.81 
B. Municipal Court Decisions Interpreting Domestic Commercial 
Legislation 
The second possible source of commercial law is domestic court 
decisions interpreting domestic legislation.  These cases may or may not 
be decided within legal systems that recognize the concept of 
precedent.82  For courts that do not create precedent, still, their decisions 
may be influential for other reasons having to do with ensuring 
consistency and uniformity in the law.83  That the holdings of these 
187 (1997); Kathleen Patchel & Amelia H.  Boss, Consumer Transactions and the Code: 
Some Considerations, 51 BUS. LAW. 1343 (1996). 
80. See Jean Braucher, The Failed Promise of the UCITA Mass-Market Concept and
its Lessons for Policing of Standard Form Contracts, 7 SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 393
(2003); Jean Braucher, Briefing Paper for the National Conference of State Legislatures, 
March 2001, http://www ncsl.org/programs/lis/cip/CIPCOMM/braucher0301 htm (last 
visited July 4, 2008); Michael Rustad, Making UCITA More Consumer-Friendly, 18 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO L. 547 (1999). 
81. It is not unusual for British law professors to hold chairs in consumer protection
law alone. 
An example of the demarcation is secured transactions law, which in English law is 
known as credit and security law.  In English law, there are two registries for security 
interests, one for security interests in property owned by individuals and the other for 
security interests in property owned by companies.  Bills of Sales Act 1878; Bills of Sales 
(Amendment) Act 1882, as amended; Companies Act 1985 §§395, 396; Bradgate, supra 
note 71, at 495-500. 
82. I avoid the simplistic notion that common law jurisdictions recognize the
concept of precedent while civil law jurisdictions do not.  These sorts of broad 
generalizations are often inaccurate because they fail to capture the nature of judicial 
decision-making.  These concerns are well beyond the scope of this article.  For a 
discussion of these issues by a German law professor, see Katja Funken, The Best of Both 
Worlds—The Trend Towards Convergence of the Civil Law and the Common Law System 
(July 2003).  Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=476461 (last visited July 4, 
2008). 
83. Following a previous court decision because it is precedent is a different reason
for following it because it is a well decided, just, fair, efficient, promotes consistency or 
uniformity in the law, and so on.  To follow a decision because it is precedent means that 
“[t[he previous treatment of occurrence X in manner Y constitutes, solely because of its 
historical pedigree, a reason for treating X in manner Y if and when X again occurs.” 
Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 572 (1987).  The elucidation of the 
concept of precedent could go further by further specifying what it means to have a 
reason to treat X in manner Y.  If precedent is to have a mandatory feature, it must be 
more than a reason, it must be an overriding reason, something in the nature of a reason 
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decisions serve as independent sources of the law is undisputed in 
common law countries and certainly plausible in civil law countries. 
An example of how a court operating under this second category 
both “interprets” and “makes” commercial law is the Maine Supreme 
Judicial Court decision in Maine Family Credit Union v. Sun Life 
Assurance Co. of Canada.84  The principal issue in that case was whether 
a credit union that accepted for deposit fraudulently indorsed checks was 
a holder in due course and therefore not subject to defenses of the 
drawer, an insurance company that issued the checks to beneficiaries 
defrauded by the credit union’s customers.  A holder in due course of a 
negotiable instrument is someone who takes the instrument for value, 
without “apparent evidence of forgery or alteration,” in good faith, and 
without notice of claims and defenses specified in UCC § 3-302(a).85  
The Credit Union’s holder in due course status depended on whether it 
met the good faith requirement.  In 1990, the NCCUSL and the ALI 
revised Article 3 to reflect an objective good faith standard.86  Section 3-
103(a)(6) of the UCC now requires holders to prove good faith by 
showing “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial 
standards of fair dealing.”87  The second part of the standard—
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing—adds the 
objective element.88  The prior definition only required the holder to 
prove “honesty in fact,” a subjective standard, to show good faith.89  In 
interpreting the Code before the revision, with few exceptions courts 
that at least in ordinary cases trumps all other reasons.  Elaboration of these points is well 
beyond our scope here. 
84. Me. Family Credit Union v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 727 A.2d 335 (Me.
1999). 
85. UCC § 3-302(a); see also Any Kind Checks Cashed v. Talcott, 830 So.2d 160
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). 
86. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 70, at 522.
87. UCC § 3-103(a)(6).
88. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 70, at 522.
89. In the early days of the UCC, the drafters disputed whether the test for good faith
in UCC Article 3 should be objective or subjective.  The subjective test prevailed until 
the latest revision in 1990.  The apparent source of the difficulty is a nineteenth century 
English case, Gill v. Cubitt, 3 B. & C. 466, 107 Eng. Rep. 806 (K.B. 1824), which 
applied an objective test of good faith.  The 1945 UCC Permanent Editorial Board 
Recommendations expressly rejected Gill’s approach.  WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 
70, at 522.  Though U.S. lawyers have had difficulty with this case, English lawyers have 
not.  Gill is not even cited in Roy Goode’s foundational English Commercial law text, 
and subjective good faith is summarily stated to be the English law on the subject without 
any equivocation.  See ROY GOODE, COMMERCIAL LAW 602 (1995).  Here is not the place 
for extended discussion, but English law has historically had difficulties with the notion 
of good faith.  Id. at 100-01.  For an example of how practitioners might advise clients 
unfamiliar with English law, see Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, English Law—
Potential Hazards—Briefing (April 2006), www freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2006/ 
14422.pdf (last visited June 3, 2009). 
146 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 114:1
refused to incorporate an objective element into the good-faith 
standard.90  But the addition of more words and standards to a statute 
does not necessarily mean that the statute becomes clearer or more 
certain.  As the Maine Supreme Judicial Court explained in Maine 
Family Federal Credit Union, “The new objective standard . . . is not a 
model of drafting clarity.”91  The Code does not furnish a standard for 
“fair dealing” but the UCC Official Comments distinguish fair dealing, 
which is part of the good faith standard, from careful dealing, which is 
not.92  It is up to courts to supply a standard.  Maine Family Federal 
Credit Union provides the following: 
The factfinder must . . . determine, first, whether the conduct of the 
holder comported with industry or “commercial” standards applicable 
to the transaction, and, second, whether those standards were 
reasonable standards intended to result in fair dealing.  Each of those 
determinations must be made in the context of the specific transaction 
at hand.  If the factfinder’s conclusion on each point is “yes,” the 
holder will be determined to have acted in good faith even if, in the 
individual transaction at issue, the result appears unreasonable.  Thus 
a holder may be accorded holder in due course status where it acts 
pursuant to those reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing—
even if it is negligent—but may lose that status, even where it 
complies with commercial standards, if those standards are not 
reasonably related to achieving fair dealing.93 
The case was on appeal from a jury verdict against the credit 
union.94  Applying this standard, the court in Maine Family Federal 
Credit Union held that a jury could have found that the failure of the 
credit union to place a hold on uncollected funds exceeding $120,000 
drawn on an out-of-state bank fails to comply with the fair dealing 
requirement.95 
C. Domestic Common Law 
The third possible source of commercial law is domestic common 
law unconnected to statutes.  UCC  Section 1-103(b) provides:  “Unless 
displaced by the particular provisions of [the Uniform Commercial 
Code], the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and 
the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, 
90. See Maine Family Fed. Credit Union v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 727 A.2d 335,
340-41 (Me. 1999). 
91. Id. at 342.
92. See id. at 342-43.
93. Id. at 343.
94. Id. at 338.
95. Id. at 343-44.
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fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, and 
other validating or invalidating cause supplement its provisions.”96  
White and Summers explain that “[i]t is neither possible nor desirable to 
put all (or even nearly all) commercial law into a code.”97  Despite 
nationwide codification in the United States, a significant common law 
of commercial law still exists.  Lender liability cases are a good 
example,98 as are cases involving marshaling of assets.99  The emerging 
unjust enrichment cases in which unsecured creditors have a claim in 
restitution against secured creditors upon which they have conferred 
benefits offer examples of the tension between a rigid Article 9 that 
preempts the field and the need for courts to achieve justice.100  Agency 
law can be understood as commercial law, and it is almost entirely the 
product of court decisions. 
If we examine jurisdictions with codification not as preemptive as 
the UCC, we find even more case law.  In English law there is a more 
frequent use of trusts in commercial contexts.  The Quistclose trust is an 
example.101  In a Quistclose trust, funds lent for a specific purpose are 
held in trust for the lender, who in effect takes a security in the funds 
through the trust.  With a trust in place, the lender’s remedies are what in 
English law are known as proprietary remedies for the trust funds, as 
opposed to personal remedies for damages for breach of loan covenants. 
This is not the place for an extended discussion of how the Quistclose 
transaction would be structured in the United States.  In the United 
States, the trust would likely be a security interest, and a creditor not 
pursuing Article 9 secured creditor status would bear significant risk of 
96. UCC § 1-103(b).
97. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 70, at 21.
98. See GERALD L. BLANCHARD, LENDER LIABILITY: LAW, PRACTICE AND
PREVENTION (2nd ed. 2008). 
99. See, e.g., In re Jack Green’s Fashions for Men—Big and Tall, Inc., 597 F.2d 130
(8th Cir. 1979); In re Robert E. Derektor of Rhode Island, Inc., 150 B.R. 296 (Bankr. D. 
R.I. 1993); cf. In re The Computer Room, Inc., 24 B.R. 732 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1982); In 
re Corso Stein Enterprises, Inc., 79 B.R. 584 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1987). 
 100. See, e.g., Ninth Dist.  Production Credit Ass’n v. Ed Duggan, Inc., 821 P.2d 788 
(Colo. 1991); In re Win-Vent, Inc., 217 B.R. 803 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997); Commerce 
Bank, N.A. v. Tifton Aluminum Co., Inc., 217 B.R. 798 (W.D. Mo. 1997); Knox v. 
Phoenix Leasing Inc., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 141 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Daniels-Sheridan Fed. 
Credit Union v. Bellanger, 36 P.3d 397 (Mont. 2001). 
 101. See Barclays Bank Ltd. v. Quistclose Investments, Ltd. (sub nom Quistclose 
Investments v. Rolls Razor) [1970] A.C. 567 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng. C.A.); 
Twinsectra Ltd. v. Yardley [1999] Lloyd’s Rep. 438 (Eng. C.A.); THE QUISTCLOSE TRUST:
CRITICAL ESSAYS (William Swadling ed. 2004).  For a discussion from the perspective of 
English law of the role of equity in commerce, see Peter J. Millett, Equity’s Place in the 
Role of Commerce, 114 LAW Q. REV. 214 (1998). 
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loss in the event of the debtor’s default or bankruptcy.102  On the other 
hand, the closest American transaction to the Quistclose trust just might 
be one that is an exception to the Article 9 filing requirement, that of 
control over a deposit account under UCC Section 9-104.103  Under 
Section 9-104, control of the collateral by the secured creditor substitutes 
for filing.104  But here we can see what a code can do.  Moving the fund 
into a deposit account removes the trust concept from the discussion and 
radically alters the nature of the security. 
D. International Conventions 
Treaties are an obvious source of commercial law that nations enter 
to govern commerce.  These treaties have a variety of labels.  One such 
label is “international conventions” when they deal with transactional 
law, such as the Vienna Convention on the International Sale of 
Goods.105  In contrast, another label is “agreements” when they deal with 
the regulatory side of international trade, as in the free trade agreements, 
such as the WTO agreements.106  For purposes of simplification, I refer 
to the former simply as conventions.107 
Nations have entered into many multilateral and regional 
conventions governing a wide range of commercial activity, from sale of 
goods to security interests in mobile equipment.108  Has anyone counted? 
There are so many.  No doubt many a law professor who teaches basic 
international commercial law courses, such as international business 
transactions, have had the experience of a student coming to him or her, 
 102. Michael Bridge, The Quistclose Trust in a World of Secured Transactions, 12 
O.J.L.S. 333, 345 (1992); Robert Stevens, Insolvency, in THE QUISTCLOSE TRUST:
CRITICAL ESSAYS,  supra note 101, at 153, 166. 
103. UCC § 9-104. 
 104. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 70, at 775. 
 105. The Vienna Convention, also known as the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), can be found at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG html (last visited 
June 7, 2009). 
 106. For the legal texts of the World Trade Organization agreements, see 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/docs_e htm (last visited June 7, 2009). 
 107. The notion of convention as used above is a very different use of the phrase 
“social convention” by philosophers to refer to a regularity groups of agents observe, 
such as holding cutlery a certain way.  Michael Rescorla, Convention, THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zelta ed., 2008), available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/convention/ (last visited June 7, 2009). 
 108. One of the more recent commercial law conventions is the UNIDROIT 
Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, known as the Cape Town 
Convention, which was signed in 2001 and came into force in January 2006. 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/mobile-equipment/main.htm (last visited 
June 7, 2009). 
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and saying, “I had no idea there were so many laws and institutions 
working at the international level.” 
International conventions are state-created law.  Some 
commentators, including Jan Dalhuisen, Ole Lando, and Clive 
Schmitthoff,109 classify international conventions as part of the law 
merchant.  As explained below, I stipulate the law merchant as rules, 
principles, standards, or more generically, norms, if any, that come to 
exist entirely outside of the nation-state lawmaking apparatus.110  Such a 
source-based classification might be seen to contradict the uses of the 
phrase in the practices of arbitrators.  Another criticism I anticipate is 
that I am engaging in “sources thinking,” an often stated but unfounded 
complaint about legal positivism. 
First, as to the question of meaning as used by arbitrators, the 
purpose of the classification is to get clear on the actual practices of how 
some commercial norms are actually produced.  We need a way of 
understanding how states produce some norms and how non-state actors 
produce others.  I do not think I am departing from actual use here.  I am 
trying to clarify what I think has been made a mess by some 
commentators, a point addressed below.111 
Second, as to the criticism of “sources thinking,” if we are to 
understand the nature of commercial law at the transnational level, we 
must explore the features of institutions and governance structures 
relevant to commercial law.  Source is not the focus, but institutional 
structure is.  How commercial law is made is an important characteristic 
of commercial law, since commercial law has the potential to come from 
a diversity of sources, both within and outside nation-states, and from 
state and non-state norm making institutions.  We could not make sense 
of commercial law without understanding these institutions. 
As to identifying institutions, conventions are state-created law, and 
as such they are not created by so-called “private” legislatures.  The use 
of the word “private” in the literature is confusing.112  If the term 
 109. DALHUISEN, supra note 72, at 146-96; Dalhuisen, Legal Orders and their 
Manifestation, supra note 17; Ole Lando, The Lex Mercatoria in International 
Commercial Arbitration, 34 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 747 (1985); Clive M. Schmitthoff, The 
Unification of the Law of International Trade, in CLIVE M. SCHMITTHOFF’S SELECT
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 170 (Clive M. Schmitthoff & Jiarui Cheng eds. 
1988). 
110. See infra notes 145-85 and accompanying text. 
111. See infra part II.F.1. 
112. There is an extensive law and economics literature on private legislatures.  See, 
e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995) (National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws/American Law Institute in UCC context); Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of of 
Unification and Harmonization in International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 743 
(1999) (intergovernmental organizations and other international organizations), cf. John 
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“private” is used to designate a rule-creating body whose membership is 
comprised wholly of private actors with no state-sponsorship, then 
international conventions clearly are not the product of private 
legislatures.  The main producers of commercial law conventions are 
UNCITRAL, the Hague Conference on International Law, and 
UNIDROIT.113  States dominate the membership of all of these 
organizations.  In fact only states can be members of these 
organizations.114  The terminology often used to describe them is 
Linarelli, The Economics of Uniform Laws and Uniform Law Making, 48 WAYNE L. REV. 
1387 (2003). 
 113. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, http://www.uncitral.org 
(last visited June 10, 2009); International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, 
http://www.unidroit.org (last visited June 10, 2009); Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, http://www hcch net/index_en.php (last visited June 10, 2009). 
 114. The United Nations General Assembly created UNCITRAL in Resolution 
2205(XXI) of December 17, 2006.  G.A. Res. 2205(XXI) (Dec. 17, 2006).  The 
Resolution provides for membership by sixty states who are General Assembly members. 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/origin.html (last visited June 10, 2009).  Article 
20 of the UNIDROIT Statute provides for membership by “governments.”  UNIDROIT 
Statute art. 20 (March 23, 1993).  The UNIDROIT Web site explains that membership is 
“restricted to States acceding to the UNIDROIT Statute.”  http://www.unidroit.org/ 
english/members/main htm (last visited June 10, 2009).  Article 2 of the Statute of the 
Hague Conference on Private International Law provides in relevant part: 
1. Members of the Hague Conference on Private International Law are the
States which have already participated in one or more Sessions of the 
Conference and which accept the present Statute. 
2. Any other State, the participation of which is from a juridical point of view
of importance for the work of the Conference, may become a Member.  The 
admission of new Member States shall be decided upon by the Governments of 
the participating States, upon the proposal of one or more of them, by a 
majority of the votes cast, within a period of six months from the date on which 
that proposal is submitted to the Governments. 
Statute of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, art. 2 (July 15, 1955), 
available at http://www hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=29 (last 
visited June 10, 2009) [hereinafter Hague Statute]. 
Article 3 of the Hague Statute provides that a “Regional Economic International 
Organisation” comprised solely of states may also be members of the Hague Conference. 
Hague Statute, art. 3.  Article 3(1) provides that “Member States of the Conference 
may . . . decide to admit also as a Member any Regional Economic Integration 
Organisation which has submitted an application for membership to the Secretary 
General.” Hague Statute, art. 3(1).  As for eligibility requirements, Article 3(2) provides 
that a Regional Economic Integration Organisation “must be one constituted solely by 
sovereign States, and to which its Member States have transferred competence over a 
range of matters within the purview of the Conference, including the authority to make 
decisions binding on its Member States in respect of those matters.”  Hague Statute, art. 
3(2).  Article 3(9) defines a Regional Economic Integration Organisation” as “an 
international organisation that is constituted solely by sovereign States, and to which its 
Member States have transferred competence over a range of matters, including the 
authority to make decisions binding on its Member States in respect of those matters.” 
Hague Statute, art. 3(9).  The Statute also contains a number of provisions to police the 
ongoing eligibility of these organizations for membership.  Hague Statute, arts. 3(4)-(8). 
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intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), to distinguish them from 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).  In IGOs, the states call the 
shots.  Rule-making institutions that have no state participation, such as 
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), are NGOs when they 
participate as observers in the rulemaking within UNCITRAL, the main 
producer of international conventions.  NGOs have observer status in 
UNCITRAL deliberations.  In fact even states that are not UNCITRAL 
members have observer status.115  UNCITRAL’s practice, however, is to 
admit representatives to working groups with full rights of participation, 
regardless of whether they represent UNCITRAL member states, but 
most represent states, as either members or observers.  The ICC has had 
a privileged “consultative status” with the U.N. almost since the U.N. 
came into existence.116  But while the ICC is the most prominent private 
industry group involved in transnational lawmaking,117 it has no power to 
produce conventions on its own.118  It must participate in an IGO’s 
process, something like prominent lobbyists participating in lawmaking 
in national capitals. 
For those democratic states that are members of commercial 
lawmaking IGOs, the IGOs could be said to be indirectly democratic. 
That these IGOs are indirectly democratic is hardly fatal to the claim that 
they are public and not private legislatures.  An executive branch agency, 
such as the U.S. Department of State Attorney Advisor for Private 
International Law, appoints IGO delegates for the United States, and 
other countries have similar arrangements.  These delegates work in 
deliberating sessions to produce conventions that must be acceptable to 
the domestic body that delegated authority to them, and ultimately to a 
domestic legislature or some other domestic lawmaking body that must 
The Statute is obviously designed to accommodate membership of supranational 
organizations, such as the European Union. 
 115. See http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/methods_faq html (last visited 
June 10, 2009). 
 116. International Chamber of Commerce: Policy and Business Practices, 
http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/id3237/index html (last visited June 10, 2009); Guillermo 
Jiménez, The International Chamber of Commerce: Supplier of Standards and 
Instruments for International Trade, 2 UNIFORM L. REV. 284, 286, 292 (1996) (“The ICC 
has class 1 (top-level) consultative status with the United Nations, where it puts forward 
the views of business in industrialized and developing countries . . . ICC permanent 
representatives at the U.N. in New York and Geneva monitor developments affecting 
business within the U.N. and its specialized agencies. . . . “), quoted in ROY GOODE,
HERBERT KRONKE, EWAN MCKENDRICK, & JEFFREY WOOL,TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
LAW 356-57 (2007). 
 117. GOODE, KRONKE & MCKENDRICK, supra note 114, at 352. 
 118. But it does have authority to make other sources of law on its own and its 
instruments are sometimes more successful than those made through official state 
channels.  See infra notes 181-95 and accompanying text. 
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ratify the convention for it to become the law of the country.119  States in 
effect delegate a limited form of law making power to IGOs, and the 
IGOs produce a convention that has no effect for a state until accepted in 
the state’s constitutionally mandated ratification process. 
Commercial lawmaking IGOs serve important state functions. 
Despite criticisms,120 the conventions they produce are often superior to 
the alternative of private international law approaches to handling legal 
problems that cross borders.  In fact one could say that conflicts 
approaches are being undermined by the proliferation of conventions and 
the law merchant as I stipulatively define it below. 
A convention goes into force when a specified number of 
signatories ratify it.  The terms of when it goes into force are defined 
within the Convention itself.  A convention is in force only for states that 
ratify it, unless its provisions become so accepted by the community of 
states that they become customary international law.121 
In U.S. law, most and perhaps even all commercial law conventions 
are self-executing, which means that they become law once ratified by 
the U.S. Senate, without the need for any domestic implementing 
legislation.122  The distinction is significant.  If a convention is not self-
executing, then it is the law of the land, but only as between states.  If not 
self-executing, there must be the further step of Congress passing 
implementing legislation, and it is the implementing legislation, and not 
the convention, that courts apply in disputes involving private parties.123  
If a commercial law convention is self-executing, then once ratified, it is 
as much a part of domestic law as any federal statute, and as a federal 
statute, may even preempt state law, such as the UCC.124 
 119. The ratification terminology may be inaccurate for some countries.  The 
emphasis in the text is on the U.S. terminology, though I have tried to explain as 
generically as possible, e.g., discussing how ratification has to be by a legislature or other 
law making body.  In the specific case of the United States, it would be the U.S. Senate. 
U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, ¶2. 
 120. Citations to this critical literature as of about 2003 can be found at Linarelli, 
supra note 112, at 1409. 
 121. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 24, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/ 
conventions/1_1_1969.pdf; see MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 835 (5th ed. 
2003) (“It is quite clear that a treaty cannot impose obligations upon third states. . . . 
There is, however, one major exception to this and that is where the provisions of the 
treaty in question have entered into customary law.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 122. “The field of commercial law represents one of the most prominent examples of 
the influence of self-executing treaties.”  Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law 
in an Age of Treaties, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 892, 922 (2004), quoted in Amelia H. Boss, 
The Future of the Uniform Commercial Code Process in an Increasingly International 
World, 68 OHIO ST. L. J. 349, 362 (2007). 
123. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 111 (1987). 
124. See Van Alstine, supra note 122, at 905-06. 
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Commercial law conventions should be distinguished from model 
laws125 and legislative guides.126  A model law is not a formal agreement 
between countries in the form of a convention.  Nor is it a legislative 
guide.  They both require, however, substantive agreement as to content; 
otherwise they would not be approved in the IGO rulemaking process. 
They do not go through the ratification process of a convention.  Rather, 
the model law is something for municipal legislatures to consider for 
enactment as municipal legislation, and a legislative guide is just that—a 
guide for municipal legislatures to use in drafting their own legislation. 
Ministries responsible for participating in international lawmaking for 
their governments often prefer model laws and legislative guides because 
these documents do not have to go through ratification processes and 
there is no worry about entry into force.  Most model laws and legislative 
guides produced today are produced for consideration by developing 
countries in need of improving their legal institutions. 
E. Judicial Interpretations of Conventions 
Commercial law conventions are subject to interpretation just like 
domestic codes.  The same concepts identified in Part II.B above apply 
mutatis mutandis here.  It is by now well accepted that uniformity in the 
law is not achieved simply by promulgating a code or convention. 
Courts interpret conventions to decide cases, and interpretation in 
different state traditions has the potential to bring about divergences in 
interpretation.  Divergence can occur even in the municipal courts of a 
single state. 
Some conventions contain provisions like that of CISG Article 7(1), 
which provides that “[i]n the interpretation of this Convention, regard is 
 125. The laws of one country may be used as models for reform in other countries.  It 
is still done to some extent, as, for example, the English commonwealth countries of 
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand have adopted UCC Article 9-like secured credit 
statutes, and England and Wales have considered doing the same thing.  GERALD
MCCORMACK, SECURED CREDIT UNDER ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW (2004).  English 
commercial law statutes were used as models for the drafting of the first American 
uniform commercial law statutes.  Williston explains that as for international standards 
on sales law, the English Sale of Goods Act was “the recognized statement of the 
common law, as distinguished from the civil law.”  Samuel Williston, The Law of Sales 
in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HARV. L. REV. 561, 564 (1950).  The 
American Uniform Sales Act was “identical in most respects with the British Act.”  Id. at 
563.  It “followed the English statute both in substance and in the use of identical words.”  
Id. at 564.  See also Karl N. Llewellyn, The Needed Federal Sales Act, 26 VA. L. REV.
558, 558-59 (1940); Karl N. Llewellyn, On Warranty, Quality, and Society I, 36 COLUM.
L. REV. 699 (1936). 
 126. A recent example of a legislative guide is the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on 
Secured Transactions, published in 2008.  http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/ 
uncitral_texts/payments/Guide_securedtrans html (last visited June 10, 2009). 
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to be had to its international character and to the need to promote 
uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in 
international trade.”127  Other conventions contain substantially similar 
language.128  Further, CISG Article 7(2) provides, at least by implication, 
that courts should not rely on domestic law to interpret the CISG: 
Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are 
not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the 
general principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such 
principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the 
rules of private international law.129 
Some refer to interpretations of an international character as autonomous 
interpretations, meaning that they are independent of domestic law.130  It 
is beyond the scope of this article to explore these issues in detail.131  But 
 127. CISG art. 7(1), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/e-text-
07 html (last visited June 11, 2009). 
 128. See, e.g., UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring, art. 4(1) (May 28, 
1998), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/1988factoring/main htm 
(last visited June 11, 2009) (“In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had 
to its object and purpose as set forth in the preamble, to its international character and to 
the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in 
international trade.”); UNIDROIT Convention on International Financial Leasing, art. 
6(1) (May 28, 1998), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/1988 
leasing/main htm (last visited June 11, 2009) (“In the interpretation of this Convention, 
regard is to be had to its object and purpose as set forth in the preamble, to its 
international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the 
observance of good faith in international trade.”); UN Convention on Independent 
Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit, art. 5 (Dec. 11, 1995), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/payments/1995Convention_guarantees
_credit html (last visited June 11, 2009) (“In the interpretation of this Convention, regard 
is to be had to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its 
application and the observance of good faith in the international practice of independent 
guarantees and stand-by letters of credit.”). 
 129. CISG art. 7(2), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/e-text-
07 html (last visited June 11, 2009). 
 130. See Franco Ferrari, The CISG’s Uniform Interpretation by Courts—An Update, 9 
VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 233, 239-40 (2005). 
 131. Others have done so.  See, e.g., LARRY A. DIMATTEO, LUCIEN J. DHOOGE,
STEPHANIE GREENE, VIRGINIA G. MAURER, & MARISA ANNE PAGNATTARO,
INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CISG JURISPRUDENCE (2005); 
Karen Halverson Cross, Parol Evidence Under the CISG: The “Homeward Trend” 
Reconsidered, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 133 (2007); Ferrari, supra note 130; Francesco G. 
Mazzotta, Why Do Some American Courts Fail to Get it Right?, 3 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L.
REV. 85 (2005); Harry M. Flechtner, The Several Texts of the CISG in a Decentralized 
System: Observations on Translations, Reservations and Other Challenges to the 
Uniformity Principle in Article 7(1), 17 J. L. & COM. 187 (1998); John E. Murray, Jr., The 
Neglect of CISG: A Workable Solution, 17 J. L. & COM. 365 (1998); Anthony S. Winer, 
The CISG Convention and Thomas Franck’s Theory of Legitimacy, 19 NW. J. INT’L L. &
BUS. 1 (1998); Franco Ferrari, The Relationship Between the UCC and the CISG and the 
Construction of Uniform Law, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021 (1996); Lisa M. Ryan, The 
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a sketch of the issues will help us to identify the nature of autonomous 
interpretation. 
The issue is not whether a court may simply ignore a convention in 
favor of domestic law.  There must first be a need for a judge to interpret 
a convention.  Moreover, that interpretation must be inconclusively 
resolved by resort to the convention language alone.  In some cases the 
issue is whether the court should then rely on domestic law to fill the gap 
in the convention or on foreign court interpretations of the convention.132  
An example of a court refusing to rely on domestic law is MCC-Marble 
Ceramic Center, Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D’Agostino, S.P.A., in which 
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the parol evidence rule 
found in UCC Article 2-202 does not apply to sales contracts to which 
the CISG applies.133  It is doubtful that the Court in MCC-Marble had to 
engage in any interpretative exercise, as CISG Article 8(3) seems to 
advise that the CISG does not contain a parol evidence rule.134  MCC-
Marble may be contrasted with Beijing Metals & Minerals 
Import/Export Corp. v. American Business Center, Inc., in which the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in dictum that the parol evidence 
rule found in Texas law applied regardless of whether the CISG 
applied.135  In neither of these cases, nor in many other American cases, 
do courts look to foreign court judgments on the CISG for solutions. 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Divergent Interpretations, 
4 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 99 (1995); R.J.C. Munday, The Uniform Interpretation of 
International Conventions, 27 INT’L COMP. L. Q. 450 (1978). 
 132. Readily accessible English language sources for abstracts and digests of judicial 
decisions from other countries are now available, at least for the CISG.  UNCITRAL 
publishes CLOUT, Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts, a collection of abstracts of court 
decisions on any UNCITRAL text.  UNCITRAL has also prepared a Digest of the CISG 
case law.  The Center for Comparative and Foreign Law Studies in Rome has prepared 
UNILEX, a collection of case law and a bibliography for the CISG.  Ferrari, The CISG’s 
Uniform Interpretation, supra note 130, at 242-44.  Various web sites are very helpful, in 
particular Al Kritzer’s CISG Database sponsored by Pace University School of Law. 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/ (last visited June 11, 2009).  Still, almost all of the 
translated material has to do with the CISG, and not much else.  The CISG is, however, 
perhaps the more successful of the UNCITRAL conventions in terms of widespread 
ratification or accession. 
 133. MCC-Marble Ceramic Center, Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D’Agostino, S.P.A., 144 
F.3d 1384 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 134. CISG Article 8(3) provides: “In determining the intent of a party or the 
understanding a reasonable person would have had, due consideration is to be given to all 
relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any practices which the 
parties have established between themselves, usages and any subsequent conduct of the 
parties.”  CISG art. 8(3), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/e-text-
08 html (last visited June 11, 2009). 
 135. Beijing Metals & Minerals Imp./Exp. Corp. v. Am. Bus. Ctr., Inc., 993 F.2d 
1178, 1184-85 (5th Cir. 1993) (dicta).  The contrast is suggested by DANIEL C. K. CHOW
& THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: PROBLEMS,
CASES, AND MATERIALS 207-08 (New York: Aspen 2005). 
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CISG Article 7 seems to advise that foreign judgments are even more 
“relevant” than UCC Article 2 or domestic contract law, in the sense that 
they might serve as persuasive authority or at least as information on 
how to interpret the CISG.  Some scholars have even argued for a strict 
doctrine of precedent for foreign judgments deciding CISG issues.136  
British courts have perhaps been more consistent cosmopolitans than 
their U.S. counterparts, at least in interpreting conventions.  In Stag Line, 
Ltd. v. Foscolo Mango & Co., Ltd.,137 Lord Atkin explained that the 
Carriage at Goods by Sea Act 1924, which implements the Hague-Visby 
Rules in the United Kingdom, “is not intended to codify the English law, 
but is the result (as expressed in the Act) of an international conference 
intended to unify certain rules relating to bills of lading.  It will be 
remembered that the Act applies only to contracts of carriage of goods 
outwards from ports of the United Kingdom, and the rules will often 
have to be interpreted in the courts of the foreign consignees.”138  Lord 
Atkin, however, went on to express the need to focus on the language of 
the Act, a common law method of statutory interpretation.139  In 
Corocraft Ltd. v. Pan American Airways Inc.,140  Lord Denning said of 
the Warsaw Convention:  “[E]ven if I disagreed, I would follow [the 
decisions of foreign courts] in a manner which is of international 
concern.  The courts of all countries should interpret [the Warsaw 
Convention] in the same way.”141 
The CISG scholar John Honnold invented the phrase “homeward 
trend” to describe how courts interpret the CISG to defeat uniformity in 
international sales law.142  Legal scholars have used the phrase 
imprecisely.  If it makes a hermeneutical claim that judges cannot help 
but work in their own national traditions, then it states a truism that 
would apply beyond the CISG context.143  Whether a threat to uniformity 
 136. DIMATTEO ET AL., supra note 131, at 2. 
 137. Stag Line, Ltd v. Foscolo Mango & Co., Ltd. [1932] A.C. 328 (H.L. 1931) 
(appeal taken from Eng. (U.K.). 
138. Id. at 342 (opinion of Atkin, L.). 
139. Id. at 342-43. 
140. Corocraft Ltd. v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., [1969] 1 Q.B. 616, 655 (C.A.). 
141. Id. at 655 (opinion of Denning, M.R.), quoted in INDIRA CARR & PETER STONE,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 72, 235-236 (3rd ed. 2005). 
 142. Cross, supra note 131, at 136-37 (quoting JOHN O. HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE STUDIES,
DELIBERATIONS, AND DECISIONS THAT LED TO THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 
WITH INTRODUCTIONS AND EXPLANATIONS 1 (1999)).  John Murray uses the phrase 
“domestic legal lens.”  Murray, supra note 131, at 367, quoted in CARR & STONE, supra 
note 138, at 72. 
143. This seems to be Honnold’s use of the phrase.  Honnold says: 
The Convention, faute de mieux, will often be applied by tribunals . . . who will 
be intimately familiar with only their own domestic law.  These tribunals, 
regardless of their merit, will be subject to a natural tendency to read the 
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results is an empirical question.  Not all judges are susceptible to it, as 
explained above.  Another meaning of the phrase is that legal texts alone 
cannot produce uniformity.144  A uniform application of the text does not 
necessarily follow from the uniformity of the text.  But this is true for 
any legislative or regulatory enactment, from legislated law merchant to 
domestic codes.  It has no uniqueness for conventions, except perhaps 
that in the domestic context, judges work in the same national tradition, 
and hence the possibility of uniformity is greater.  Another meaning of 
the phrases is that when judges are confronted with an opportunity to fill 
a gap in the CISG, they tend to fill it with their own domestic law. 
Another meaning of the phrase is that judges ignore CISG Article 7.  Yet 
another meaning: judges are reluctant to use foreign court judgments. 
Finally, another meaning is that uniformity will be defeated unless 
judges consult court judgments of other countries.145  We can continue to 
digress on the question of what “homeward trend” means.  Its meaning 
likely will combine several of these possibilities. 
F. Law Merchant 
A good deal of confusion persists as to what the law merchant 
actually is, if it exists at all.  In this section, I attempt to clarify the field. 
Section 1 examines the ways in which commentators have 
conceptualized the law merchant.  In section 1, I identify the sources of 
the confusion.  Sections 2 through 4 provide my own elaboration of 
possible law merchant categories. 
1. Competing Definitions
No settled definitions of the contemporary law merchant exist.  To 
the contrary, a diversity of conceptions dominates the literature.  In their 
influential book on International Chamber of Commerce arbitration, W. 
Laurence Craig, William Park, and Jan Paulsson suggest three possible 
meanings: 
First, the most ambitious concept of lex mercatoria is that of an 
autonomous legal order, created spontaneously by parties involved in 
international rules in light of the legal ideas that have been embedded at the 
core of the intellectual formation.  The mind sees what the mind has means of 
seeing. 
HONNOLD, supra note 141, at 1, quoted in Cross, supra note 131, at 136-37. 
 144. Many have said this.  Ferrari calls it “common knowledge.”  Ferrari, The CISG’s 
Uniform Interpretation, supra note 130, at 233. 
 145. Vikki M. Rogers & Albert H. Kritzer, A Uniform International Sales Law 
Terminology, 13 www.jus.uio no/sisu/a_uniform_international_sales_terminology.vikki_ 
rogers.and.albert_kritzer/portrait.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2008). 
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international economic relations and existing independently of 
national legal orders.  Second, lex mercatoria has been viewed as a 
body of rules sufficient to decide a dispute, operating as an 
alternative to an otherwise applicable national law.  Third, it may be 
considered as a complement to otherwise applicable law, viewed as 
nothing more than the gradual consolidation of usage and settled 
expectations in international trade.146 
Klaus Peter Berger also suggests three possible meanings, which differ in 
some respects from Craig, Park, and Paulsson’s: 
Some authors use the term to denote a mere “legal mass” of rules and 
principles without any internal consistency or systematic quality.  It 
merely serves as a complement to the otherwise applicable domestic 
law. . . . .  A second view regards the lex mercatoria as the totality of 
trade usages that are refined according to the needs of international 
commerce and constitute a “factual jus commune. . . .  A third view 
regards the lex mercatoria as an independent, supra-national legal 
system which derives its justification and validity from its 
autonomous existence or through the principle of party autonomy as a 
meta-legal rule.147 
Berthold Goldman, one of the most influential proponents of the 
existence of a contemporary law merchant, suggests that the different 
views as to the law merchant can be understood as either a wide view of 
the law merchant or a narrow view.148  The wide view is that of Ole 
Lando, Clive Schmitthoff, and others, in which the law merchant 
includes law from official government sources, as well as from trade and 
professional sources.149  The law merchant, under the wide view, 
includes public international law, conventions, general principles of law, 
“rules of international organizations,” such as UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts150 and the Principles of European 
Contract Law produced by the Commission on European Contract 
 146. W. LAURENCE CRAIG, WILLIAM W. PARK, & JAN PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION 633 (3d ed. 2001), quoted in Christopher R. 
Drahozal, Contracting Out of National Law: An Empirical Look at the New Law 
Merchant, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 523, 529 (1997). 
 147. KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE LEX MERCATORIA 40 
(1999). 
 148. Berthold Goldman, Lex Mercatoria, 3 F. INTERNATIONALE 4-7 (1983). 
 149. Lando, supra note 109; Schmitthoff, supra note 109.  The above list is modified 
from Lando. 
 150. UNIDROIT Principles of International Conmmercial Contracts (2004), 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/main htm (last visited Aug. 16, 
2008). 
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Law,151 customs and usages, standard form contracts, and reports of 
arbitral awards, even though many of these are confidential and not 
publicized.  The wide view drains the idea of the law merchant of any 
significance.  When we classify all commercial law sources as within the 
law merchant, we remove any meaning from the law merchant as a 
distinctive concept.  Goldman, however, supports the narrow view of the 
law merchant.  He contends that one cannot define the law merchant by 
the “object of its constituent sources,”152 but rather, one must also look to 
its origin, which he says is in its customary and spontaneous nature.153  
He also requires frequent use.  Goldman says that standard form 
contracts are not law merchant unless they achieve the status of custom 
by frequent use.154 
We could go on and look at the other many attempts at stipulating 
definitions of the law merchant, but the problems with all of these 
definitions are common to them all.  I will spend little time on the 
difficulties with these definitions because they do not advance the project 
of this article, but just a few obvious points.  First, the requirement or 
characteristic of spontaneity is highly suspect.  Spontaneity is at best 
contingently a feature of the law merchant.  It may give rise to norms in a 
narrow set of conditions, in particular, when the conditions for infinitely 
repeating games are present.155  Moreover, spontaneity does not 
necessarily result in rules about which people have what Hart calls a 
critical reflective attitude towards compliance and violation.156  
Spontaneity more likely advises us on externally observed statistical 
regularities, such as habits.157  People do not care about deviations from 
statistical regularities unless they become rules associated with a critical 
reflective attitude.  Spontaneity can likely fully explain a habit but not a 
rule.  To explain a rule, we need something more, some account of the 
beliefs and attitudes of the norm users, which spontaneity cannot explain. 
I may not have a critical reflective attitude about putting my right shoe 
on first every day.  Spontaneity might explain that habit.  But spontaneity 
cannot explain why I wear dress shoes with a suit and sneakers with 
 151. The Principles of European Contract Law, (rev. ed. 1998), http://www.jus. 
uio no/lm/eu.contract.principles.1998/doc.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2008). 
 152. Goldman, supra note 148, at 5. 
 153. Others also make the spontaneity point.  See Dalhuisen, Legal Orders and their 
Manifestation, supra note 17, at 129-30; Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of 
Commercial Law, 55 S. ECON. J. 644, 644-45 (1989). 
 154. Goldman, supra note 148, at 6-7. 
 155. See Paul Milgrom, Douglass C. North, & Barry Weingast, The Role of 
Institutions in the Revival of Trade: the Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the 
Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POLITICS 1 (1990). 
 156. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 8, at 57. 
157. What follows is my variation on Hart.  Id. at 57-58. 
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jeans, and why I would find it odd to see large numbers of people doing 
otherwise.  Shoe wearing etiquette likely reflects a set of social rules 
about which people have formed a critical reflective attitude. 
Spontaneity, moreover, explain normativity because it is too unstable. 
What is spontaneous today will not be spontaneous tomorrow.  And what 
truly is spontaneous in any event?  The proponents of spontaneity as a 
feature of the law merchant fail to give definitions and examples. 
Spontaneity must be ruled out as a plausible basis for the existence and 
the authority of the law merchant. 
Perhaps the way to cure these problems with spontaneity is 
Goldman’s requirement of frequent use, which would work something 
like Hart’s and Raz’s requirement that a legal system be “in force,” 
meaning that many people in the normative community in question 
generally but not always comply with the law merchant.158  So, the 
argument would go, spontaneity plus frequent use or the fact that norms 
are in force results in the law merchant.  But these two features cannot 
support the idea of a system of norms that law merchant theorists 
advocate.  What is missing is an institutional infrastructure in the nature 
of secondary rules, a subject discussed in Part III.159 
Most commentators on the law merchant are comparativists or are 
trained in comparative law methods.  They conflate the notion of content 
convergence with authority.  Their strategy is to argue a content 
convergence thesis.160  The result is a never-ending circular discussion of 
158. See infra notes 291-93 and accompanying text. 
159. See infra notes 279-364 and accompanying text. 
 160. Emmanuel Gaillard, Transnational Law: A Legal System or a Method of 
Decision-Making?, in BERGER, THE PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW, supra note 30, at 
53. Gaillard’s work is a classic example of a failure to properly identify the conditions for
the law merchant’s status as law.  Gaillard says that the “primary debate” in the past was 
on “the very existence and legitimacy of resorting to rules other than those of a given 
legal system.”  Id. at 55.  He says the debate is now on (1) sources or content and 
(2) whether the law merchant should be restricted to a list or understood as a method. 
These are ill-formed questions.  Galliard is of the view that the law merchant is defined 
by content and that it can derive itself from content of national law.  Id. at 58.  The list 
versus method issue is subsidiary to first issue, because it is about content too.  Gaillard 
contends that method is important, and his method is traditional comparative law analysis 
of comparing rules and trying as best one can with lawyer’s methods to understand these 
rules in context.  On the issue of whether the law merchant is a “distinct legal system,” 
Gaillard identifies four necessary features of a “genuine” legal system, which come down 
to his initial point that if you understand the law merchant from the standpoint of the 
comparative law methods he espouses, you will find a legal system.  Id. at 59-65.  For the 
reasons explained above, this cannot be so.  Gaillard relies on domestic validity for 
transnational validity and confuses analogous content with validity. 
Berger does something similar to Gaillard.  His CENTRAL project is about the 
search for existence of a “third” legal system empirically, through repeated use of 
contract clauses and “reliance in mutual adherence” to them.  Berger’s work is rich with 
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the legitimacy of the law merchant.  Their inability to produce an 
adequate account is at least an indirect form of support for the positivist 
strategy employed here.161  They use the methods of comparative law to 
claim that the content of the law is converging across municipal legal 
systems, is the subject of increasing harmonization through conventions, 
and that harmonization has occurred as well through the law merchant. 
From this content convergence they argue that there must be a 
transnational commercial legal order.  The comparative method leads 
them in some cases to argue that they are looking for the “common core” 
of legal systems.162  To clarify this argument, we can give it a more 
formal presentation.  The content convergence thesis is as follows: 
(1) The law of w jurisdictions on subject x contain the similar valid 
rule y. 
(2) The law of z international instruments (or other sources) also 
contain valid rule y. 
(3) Therefore, there must be a valid rule y, existing independently 
of the w jurisdictions and the z international instruments. 
This is poor logic.  The conclusion does not follow from the premises.  It 
is question begging. 
Content convergence proponents may argue that I have performed a 
sleight of hand because I have converted their inductive claim into a 
deductive claim.  They are attempting an inference to the best 
explanation, in which the conclusion is not “guaranteed” by the 
premises.163  So, their argument is one based on the best available 
evidence, with a probabilistic conclusion.  Converting the reasoning into 
inductive form does not solve the problems with content convergence, as 
institutional detail, but fails to establish a legal system.  His project, like Gaillard’s is 
content convergence.  BERGER, CREEPING CODIFICATION, supra note 146. 
Clive Schmitthoff argues that the law merchant “comes from” comparative law.  He 
uses the phrase “common core” to describe the search for the law merchant.  His account, 
too, is about content convergence.  Schmitthoff, supra note 107. 
 161. Some law merchant theorists have criticized legal positivism as unable to explain 
the law merchant or transnational legal order.  BERGER, CREEPING CODIFICATION, supra 
note 146, at 91, 103.  Burman and Dresser pose the question as one between 
“autonomists” and “positivists,’ and erroneously argue that to a positivist only national 
law is the source of law.  Harold J. Burman & Felix J. Dresser, The “New” Law 
Merchant and the “Old” Sources: Content and Legitimacy, in LEX MERCATORIA AND
ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW MERCHANT 60 (Thomas Carbonneau ed. 
rev. ed. 1998). 
 162. The apparent influences are the “common core” comparativists.  See, e.g., Mauro 
Bussani & Ugo Mattei, The Common Core Approach to European Private Law, 12
COLUM. J. EUR. LAW 339, 339-40 (1997). 
 163. See LARRY WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING 57-58 (1988); Larry Wright, 
Induction and Explanation, 4 PHIL. INQUIRY 1 (1982). 
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their premises still fail support their inference.  They still require some 
additional element explaining why content convergence leads to a new 
valid legal rule in a new legal system.  Content convergence fails from 
the basic standpoint of logical coherence. 
Content convergence fails because it confuses analogous content 
with validity.  Many normative systems have analogous content, but that 
does not mean they are the same normative system.  Law and morality, 
for example, may reflect the same or similar content, and one may 
influence the content of the other, but the conclusion does not follow that 
law is morality or morality is law.  Morality may profoundly influence 
the content of the law, but the question of the validity of the law is not a 
question about whether the law is moral.164 
Finally, the views of arbitrators for and against a law merchant are 
contradictory.165  European arbitrators, who tend to be academics, the 
“grand old men” of the profession, tend to support the idea of a law 
merchant.166  They come from a civil law tradition in which legal 
analysis is reasoned inquiry from the top to the bottom, from the general 
to the specific, in search of immanent legal principles.  Their civil law 
backgrounds hardly explain their attitudes toward the law merchant. 
With the civil law tradition comes a strong connection of the law to 
national identity, and the values of reason, universalism, coherence, and 
completeness of an ordered and codified system.167  Though civilians use 
their styles of legal analysis to engage in teleological interpretation of 
code provisions that look general to the common law lawyer, these 
interpretations are governed by a notion of the ordered whole that comes 
out of code commentaries that fill in the details of the code.  The civilian 
lawyer works in a structured environment in which the law is conceived 
as a complete normative system with all legal answers to be found in the 
code.  It is puzzling why an academic lawyer working in such a tradition 
would be supportive of the law merchant, except perhaps to argue that it 
comes from the traditional professional role that academics play in 
civilian legal systems, of propounding the law through commentaries.  In 
civilian legal systems, legal academics have historically had the more 
important role in producing and elucidating the law than the judges.168 
The English and American common law lawyers who are 
arbitrators, on the other hand, tend to deny the existence of the law 
 164. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 8, at 185-212. 
 165. Berger characterizes the views not as contradiction but as an antimony of 
viewpoints.  BERGER, THE PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW, supra note 30, at 32. 
 166. Dezalay & Garth, supra note 17, at 20-23. 
167. There have been many expositions of these points throughout the years.  See, 
e.g,, Pierre Legrand, Against a European Civil Code, 60 MODERN L. REV. 44 (1997).
168. See also Garth and Dezalay, supra note 17, at 41-42.
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merchant.169  They tend to be practitioners in the large Anglo-American 
law firms populating European capitals.170  They tend to see the law 
merchant as a way for “academics to avoid the rigorous analysis of the 
facts, the formal law, and even the terms of the contract.”171  One of 
Bryant Garth’s and Yves Dezalay’s interviews for their book, Dealing in 
Virtue, was of a “well-known English QC from the commercial bar.”172  
That QC said:  “These people are just deciding by the seat of their pants. 
There’s no such thing as the lex mercatoria.”173  As Lord Diplock said in 
Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp. v. Kuwait Insurance Co.: 
The purpose of entering into a contract being to create legal rights 
and obligations between the parties to it, interpretation of the contract 
involves determining what are the legal rights and obligations to 
which the words use in it give rise.  This is not possible except by 
reference to the system of law by which the legal consequences that 
follow from the use of those words is to be ascertained.174 
Lord Diplock also said in that case: 
Contracts are incapable of existing in a legal vacuum.  They are mere 
pieces of paper devoid of all legal effect unless they were made by 
reference to some system of private law which the obligations 
assumed by the parties to the contract by their use of particular forms 
of words and prescribes the remedies enforceable in a court of justice 
for failure to perform any of those obligations.175 
This rejection of the law merchant is puzzling, because common law 
lawyers would seem to be in a better position to understand legal 
evolution, and have greater tolerance for defects in the law in the forms 
of incompleteness, incoherence, lack of systematization, and so on. 
Counterarguments may be posed against any of these claims about 
differences between the civil and the common law traditions.  As Garth 
and Dezalay explain: 
[E]ach side seeks to promote the value of the know-how or the 
competence that it has mastered the best.  Academics—with a 
 169. For expositions of the English view, see Dalhuisen, Legal Orders and their 
Manifestation, supra note 17; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Lex Mercatoria: An Arbitrator’s 
View, 6 ARB. INT’L 133 (1990); L. Yves Fortier, The New, New Lex Mercatoria, or, Back 
to the Future, 17 ARB. INT’L 121 (2001). 
170. Garth & Dezalay, supra note 17, at 43. 
171. Id. at 41. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at n. 19. 
174. Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp. v. Kuwait Ins. Co., [1984] A.C. 50, 60 (H.L. 
1983) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (opinion of Diplock, L.). 
 175. Id. at 65.  I will not comment on the question begging features of Lord Diplock’s 
conclusions. 
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competitive advantage in theory—emphasize the lex mercatoria 
elaborated in countless academic books and articles.  Practitioners 
promote the virtues of solid case law and thorough analysis of the 
facts.176 
Perhaps this is true, but if one has ever read a decision of a French court, 
with its emphasis on the syllogism, on only the essentials, and on brevity, 
one may see the point coming from sources deeper than that of the 
distinction between the academic and the practitioner.  The differences 
likely come from differences in legal culture, not from professional roles 
played in a legal system. 
We still have not gotten to the point of what the law merchant is.  
With some exceptions, the literature is written at a high level of 
abstraction and is vague on identifying law merchant norms.177  The 
differences between European and Anglo-American arbitrators may be 
partly dissolved by clarifying what the law merchant is comprised of. 
The above disagreement seems mainly to be about the classification of 
general principles of law or uncodified custom as law merchant.  The 
differences in the continental and Anglo-American approaches to 
arbitration may rather be evidence of different approaches to 
adjudication in the civilian and common law traditions.  Regardless of 
the nature of the disagreement about the role of the law merchant in 
arbitration, there is likely a good bit of uncontroversial territory, on say, 
the role and status of INCOTERMS or the UCP, rules created by non-
state actors, as law merchant.  Acceptance of rules as “law merchant” or 
something else requires a good bit of work in clarifying terminology. 
And that is what this section purports to do. 
The approach to ordering the law merchant here is drawn largely 
from the settled categories of the law found in state-created legal 
systems.  I use concepts like legislation, case law, and general principles 
to order the law merchant.  The language of state law reflects forms of 
normative practices that are well accepted by both the creators and the 
users of the practices.  Schmitthoff offers a similar distinction between 
“international legislation” and “international commercial custom,” but 
his international legislation includes norms that even states produce, such 
as conventions, domestic legislation, and model laws.178  He calls it 
176. Garth & Dezalay, supra note 17, at 41-42. 
 177. There are counterexamples.  Berger and Dalhuisen identify norms.  BERGER,
CREEPING CODIFICATION, supra note 146; DALHUISEN ON TRANSNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL AND TRADE LAW, supra note 72, at 142-68, 209-
16, 219-37. 
 178. Schmitthoff, The Unification of the Law of International Trade, supra note 109, 
at 210. 
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“formulated custom.”179  It is true that these “formulations” reflect the 
evolved practices of merchants and banks throughout the years.  The 
organizations that make the law merchant he calls “international 
formulating agencies,” but these go far into state dominated IGO 
territory, and the norm sets these organizations produce are not the law 
merchant in my conception, but rather are state-created law.180 
2. Legislated Law Merchant
Legislated law merchant is sets of rules of a legislative or regulatory 
character, promulgated by non-state actors such as the International 
Chamber of Commerce in a legislative or regulatory setting.  They are 
usually produced as a single document in the form or an enactment or 
publication.  They are usually intended to be codifications of customary 
practices.181  They can include but are not limited to standard form 
contracts.  They can be transnational or domestic.  INCOTERMS and the 
Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits are 
transnational examples.182  Others are the Uniform Rules for Demand 
Guarantees and the Uniform Rules for Contract Bonds.183  I will focus on 
INCOTERMS and the UCP as standard examples familiar to most 
international commercial lawyers which are codifications of practices 
accepted for transborder transactions.  Lisa Bernstein provides a number 
of domestic trade association examples in her work.184  Her merchant 
communities are tight-knit professionals in trade associations but 
179. Id. 
 180. Id., at 212-18; Klaus Peter Berger, The New Law Merchant and the Global 
Market Place—A 21st Century View of Transnational Commercial Law, in THE PRACTICE 
OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 7 (Klaus Peter Berger ed. 2001). 
 181. Telephone Conversation with Emily O’Conner, ICC Commission on 
Commercial Law and Practice (Sept. 29, 2008). 
 182. The abbreviation for the Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary 
Credits is “UCP.”  INCOTERMS stands for “International Commercial Terms,” but the 
abbreviation is so widely used that the full name has fallen out of use. 
There are many other examples of legislated law merchant not explored above. 
Another prominent example is the rules and recommendations of the International Capital 
Markets Association, which “constitute the self-regulatory framework which ensures that 
tens of thousands of trades each day in international securities proceed smoothly to 
settlement.”  http://www.icma-group.org/market_practice.aspx (last visited November 17, 
2008). 
 183. ROY GOODE, HERBERT KRONKE, & EWAN MCKENDRICK, TRANSNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL LAW 351 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007). 
 184. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating 
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001); Lisa 
Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: A 
Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710 (1999); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a 
Merchant Court; Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996); Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal 
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992). 
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merchant communities could be understood broadly, as, for example, all 
non-consumer buyers and sellers of goods, which is the traditional 
coverage of International Chamber of Commerce instruments such as 
INCOTERMS. 
The nationalist would not classify these types of instruments as 
possible sources of law.  They would, rather, say that these instruments 
are standard contract terms and conditions that become part of the law of 
the contract when they are incorporated by reference into a contract and 
are then governed by whatever national law applies to the contract, 
including conventions that the country whose law applied has adopted.185  
They have such universally accepted status, however, that they reflect a 
normative practice independent from contractual incorporation.  That is, 
if you ask a banker if they comply with the UCP, the answer will very 
likely be “yes,” and not qualified by “only when incorporated into a 
contract.”186 
INCOTERMS are standard terms and conditions for allocating 
delivery obligations between buyers and sellers in sale of goods contracts 
that cross international borders.  They cover questions of who, as 
between buyer and seller, is to arrange for carriage, import and export 
regulatory matters, who buys insurance, and who has the risk of loss at 
different points in the transportation process.  They are frequently used 
because they provide uniformity, certainty, and predictability to buyers 
and sellers in different countries.  The “official” laws of nations have 
been notoriously deficient and lacking in uniformity on the issues that 
INCOTERMS covers.187  In 1936, the ICC stepped in to solve the 
 185. Jiménez explains: 
With regard to the legal effect around the world of the ICC’s rules for letters of 
credit, the basic rule is that the UCP rules are creatures of contract, and thus 
apply principally when they have been voluntarily incorporated by the parties. 
After more than 60 years of existence, the UCP has achieved such universal 
effect that in some countries, the UCP is recognised as having the force of law, 
or at least that of a strong trade custom.  However, in other countries, such as 
the UK, the UCP does not have formal legislative status. 
Jiminéz, supra note 116, at 292.  Regrettably, Jiménez identifies no sources for the 
treatment by a state body of the UCP as the law of a state. 
 186. Jiménez, supra note 116,quoted in GOODE, KRONKE, & MCKENDRICK, supra note 
116, at 356-58. 
 187. The 2002 revision of UCC Article 2 eliminated references to delivery and 
payment obligations in the UCC.  “The rationale for these changes is that the shipping 
terms as codified are out of date with commercial practice and any attempted codification 
of these terms would not keep in step with both domestic and international practice.” 
Linda J. Rusch, Is the Saga of the Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 Revisions Over? 
A Brief Look at What NCCUSL Finally Approved, 6 DEL. L. REV. 41 (2003).  The 
Comments to revised Article 2 recommend reference to INCOTERMS.  John E. Murray, 
Jr. & Harry M. Flechtner, The Summer, 1999 Draft of Revised Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code: What Hath NCCUSL Rejected?, 19 J. L. & COM. 1, 44 (1999).  The 
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problem through the promulgation of INCOTERMS.188  Merchant buyers 
and sellers of goods now rely on the 2000 version of INCOTERMS.189 
The UCP is the codification of banking practices for the issuance 
and use of documentary letters of credit, which are commonly used as 
the primary means of trade financing in international sale of goods 
transactions.  As Guillermo Jiménez explains, the UCP: 
is frequently cited as the foremost example of how international 
business self-regulation can be more efficient than treaties, 
government regulation or case law.  Indeed, legal commentators have 
called the UCP the most successful act of commercial harmonisation 
in the history of world trade, with the UCP 500 currently observed by 
banks in approximately 180 countries.190 
Jiménez continues: 
Near-universal adoption of the UCP in international trade and their 
incorporation into all relevant contracts . . . has had the result of 
producing, through a series of bilateral contracts, a multilateral 
network of contractual arrangements all based on a set of uniform 
rules by which the parties make their own law, which is largely 
independent of national legal systems.191 
The International Chamber of Commerce published the first UCP in 
1933, and has revised it regularly.192  The current version is known as 
UCP 600, which the ICC Commission on Banking Technique and 
Practice approved in October 2006, taking effect as of July 1, 2007.193  
The UCP is widely accepted by bankers and contract parties.  It is widely 
accepted as one of the most successful codifications of commercial 
practice.194  They, like INCOTERMS, are standard terms and conditions 
for incorporation by reference into letters of credit, but they also serve as 
standard practice regardless of incorporation.  To understand the practice 
of using the UCP, consider what Barclays Bank says about the UCP on 
its website: 
drafters are thus interested in promoting uniformity in domestic and international 
practices. 
188. Murray & Fletchner, supra note 131, at 44. 
189. The latest version is INCOTERMS 2000 (Geneva: ICC 2000). 
 190. Jiménez, quoted in GOODE, KRONKE, & MCKENDRICK, supra note 116, at 357. 
191. Id. at 358. 
192. Janet Koven Levit, Bottom-Up Lawmaking Through a Pluralist Lens: The ICC 
Banking Commission and the Transnational Regulation of Letters of Credit, 57 EMORY 
L.J. 1147, 1170-71 (2008). 
193. Id. 
 194. GOODE, KRONKE, & MCKENDRICK, supra note 116, at 350-51. 
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The majority of Documentary Letters of Credit are subject to a 
standardised code of practice formulated, and revised from time to 
time, by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and known 
as “Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits.”  UCP 
is therefore made a part of the contract between the Importer and the 
Issuing Bank, between the various banks concerned in the Credit and 
between the banks and the Exporter. 
Letters of Credit conforming to the current code should bear the 
clause “subject to Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary 
Credits (latest version).”195 
The ICC produces INCOTERMS, the UCP, and other norms using 
established procedures.  The procedures are unwritten, at least in a public 
document, but they are well-established.  The ICC seeks consensus from 
the various domestic chambers of commerce and other interested parties 
on rule changes.  The revisions themselves reflect actual practices of 
relevant merchants and professionals and are worked into INCOTERMS 
and UCP revisions.  The revisions are approved by a consensus 
procedure.  Notably, they are valid only if produced according to these 
procedures.196 
A less obvious yet still important source of legislated law merchant 
is the International Federation of Consulting Engineers, or FIDIC, 
standard terms and conditions for construction and related contracts. 
Some commentators call these the lex constructionis.197  International 
construction is a significant part of the global economy and the projects 
undertaken are complex.  Construction poses tremendous risks for the 
contract participants and for also for communities who finance public 
projects and ultimately use the completed works.  The World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Council for Trade in Services explains: 
Construction is one of the oldest of all industries, retaining its role as 
a core economic activity from the early days of human civilization to 
this day.  It not only provides the infrastructure for all other 
 195. Barclays Business Banking: Uniform Customs & Practice for Documentary 
Letters of Credit, http://www.business.barclays.co.uk/BRC1/jsp/brccontrol?task=article 
group&value=3448&target=_blank&site=bbb (last visited Aug. 15, 2008). 
 196. Emily O’Connor, supra note 181. 
 197. Gunther Teubner & Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Regime-Collisions: The Vain 
Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 999 
(2004); Oren Perez, Using Private-Public Linkages to Regulate Environmental Conflicts: 
The Case of International Construction Contracts, 29 J.L. SOC’Y. 77 (2002); Charles 
Molineaux, Moving Toward a Construction Lex Mercatoria: A Lex Constructionis, 14 J. 
INT’L. ARB. 55 (1997). 
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industries, but also constitutes one of the largest single sectors in the 
economy on its own.198 
Philip Bruner describes the risks involved in international construction as 
follows: 
International construction presents the greatest business risks (and 
presumably rewards) in the world.  In undertaking to construct 
massive monuments to mankind’s ingenuity in distant cities, jungles, 
deserts, mountains, and seas, international contractors confront a 
multitude of risks:  (1) management of many multinational parties; 
(2) language barriers to communication; (3) variations in the 
availability, productivity, and skill of labor; (4) foreign customs and 
practices; (5) potential political and economic instability; 
(6) uncertainties of weather; (7) unexpected geologic conditions; 
(8) extended lines of communications and supply; (9) differing 
quality and suitability of building materials; (10) currency 
fluctuations and restrictions; (11) unfamiliar forms of disease, plant, 
insect and animal life; (12) different civil and criminal laws; 
(13) possible arbitrary government regulation; (14) difficulties in 
obtaining adjudication of claims and enforcement of contract rights; 
and (15) abnormal duration, size, and technical complexity of 
international construction projects.199 
I have used “international construction” because that is the 
terminology the industry uses.  But the use of the word “international” is 
imprecise in the construction context.  The projects involve the use of 
standard form contracts written by a trade association with international 
membership but also rely on domestic law for gap fillers and recognition 
and enforcement of arbitral awards.  Moreover, the projects are usually 
undertaken on the soil of a particular country, and sometimes the owner 
is a government or a public enterprise.  Substantial domestic regulation is 
often the case.  It is the nationality of the contractors based on their 
headquarters being outside of the country where the work is performed, 
and the multinationality of the projects, including the financing, that 
gives the project its international character.  The kinds of projects for 
which FIDIC contracts are intended tend to be large-scale, such as the 
 198. WTO Council on Trade in Services, Construction and Related Engineering 
Services, Background Note by the Secretariat, June 8, 1998, S/C/W/38.  The WTO is 
interested in construction because it is a possible area of future expansion for the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services Agreement (GATS).  See World Trade Organization: 
Proposals for the new negotiations, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/ 
s_propnewnegs_e.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2008). 
 199. Philip L. Bruner, Allocation of Risks in International Construction: Revisting 
Murphy’s Law, The F.I.D.C. Conditions and the Doctrine of Force Majeure, 3 INT’L.
CONST. L. REV. 259, 259-60 (1986). 
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construction of major roads, airports, harbors, power generating 
facilities, waste disposal and sanitation facilities, and petrochemical 
plants.200 
Any unification that has occurred in construction law has been 
through the widespread use of FIDIC standard form contracts.  As 
Thomas Stipanowich explains in the context of U.S. law and the U.S. 
domestic construction industry: 
The transactional law of building design and construction stands in 
sharp contrast to the UCC approach to commercial transactions 
within its scope.  In the private arena, there is no overarching 
codification or synthesis of public law defining and limiting the 
spectrum of transactions.  Nor, until recently, was there significant 
professional or academic emphasis on construction law.201 
Transnational construction norms come from “standardized contracts, 
technical guidelines and arbitration awards,” with standardized contracts 
forming “the most important element in this discursive universe.”202  
These standardized contracts profoundly effect “the formation of 
normative expectations” in international construction.203 
Founded in 1913, FIDIC is the International Federation of 
Consulting Engineers.204  The acronym “FIDIC” is based on the French 
version of the name of the organization, “Fédération Internationale des 
Ingénieurs-Conseils.”  The folklore about FIDIC is that it chose to make 
its headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, and to use the French name 
because it wanted to show that it was a truly international body not 
dominated by British engineers.  As one commentator explains, 
“Although FIDIC is headquartered in Switzerland, the Red Book itself is 
firmly rooted in British law, both in the sense that it is fashioned for 
implementation in a common law system and that it incorporates 
peculiarly British notions of civil engineering construction 
contracting.”205  Its historically most influential set of standard terms and 
 200. Perez, supra note 197, at 83. 
 201. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Reconstructing Construction Law: Reality and Reform 
in a Transactional System, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 463, 467-48 (1998) (footnotes omitted). 
 202. Perez, supra note 197, at 84. 
203. Id. 
 204. International Federation of Consulting Engineers, http://www1 fidic.org/ 
federation/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2008). 
 205. M. Beth Lyon, The Role of the Consulting Engineer in Developing Country 
Construction Under the FIDIC Form Contract, 26 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 273 (1994). 
FIDIC’s Statute specifies “FIDIC” as its acronym regardless of the language used 
for its full name.  Fédération Internationale des Ingénieurs-Conseils.  Statutes and By-
Laws, International Federation of Consulting Engineers, Art. 1 (October 2005), 
http://www1 fidic.org/about/statutes.asp (last visited Aug. 15, 2008). 
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conditions, the so-called Red Book, is based on the domestic standard 
form contract of the British Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE).206  ICE, 
moreover, was instrumental in starting FIDIC.  British engineers have 
traditionally dominated as consulting engineers on international 
construction projects starting in the nineteenth century and continuing 
well into the twentieth century. 
FIDIC membership is comprised of national associations of 
consulting engineers.  As the FIDIC website explains: 
FIDIC . . . represents the international business interests of firms 
belonging to national Member Associations of engineering-based 
consulting companies.  As such, the Federation represents the 
As Hani Sarie-Eldin explains in the context of using the FIDC contracts in the 
Middle East: 
FIDIC conditions are inspired by the Institute for Civil Engineers (ICE) form, 
which, in turn, was based on English law concepts and construction industry 
practice in the United Kingdom.  Thus, FIDIC conditions are based on U.K. 
domestic contract law.  The changes made to transform the domestic form 
(ICE) to an international form (FIDIC) were, except for a few, insubstantial. 
Professor [Ian Duncan] Wallace has clearly pointed out this problem in his 
comment on FIDIC conditions, stating that: “There has . . . been far too little 
internationalization of the contract in this sense, which remains far too 
domestically English in character and language.” 
In addition, the general practice in some Arab countries (for example, Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates-Abu Dhabi) is to use the Arabic 
language for the language of the contract and its documents, including the 
FIDIC conditions.  According to such practice, the contract is constructed and 
interpreted in accordance with Arabic, not English, which is the origin 
language of the document.  On this point Professor Wallace notes that “the 
contract is so unremittingly and peculiarly English in its language and concepts 
at a number of points, that the task of any translator becomes impossible 
without a profound knowledge of English law and industrial practices.” 
Therefore, it is not surprising to find a considerable number of disputes due to 
the contradiction between the English version and an inaccurate Arabic 
translation. 
To sum up, on many occasions the intended aims of the FIDIC clauses 
supported by the English legal system and U.K. construction industry practice 
may lead to a different result for the same FIDIC clauses governed by Egyptian 
law or any other Arab country’s laws. 
Hani Serie-Eldin, Operation of FIDIC Civil Engineering Conditions in Egypt and Other 
Arab Middle Eastern Countries, 28 INT’L LAW 951 (1994) (footnotes omitted).  In 
response to these worries, FIDIC has promulgated contract documents based on the civil 
law and in different languages.  For a discussion of FIDIC and the civil law, see Hubert 
Andre-Dumont, The F.I.D.I.C. Conditions and Civil Law, 5 INT’L. CONST. L. REV. 43 
(1988). 
 206. NAEL G. BUNNI, THE FIDIC FORM OF CONTRACT: THE FIFTH EDITION OF THE RED
BOOK 3-4 (2nd ed. 2005). 
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business interest of firms supplying technology-based intellectual 
services for the built and natural environment.207 
Member associations must require that their individual members 
meet quality and ethical requirements set forth in the FIDIC Statute.208  
Current FIDIC membership is comprised of 64 member associations, 
which in turn are comprised of about 56,000 professional engineers.209 
Firms and other organizations may join FIDIC as affiliate members if 
their country has no national association or they do not qualify to belong 
to the national association.210  Individuals are not FIDIC members but 
can be correspondents in countries that do not have member 
associations.211 
FIDIC established a Contracts Committee in its year of inception, 
1913.212  From 1913 until 1993, FIDIC limited its contract drafting to 
three sets of contracts:  the Red Book, the Yellow Book and the White 
Book.213  FIDIC standard form contracts are known in shorthand by the 
colors of their covers.  FIDIC’s most used standard form contract is the 
“Red Book,” the official name of which is “Works of Civil Engineering 
Construction.”214  The Red Book has been used mainly for large 
traditional construction projects.  It is in its fourth edition, which was 
first published in 1987 and then amended in 1988 and 1992.215  In 1999, 
FIDIC published another set of contract conditions to replace the Red 
Book.216  The replacement is labeled as a first edition, so the fourth 
edition Red Book remains available.  The Yellow Book, “Electrical and 
Mechanical Works,” is in its third edition, dating from 1987, and was 
first published in 1963.217  Its primary use is in the construction of 
industrial sites.218  The White Book, “Client/Consultant Agreement,” is 
 207. International Federation of Consulting Engineers, http://www1 fidic.org/ 
federation/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2008). 
 208. International Federation of Consulting Engineers, Statutes and By-Laws art. 3 
(Oct. 2004) 
 209. International Federation of Consulting Engineers, http://www1 fidic.org/ 
federation/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2008). 
 210. International Federation of Consulting Engineers, Statutes and By-Laws art. 4 
(Oct. 2004). 
211. Id. at art. 17. 
 212. BUNNI, supra note 205, at 441. 
213. Id. 
214. FIDIC Forums: Contracts, http://www1 fidic.org/resources/contracts/default.asp? 
back=/resources/default.asp (last visited Aug. 15, 2008). 
 215. http://www1 fidic.org/bookshop/prod_page.asp?productcode=FC-RB-A-AA-10 
(last visited Aug. 15, 2008). 
 216. http://www1 fidic.org/bookshop/prod_page.asp?productcode=FC-RA-A-AA-09 
(last visited Aug. 15, 2008). 
 217. BUNNI, supra note 205, at 441; http://www1 fidic.org/bookshop/prod_page.asp? 
productcode=FG-AV-B-AA-10 (last visited Aug. 15, 2008). 
 218. Perez, supra note 197, at 88. 
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in its third edition, dating from 1998, and was first published in 1990.219  
There are now many other standard contracts, including the Orange 
Book, “Design Build and Turnkey,” the Silver Book, “EPC and Turnkey 
Projects,” and various other standard form contracts that may not be 
known by the color of their covers.220  The newer contracts, particularly 
the Orange and Silver Books, reflect new thinking by FIDIC.  The 
Orange Book reflects a trend towards classifying construction contracts 
based on allocation of responsibilities rather than on project type.  The 
Silver Book is based on a completely new model.  It is a two-party 
contract (employer-contractor) in which the engineer has no role.221  The 
Silver Book is designed for BOT and BOO projects, which reflect 
different roles for the parties and introduces the concessionaire as the 
party who takes responsibility for financing, construction and operation 
until the financing is paid off.222  FIDIC publishes its popular contracts in 
many languages, depending on need.  The Red Book, for example, is 
published in English, Arabic, Chinese, Croatian, French, Hungarian, 
Laotian, Polish, Russian, Spanish, Thai and Turkish.223 
These books are frequently used globally.  As Nael Bunni explains, 
the Red Book “has . . . been used continuously more than any other form 
in the international scene for over 30 years.”224  The World Bank and 
other international development institutions require the use of the Red 
Book, and other FIDIC books, modified to meet their particular needs, as 
standard terms and conditions in construction contracts that they fund.225  
FIDIC dominates in the production of norms for international 
construction. 
FIDIC has a sophisticated governance structure.  One of the tasks 
undertaken in this structure is the care and maintenance of FIDIC 
contracts.  The FIDIC By-Laws provide for a system of Standing or 
Liaisons Committees, answerable to the Executive Committee.  FIDIC 
has created the Contracts Committee, a standing committee whose 
 219. http://www1 fidic.org/bookshop/prod_page.asp?productcode=FG-AV-B-AA-10 
(last visited Aug. 15, 2008). 
 220. International Federation of Consulting Engineers Bookshop, 
http://www1 fidic.org/bookshop/default_contracts.asp#collection (last visited Aug. 15. 
2008).  “EPC” means “engineering, procurement, construction.” 
 221. Perez, supra note 197, at 91. 
 222. Id. at 92.  “BOT” stands for “build operate transfer” and “BOO” stands for build 
operate own.”  For more on these kinds of arrangements, see John Linarelli, Private 
Participation in Public Projects: Some Strategic Issues, in, PUBLIC PROCUREMENT:
GLOBAL REVOLUTION 259 (Sue Arrowsmith & Arwel Davies eds. 1998). 
 223. Perez, supra note 197, at 92. 
 224. BUNNI, supra note 205, at 108. 
225. See World Bank, Standard Bidding Documents, Procurement of Works and 
User’s Guide (World Bank May 2005). 
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purpose is to draft and update FIDIC contracts.226  The Executive 
Committee is elected by the FIDIC General Assembly.227 
In addition to the legislative functions within FIDIC itself, FIDIC 
contracts themselves have historically given the consulting engineer 
considerable power, in both contract management and in the system of 
resolving disputes in projects in which the contracts are used.  FIDIC 
contracts are generally designed around the idea of what a “trusted civil 
engineer” would expect to see in the document, and how a trusted civil 
engineer would interpret it.228  Historically, the British-trained engineer 
“provided an efficient alternative to the use of the judicial system.”229  
Though in revisions of the Red Book, the powers of the engineer have 
changed towards making the engineer less an impartial dispute resolver 
and more an agent of the employer,230 the following description is 
reflective of the traditional role of the engineer in FIDIC contracts, and 
in particular in the fourth edition of the Red Book, which still is available 
for use in construction projects: 
The engineer must also resolve most of the day-to-day differences of 
opinion which frequently occur in multi-million or multi-billion 
dollar projects involving years of work by multiple subcontractors.  It 
is this broad spectrum of decisional powers, binding both the 
contractor and the employer, which makes the FIDIC engineer 
226. The terms of reference for the Contracts Committee are as follows: 
(1) To identify Conditions of Contract and other documents which, subject to 
the concurrence of the Executive Committee, should be prepared or up-
dated by FIDIC. 
(2) To establish task forces to draft each document and to guide them as 
required and to carry out a final review of the documents for submission to 
the EC. 
(3) To liaise, in conjunction with the Secretariat, organizations interested in 
FIDIC’s Conditions of Contract. 
(4) To coordinate the handling of queries on the interpretation of the 
documents. 
(5) To promote interest in seminars and workshops and to suggest topics and 
speakers as appropriate. 
(6) To coordinate the handling of queries on the interpretation of the 
documents. 
(7) To promote interest in seminars and workshops and to suggest topics and 
speakers, as appropriate. 
(8) To liaise closely with the Assessment Panel for Adjudicators, a training 
operation for adjudicators. 
See FIDIC, Contract Comm., http://217.197.210.21/about/comm/cc/. 
 227. See FIDIC, Statutes & Bylaws, http://217.197.210.21/resources/statutes/ 
statutes_en_2007.pdf 
 228. BUNNI, supra note 205, at 73. 
 229. Lyon, supra note 205, at 291. 
 230. David Bateson, FIDIC—New 1999 Edition of the Red Book Impartiality of the 
Engineer, http://www1.fidic.org/resources/contracts/bateson_aug00.asp (last visited Aug. 
15, 2008). 
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“uniquely strong and independent.”  One engineer has commented 
that except under one clause, the Red Book merely authorizes the 
engineer to “express an opinion,” not to make a decision.  It seems 
that in many clauses of the Red Book, however, the engineer’s 
opinion seriously affects the rights and duties of the contractor and 
the employer. 
Additionally, under Clause 67, to which the commentator referred, 
the engineer is the authority by whom disagreements must be decided 
before they can be referred to arbitration.  This second-stage of more 
formalized decision-making occurs infrequently. . . .231 
Under clause 67, if a dispute arises, one of the parties, the owner or 
the contractor, must first refer the dispute to the engineer.  The engineer 
has a fixed number of days after receipt of written notice of the dispute to 
give notice of his decision.  The engineer’s decision is final unless one of 
the parties refers the matter to arbitration.  A disappointed party has a 
fixed number of days from the date of notice of the engineer’s decision 
to give notice of intent to arbitrate.  Before actually commencing 
arbitration, the parties must try to settle their dispute amicably.232  The 
Red Book reflects a clear FIDIC preference for the engineer as the 
adjudicator of disputes, despite the engineer’s hiring by the employer. 
The World Bank mandates that its borrowers use its standard 
bidding documents for works projects the Bank funds.  The Bank 
incorporates the FIDIC Red Book as standard terms and conditions into 
its bidding documents, with exceptions.233 
FIDIC is not the only possible source of lex constructionis.  Other 
private associations, such as the Engineering Advancement Association 
of Japan (ENAA), have produced important standard form contracts, yet 
none are as influential or as widely used as FIDIC contracts.234 
Finally, another candidate for classification as legislated law 
merchant is the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts.235  It is a contract code of sorts, prepared by a group of 
country representatives and observers in a working group under the 
authority of an IGO.  UNIDROIT has substantial government 
representation, yet the Principles are not a convention, but one of their 
intended purposes is to serve as a “model for national and international 
 231. Lyon, supra note 205, at 276-77. 
232. Red Book, Clause 67. 
233. Standard Bidding Documents, Procurement of Works and User’s Guide (World 
Bank May 2005), available at http://go.worldbank.org/IP4T44BOA0. 
 234. Perez, supra note 197, at 89. 
 235. Yet another candidate is the Principles of European Contract Law, 
http://frontpage.cbs.dk/law/commission_on_european_contract_law/ (last visited Oct. 10, 
2008). 
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legislators.”236  They are wonderfully drafted and an excellent source of 
principles of contract law for anyone interested in the comparative study 
of contract law.  But they are unlikely sources of commercial law.  They 
are the product of mainly legal scholars working under the auspices of an 
IGO.  As Dalhuisen explains: 
They are no more than products of a UNIDROIT committee and as 
such have at best persuasive power in terms of a restatement or as 
soft law.  Their authority is hardly in their academic pedigree and 
content, and their legitimacy if any can only derive from their 
reflection of international fundamental principles or from the ability 
of the international legal practice to recognise itself in them and to 
accept their guidance. . . .  To put it more crudely, short of them 
reflecting fundamental legal principle and mandatory international 
practice, only the market place can decide their ultimate fate. 
Ordinarily therefore, international trade and commerce have 
themselves here the last word.237 
At most, the UNIDROIT Contract Principles can serve to inform the 
content of the law merchant and other commercial law sources.  Their 
Preamble is ambitious in specifying that they “may be applied when the 
parties have agreed that their contract be governed by general principles 
of law, the lex mercatoria, or the like,” or when the parties have failed to 
include a choice of law clause in their contract, or “interpret or 
supplement” either domestic law or “uniform law instruments.”238  Their 
inclusion in the law merchant ultimately may depend on whether one 
takes a wide or narrow view of the law merchant.  Ole Lando, who takes 
a wide view, would classify the Principles as law merchant;239 Goldman, 
who takes a narrow view, might not, and perhaps Michael Joachim 
Bonell, the Chairperson of the Working Group that drafted the 
Principles, has the right view when he classifies them as a “hybrid.”240  
Bonell continues: 
Whether the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts are part of transnational law depends of course on the 
meaning one intends to give to this latter notion.  If one adopts a 
 236. UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, Preamble, 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/main htm (last visited Oct. 10, 
2008). 
 237. DALHUISEN ON TRANSNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL
AND TRADE LAW, supra note 72, at 306. 
 238. UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, Preamble, supra 
note 236. 
 239. Lando, supra note 109. 
 240. Michael Joachim Bonell, UNIDROIT Principles and the Lex Mercatoria, in LEX 
MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW MERCHANT 240
(Thomas Carbonneau ed., rev. ed.1998) (1990). 
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narrow definition whereby transnational law basically consists of 
generally recognised principles of law and trade usages, it may be 
difficult to consider the UNIDROIT Principles as a whole as failing 
in one category or the other.  On the contrary, on the basis of a 
broader definition whereby transnational law includes virtually all 
principles and rules other than those established by a particular 
domestic law, the UNIDROIT Principles, like other “private” 
instruments such as INCOTERMS or the UCP, are definitely part of 
it.  Yet regardless of the position taken on this point, it can hardly be 
disputed that, also with respect to the UNIDROIT Principles, what 
really matters is not so much their definition in theoretical terms but 
rather whether, and the extent to which, they may be applied in 
practice in lieu of or in addition to domestic law.241 
Under my scheme of classification, the Principles are not rules 
produced by non-state actors, such as INCOTERMS and the UCP, 
because they do not come from a non-state source, nor are they a product 
of a merchant community.  Bonell and Dalhuisen agree that what matters 
for the status of the Principles as law merchant is their use and eventual 
acceptance by normative communities as law. 
3. Interpretations of Legislated Law Merchant by Judges and
Arbitrators
Judges sometimes find themselves in a position of having to apply 
and interpret legislated law merchant.  Two U.S. examples of such 
interpretations are BP Oil International, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal 
Petroleos de Ecuador242 and St. Paul Guardian Insurance Co. v. 
Neuromed Medical Systems Support.243  In these cases, the courts held 
that when contract parties use terms found in INCOTERMS, but they 
have neither defined the terms in their contract nor expressly 
incorporated INCOTERMS into the contract by reference, INCOTERMS 
apply nonetheless.  Arbitral panels have similarly so held.244  These cases 
are based on CISG Article 9(2), which provides: 
 241. Michael Joachim Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles and Transnational Law, in 
BERGER, THE PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW, supra note 30, at 23-24. 
 242. BP Oil International, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador, 332 F.2d 333 
(5th Cir. 2003), reh’g denied, No. 02-20166, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 13595 (5th Cir. Jan. 
16, 2003), appeal after remand, No. 04-20911, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 914 (5th Cir. Jan. 
16, 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 105 (2008). 
 243. St. Paul Guardian Insurance Co. v. Neuromed Medical Systems Support, No. 00 
CIV. 9344(SHS), 2002 WL 465312 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002). 
 244. ICC Arbitration Case No. 7645 of March 1995, available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/957645i1 html); Russian Arbitration June 6, 2000 
Arbitration Proceeding 406/1998, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 
000606r1 html.  These sources are from Clayton P. Gillette, The Law Merchant in the 
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The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have 
impliedly made applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of 
which the parties knew or ought to have known and which in 
international trade is widely known to, and regularly observed by, 
parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular trade 
concerned.245 
Incorporation is not restricted to the CISG context.  Even without 
such prompting by a state-produced source, courts will incorporate the 
law merchant.  In Harlow and Jones Ltd. v. American Express Bank Ltd., 
the Queen’s Bench held that the Uniform Customs and Practices (UCP) 
of the International Chamber of Commerce governs banking 
relationships even if not expressly incorporated by contract.246  Based on 
comprehensive surveys of commercial practices, a team of European 
legal scholars headed by Klaus Peter Berger has compiled a set of “truus 
lex” principles of the contemporary law merchant.  Principle I.2.2 is as 
follows: 
The parties are bound by any usages to which they have agreed and 
by any practice which they have established between themselves. 
Unless agreed otherwise, they are considered to have impliedly made 
applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of which the 
parties knew or ought to have known and which in international trade 
is widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of 
the type involved in the particular trade concerned.247 
This principle does not distinguish between legislated and evolved law 
merchant.  There are many other examples involving express contractual 
incorporation as well.248 
To a lawyer bound to national traditions, this discussion is about 
incorporation of the law merchant into state law.  The notion of 
incorporation has a long history.  An early influential American decision 
on incorporation is Swift v. Tyson.249  Suppressing the questions of 
federalism the case is widely known for in American law, in Swift, 
Justice Joseph Story relied on a law merchant customary rule found in 
Modern Age: Institutional Design and International Usages Under the CISG, 5 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 157 (2004). 
 245. CISG art. 9(2), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/treaty.html 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2008). 
 246. Harlow and Jones Ltd. v. American Express Bank Ltd., 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 343 
(QBD 1990). 
 247. CENTRAL List of Lex Mercatoria Principles, Rules and Standards, Principle 
I.2.2, available at http://www.Trans-Lex.org/903000. 
 248. Three possible forms of incorporation have presented themselves in the history 
of commercial law.  These are covered in Part III below.  See infra notes 297-316, 338-45 
and accompanying text. 
249. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842). 
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English cases, which upheld the principle of negotiability by permitting 
past consideration to serve as meeting the value element for holder in due 
course status.  In so holding, he refused to rely on New York state court 
decisions, even though he was sitting in diversity.  Well before the UCC 
came into existence, American sales and contract law incorporated 
custom.  The comment to UCC § 1-205 cites to the pre-UCC Uniform 
Sales Act §§ 9(1), 15(5), 18(2), and 71 as relevant prior incorporation 
provisions.250  The First American Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 
well-accepted as reflecting the “classical” view of contract law, permits 
incorporation.251 
Of course, the UCC is well-known for its “incorporation 
strategy.”252  The UCC provides a hierarchy for course of dealing, course 
of performance and usages of trade, the three forms of custom the UCC 
explicitly recognizes.253  Contract terms are to be construed whenever 
reasonable as consistent with each other, but in the event that is not 
possible, express terms prevail over everything else, followed by course 
of performance, then course of dealing, then usage of trade, then UCC 
gap fillers themselves.  But the UCC goes farther than simply 
recognizing these forms of custom as aids in interpretation of contracts. 
Llewellyn’s plan was for the entire Code to reflect “good” custom 
facilitating exchange consistently with maxims of good faith.254 
In Luke v. Lyde, Lord Mansfield said that the law of negotiable 
instruments was not the law of one country.255  His view was common in 
the eighteenth century, before commercial law became a national 
enterprise.  At the time, commercial law was the law merchant and part 
of the law of nations.256  But Lord Mansfield’s approach has been 
understood to work in the other direction, that he undertook to 
250. UCC § 1-205 Comment. 
 251. Restatement (First) Contracts §§ 247, 248 (1932).  Section 247, entitled, “when 
usage is operative upon parties,” provides: 
A usage is operative upon parties to a transaction where and only where 
(a) they manifest to each other an assent that the usage shall be operative, or 
(b) either party intends the effect of his words of other acts to be governed by 
the usage, and the other party knows or has reason to know this intention, or 
(c) the usage exists in such transactions and each party knows of the usage or it 
is generally known by persons under similar circumstances, unless either party 
knows or has reason to know that the other party has an intention inconsistent 
with the usage. 
252. To my knowledge, this is Lisa Bernstein’s phrase.  See Bernstein, supra note 
184. 
253. UCC § 1-303. 
 254. Alan Schwartz, Karl Llewellyn and the Origins of Contract Theory, in KRAUS & 
WALT, supra note 27, at 42. 
255. Luke v. Lyde, 2 Burr. R. 883, 887 (1759), quoted in Dalhuisen, Legal Orders and 
Their Manifestation, supra note 17, at 11, n. 15. 
 256. MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 143-44 (1978). 
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incorporate commercial law into English law.  English cases plainly 
advise that commercial law becomes an unfeasible concept without 
incorporation.  Consider Goodwin v.  Robarts, a nineteenth century case 
in which the issue was whether certain Russian and Hungarian 
government scrip was negotiable.257  Goodwin allowed his broker to 
retain possession of scrip belonging to him.  The scrip promised to give 
bonds to the bearer after all installments had been paid with interest. 
Goodwin’s broker pledged the scrip to a bank as security for a loan.  The 
broker went bankrupt and the bankers sold the scrip.  Goodwin sued the 
bankers.  He argued that the scrip was not negotiable because it was not 
recognized as such by the law merchant.  The Exchequer Chamber held 
otherwise on the content of the law merchant, and the House of Lords 
affirmed.  Cockburn, C.J., said: 
Having given the fullest consideration to this argument, we are of the 
opinion that it cannot prevail.  It is founded on the view that the law 
merchant thus referred to is fixed and stereotyped, and incapable of 
being expanded and enlarged so as to meet the wants and 
requirements of trade in the varying circumstances of commerce.  It 
is true that the law merchant is sometimes spoken of as a fixed body 
of law, forming part of the common law, as and it were coequal with 
it.  But as a matter of legal history, this view is altogether incorrect. 
The law merchant . . . is neither more nor less than the usages of 
merchants and traders in the different departments of trade, ratified 
by the decisions of Courts of law, which, upon such usages being 
proved before them, have adopted them as settled law with a view to 
the interests of trade and the public convenience, the Court 
proceeding herein on the well-known principle of law that, with 
reference to transactions in the different departments of trade, Courts 
of law, in giving effect to the contracts and dealings of the parties, 
will assume that the latter have dealt with one another on the footing 
of any custom or usage prevailing generally in the particular 
department.  By this process, what before was usage only, 
unsanctioned by legal decision, has become engrafted upon, or 
incorporated into, the common law, and may thus be said to form part 
of it.  “When a general usage has been judicially ascertained and 
established,” says Lord Campbell, in Brandao v. Barnett . . ., “it 
becomes a part of the law merchant, which Courts of justice are 
bound to know and recognise.258
 257. Goodwin v. Robarts, LR 10 Exch. 337 (1875), aff’d, 1 App. Cas. 476 (1876). 
Much of what follows is influenced substantially by L.S. SEALY & R.J.A. HOOLEY,
COMMERCIAL LAW 22-24, 471-73 (4th ed. 2008). 
258. Goodwin, LR 10 Exch. at 346. 
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In a 1932 article in the Law Quarterly Review, Robert Chorley said that 
Cockburn’s statements of incorporation “should be inscribed in letters of 
gold in every Court handling commercial litigation.”259  Contemporary 
British commercial legislation generally accepts incorporation.260  
Incorporation is so well-accepted that courts no longer cite authority to 
support it.261  Roy Goode explains, in words sounding like Cockburn’s: 
Of great importance as a source of obligation in commercial contracts 
are the unwritten customs and usages of merchants.  The impact of 
these on the content and interpretation of contract terms cannot be 
overstated.  It is, perhaps, this feature above all which distinguishes 
commercial from other contracts, a distinction not formally adopted 
by the law.  The fertility of the business mind and the fact that a 
practice which begins life by having no legal force acquires over time 
the sanctity of law are key factors to which the commercial lawyer 
must continually be responsive.  Is a particular document a document 
of title?  The House of Lords may have said no, possibly more than 
once.  But how long ago was the ruling given?  Cannot it not now be 
said, in another time, that the acceptance of this document as a 
document of title in mercantile usage is so entrenched as to justify 
according it legal recognition as such?  Is a payment instrument 
outside the Bills of Exchange Act negotiable?  In principle yes, if so 
accepted by the mercantile community, which may happen 
immediately or only over time.262
From English and American law we can extend our search for 
incorporation to other countries, and also to international instruments as 
evidence of the trend.  Civil law countries have tended to be hostile to 
incorporation.263 
Judges are state officials and courts are state organs, so it might 
seem that this category deviates from the condition that the law merchant 
must derive only from non-state sources.  But this category is needed 
because it reflects actual practice.  It illustrates why conceptual 
restrictions on legal authority as only “public,” as relating only to state 
officials, fails to account for the interaction of state and non-state actors. 
 259. Robert S.T. Chorley, Conflict of Law and Commerce, 48 L. Q. REV. 51, 55 
(1932). 
 260. Sealy & Hooley, supra note 257, at 23. 
261. See, e.g., Harlow and Jones, supra note 246. 
 262. GOODE, COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 89, at 14. 
 263. DALHUISEN ON TRANSNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL
AND TRADE LAW, supra note 72, at 149.  A detailed examination of the reasons for this 
hostility is beyond the scope of this article.  See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying 
text on the strong national identity sentiments associated with codification in the civilian 
countries. 
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We have to account for the interaction else our categorization will be 
incomplete. 
4. Evolved Law Merchant and General Principles
Is there any law merchant that is entirely customary?  I use the term 
“customary” to refer to norms that are wholly uncodified, in other words, 
not codified even by non-state actors such as the ICC.  The distinction 
between evolved and legislated merchant may not be as stark as my 
categorization suggests, as legislated merchant may be nothing more than 
codification of custom.264 
Jan Dalhuisen provides a recent attempt to organize the law 
merchant around categories.  I will basis my discussion on his work 
because I think it is a rigorous attempt to exhaustively identify the law 
merchant categories.  Dalhuisen identifies three categories of relevance 
to the category of evolved law merchant: fundamental principles of law, 
general principles of law, and custom.265 
Dalhuisen’s fundamental principles include pact sunt servanda, 
detrimental reliance, apparent authority, select ownership principles, 
unjust enrichment liability, and good faith.266  He contends that these 
principles are “the essence and basis of the law of contract, agency, 
property, tort, and restitution.”267  He also includes basic fiduciary duties 
as fundamental principles of law.  Dalhuisen justifies fundamental 
principles of law as natural law.268  My approach, however, is positivist, 
which means that I rely on the claim that law draws entirely or mainly 
from social practices.  Positivism also requires acceptance of the claim 
that law’s validity or existence does not necessarily depend on something 
other than social practices associated with the law itself.  A positivist 
cannot claim that Dalhuisen’s fundamental principles are law, though she 
might claim, if she is an inclusive legal positivist, that in some cases 
fundamental principles not coming from a social source might identify 
valid legal rules.269  Dalhuisen, however, does not make the validation 
claim.  This inquiry treads into Part III territory only to make the point 
 264. Emily O’Conner, supra note 181. 
 265. Left unaddressed is his argument for a hierarchy of norms, in which he argues 
against conflicts approaches to transnational commercial law because it leads to use of 
ill-suited domestic law rules.  It is unnecessary to the analysis in this article. 
266. See Tom Carbonneau, A Definition of and Perspective Upon the Lex Mercatoria 
Debate, in CARBONNEAU, supra note 240, at 11, 17 (how ICC arbitrators use good faith 
and others general principles of law). 
 267. DALHUISEN ON TRANSNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL
AND TRADE LAW, supra note 72, at 149. 
268. Id. at 60, 102-03. 
 269. This is not the place to discuss inclusive versus exclusive legal positivism.  For 
discussion, see the authorities cited in note 9, supra. 
2009] THE CONCEPT OF COMMERCIAL LAW 183
that it is unlikely that Dalhuisen’s fundamental principles can be 
customary law merchant unless they come from a social source.  While 
these fundamental principles might operate as overarching principles 
when one does reflective equilibrium270 to provide normative 
justification for the content of more fine-grained legal rules, it seems 
implausible that they form an independent basis for a set of customary 
law merchant rules. 
Dalhuisen also identifies lower order “general principles of law” 
which he says are “often deduced from comparative research; that is, 
from similarities in national law.”271  As explained above,272 such a 
classification is a mistake.  Looking for content convergence adds 
nothing to determining whether independent norms exist.  It simply tells 
us that legal rules in different national systems are similar in content. 
Dalhuisen is not alone in making this mistake.  It is a mistake common to 
many comparatively minded commercial lawyers. 
Finally, Dalhuisen identifies custom as a law merchant category. 
He defines custom as: 
a practice which is universal in the trade or a relevant segment 
thereof and can as such not be unilaterally withdrawn or changed 
except if it is in its nature, but would require an industry shift or even 
the other party’s consent to be set aside in an individual case.273 
Dalhuisen makes the right distinction between customary rules and 
habit.274  The above definition, however, includes what I classify as 
legislated law merchant.  Dalhuisen does not offer purely uncodified 
examples.  Is there such a thing as pure uncodified custom that does not 
amount to some sort of overarching fundamental or general principles 
shared by state law?  I do not make the claim that evolved law merchant 
exists or that it is law, but only that it is possible that it exists and that it 
should be evaluated for determining its status.  There is likely plenty of 
uncodified specific industry custom out there that has raised to the level 
of rules and is not merely statistical irregularity or habit.  We get 
puzzling facts in cases like A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, in which 
farmers sold grain to an insolvent grain elevator on credit.275  Was this 
poor planning or reflective of an industry custom of not requiring 
advance payment or other financing?  Empirical inquiry on specific 
270. See supra note 47 for an explanation of reflective equilibrium. 
 271. DALHUISEN ON TRANSNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL
AND TRADE LAW, supra note 72, at 149. 
272. See infra notes 161-79 and accompanying text. 
 273. DALHUISEN ON TRANSNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL
AND TRADE LAW, supra note 72, at 151. 
274. Id. at 150. 
275. A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, 309 N.W. 2d 285 (Minn. 1988). 
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industries might provide some answers here, though longstanding trades 
tend to rely on standard form contracts, which are in the nature of 
codified custom, or what I classify as legislated law merchant. 
One final question that the above initial classification of possible 
sources raises:  can arbitrators create custom?  It seems plausible to 
conclude that arbitrators usually find themselves in the position of at 
most having the authority to identify and interpret pre-existing custom in 
accordance with the intent of the parties.  Custom arises from merchant 
practices.  Absent a clear choice of the law merchant as the law of the 
contract, a very rare occurrence, arbitral panels risk having their decision 
found to be void as against public policy or ordre public in actions either 
to set aside or enforce the award.276  The only way around this problem 
seems to be if a state court accepts a content convergence argument, as in 
Pabalk Ticaret v. Norsolor, in which both the Austrian Supreme Court in 
the set aside action and the French Court of Cassation in the enforcement 
action held that the principle of good faith the arbitrators used, and which 
they said came from the law merchant and not from a conflict of laws 
analysis, was sufficiently similar to state law as to not violate ordre 
public.277  The arbitrators in the case did not have the power under the 
arbitration agreement to rule as amiable compositeurs or in equity.278 
III. THE CONCEPT OF COMMERCIAL LAW
Using the above sources as background understandings of the state
of commercial law, we can now go back to the question asked at the 
beginning of this article:  can the case be made in the tradition of 
analytical jurisprudence for a system of transnational commercial law? 
So far, I have only described the plausible sources of commercial law. 
An attempt to understand commercial law as a transnational legal order 
requires an identification of what might get included in the concept of 
transnational commercial law, which is the subject of Part III.  If we 
think of law only as state-centric, we might find the question of what gets 
included to be banal.  But the identification of the above plausible 
sources casts doubt on the strength of state-centric positivist claims, 
though some parts of the above discussion also seem to confirm the 
 276. If the views of most common law judges are anything like those of Lords 
Diplock and Mustill, two prominent members of the British judiciary, one would not 
want to take before them for recognition and enforcement any arbitral award saying 
anything about the law merchant that the parties do not expressly incorporate into the 
contract.  See Mustill, supra note 19; Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp. v. Kuwait Insurance 
Co., [1983] 3 W.L.R. 241, discussed supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text. 
 277. Pabalk Ticaret v. Norsolor, 24 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 360 (1985) 
(commentary by Emmanuel Gaillard). 
278. Id. 
2009] THE CONCEPT OF COMMERCIAL LAW 185
dominance of state law and institutions.  Simply identifying the plausible 
sources, however, cannot serve as justification for conceptualizing 
commercial law as a transnational system.  Identification of sources by 
itself informs us that we should not ignore these sources from the 
standpoints of usefulness, function, or relevance to clients lawyers might 
represent, but these instrumental features of the sources alone do not 
support the conclusion that a unified system of transnational commercial 
law exists.  Identification of sources can just as well support the claim 
that commercial law exists across distinct normative systems dominated 
by state institutions. 
The question to be addressed is whether a system of transnational 
commercial law exists, in the form of what Joseph Raz calls an 
institutionalized normative system, or what Neil MacCormick calls an 
institutional normative order.279  If so, how do the above-identified 
sources work in such a system?  If the answer to the first question is yes, 
then we can claim that the “wide view” law merchant theorists, such as 
Ole Lando and Clive Schmitthoff, are right.  We will discover, however, 
that they reach the conclusion in the wrong way, through comparative 
law methods, which answers questions only about legal content and not 
about legal validity.280  I am not convinced, however, that the answer to 
the first question is in the affirmative.  Remember, the aim of this article 
is description.  The limits of legal positivism are tested here, to see if it 
can account for transnational orders or tell us that we are on the wrong 
path of conceptualizing such orders. 
I make the tentative case for a concept of transnational commercial 
law, but concede that my account is in tension with established legal 
positivist tenets.  Given that tension, legal positivism runs the risk of 
becoming a provincial and outdated theory about municipal law in an era 
of pervasive globalization of the law.  Institutionalized normative orders 
supporting the practical authority of almost all of the above sources can 
be found, but it does not follow that these orders form a legal system. 
Legal positivism gets it right in giving municipal legal systems an 
essential role in producing, applying, and enforcing commercial law. 
But legal positivism may need servicing to deal with the relationship of 
municipal legal systems to each other and to the multiple normative 
orders out there that do not rely on the state for their validity. 
My account is in tension with two different accounts, legal 
pluralism and legal positivism.  Though the state-centricity of legal 
 279. RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS, supra note 12, at 128-48; MACCORMICK,
INSTITUTIONS OF LAW, supra note 33, at 21-37; see also NEIL MACCORMICK, 
QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY 1-15 (1999). 
280. See supra notes 162-80 and accompanying text. 
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positivism is not explicit in positivist teachings, legal pluralists have 
criticized legal positivism for being an incomplete account only of state 
law.281  Legal positivists have used conceptual analysis to describe the 
logical features of municipal legal systems.  Hart’s central case of a legal 
system is that of a municipal legal system.282  As explained below, Raz’s 
uniqueness conditions for a legal system all but in name qualify only 
municipal systems for inclusion.283  Opposing positivist accounts of the 
law are pluralist accounts, which do not locate within analytical 
jurisprudence, but are mainly sociological or anthropological.284  My 
account differs from the legal pluralist account in that I write in the 
tradition of analytical jurisprudence.  I try to elucidate a cosmopolitan 
version of legal positivism that can account for the distributed and 
transnational features of commercial law.  Analytical jurisprudence is in 
desperate need of a conceptual analysis that can account for law’s 
globalization. 
To develop a transnational concept of commercial law requires that 
we try to split positivism into two versions or conceptions.  The first is 
the traditional or political conception of legal positivism, which seems to 
be the way positivism is understood in its mainstream.  The other is a 
new or cosmopolitan conception of legal positivism, which no 
philosopher or legal scholar has attempted.285  The account to follow 
must do two things, revise positivism and apply the revised version to 
commercial law norms.286 
A. The Political Conception of Positivism and National Commercial 
Law 
I divide the inquiry here into two sections.  The first section 
sketches out the political conception of positivism.  It is only a sketch 
and I cannot provide here any comprehensive survey.  The second 
section uses that political conception to conceptualize commercial law as 
a predominantly national, sovereignty-driven project. 
 281. See, e.g., Teubner, Global Bukowina, supra note 13, at 10; Tamanaha, supra 
note 24, at 42.  Although Berman does not critique positivism, his is an important recent 
account that throws doubt on legal positivism as being able to offer an adequate 
descriptive account of globalized law.  Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 24. 
282. See supra notes 291-311 and accompanying text. 
283. See infra notes 299-314 and accompanying text. 
284. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
285. As explained above, I adapt Nagel’s distinction on approaches to understanding 
justice.  See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 286. The norm-giver and norm-user terminology is from MACCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS
OF LAW, supra note 33, at 20-22. 
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1. The Political Conception of Legal Positivism
We can first easily dispense with any notion that force is the source 
of the authority of law.  From the repudiation of force it is an easy step to 
repudiate command as the source of authority for a legal system.  It is 
important to dispense with force or command as justification for a norm 
to be law because states have a monopoly on the permissible use of force 
and the declaration and enforcement of commands.  In a transnational 
approach, non-state norm givers and norm users lack the means to force 
or command, nor do they have a moral right to use force to enforce their 
norms.  No one takes seriously anymore the Austinian idea of law’s 
authority coming from sovereign power and followed by subjects out of 
a habit of obedience of the sovereign.  To Austin, the threat of sanction is 
what made law.  In his words, “every law properly so called is set by a 
superior to an inferior or inferiors:  it is set by a party armed with might, 
to a party or parties to whom that might can reach.”287  Austin was the 
last of the prominent legal positivists to make explicit the need for a 
sovereign for a law to exist.  The idea can be traced to Hobbes.  A 
distinct break occurred between the “ancestral” positivists, Hobbes, to 
Bentham,288 and then on to Austin, who all endorsed the role of force in 
supporting law’s authority, and “contemporary” positivists, who find 
law’s authority in social practices, and ultimately even in custom.289  The 
delinking of positive law from force or command is a crucial step in 
finding positive law outside of the state. 
What are the conditions analytical jurisprudence now requires for a 
legal system?  It depends who you ask, but Hart’s is certainly a canonical 
account.290  We should also examine elements of Raz’s account because 
he specifies uniqueness conditions for a legal system that effectively 
claim that a legal system cannot be anything other than a municipal legal 
system.  I will attempt to summarize relevant parts of Hart and Raz in 
several paragraphs, which undoubtedly will do both their accounts 
disservice, but I want to identify the basic contours so we are clear on the 
obstacles before us. 
Hart saw a legal system as a system of social rules, owing its 
existence entirely to human social practices, governing humans in 
societies.291  Legal systems have what Neil MacCormick calls a 
 287. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1995). 
 288. JEREMY BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL (H.L.A. Hart ed. 1970). 
289. See Waldron, supra note 1, at 93. 
 290. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 8. 
 291. NEIL MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART, supra note 11 (“The legal theory . . . 
presented [in the Concept of Law] is if a legal system of social rules, social in a double 
sense: both in that they govern the conduct of human beings in societies and in that they 
owe their origin and existence to human social practices.”). 
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“systemic quality” because they are comprised of the union of primary 
rules of obligation and secondary rules of adjudication, change, and 
recognition.292  The systemic quality comes from the fact that primary 
and secondary rules relate to one another.  Primary rules are rules that 
apply directly to human conduct, which specify crimes, torts, obligations, 
rights, duties, and so on.  Secondary rules of adjudication give certain 
officials (the archetype is the judge) power to determine whether persons 
have violated primary rules.  Included within rules of adjudication are 
rules of enforcement.  Secondary rules of change are rules used to 
change primary rules.  Examples of rules of change are the rules 
governing legislation.  Rules of change include lower order power 
conferring rules that give persons that ability to change their legal 
relationships with one another, such as the power to contract, create 
trusts, and so on.  Rules of recognition set forth the criteria for the 
validity of all other rules in the legal system.  They are essential to the 
existence of the legal system because they tell officials and citizens 
which rules are valid in the legal system.  For example, rules of 
recognition tell judges about the body of rules they can apply to decide a 
case.  A legal system has to be “in force,” which means that most persons 
subject to it obey primary rules most of the time.  It does not matter why 
they obey.  The officials themselves, however, must accept the rules of 
recognition from an internal point of view, which means that they have 
to accept them as binding on them and to take a critical view if another 
official fails to adhere to them.  Social rules that are not legal rules might 
share content similar to legal rules.  International law is an example.  A 
minimum content of natural law is necessary for collective survival, and 
that minimum content is reflected in legal systems.  Law and morality 
may overlap in content but lack a necessary connection.  Gaps in the 
rules are filled by judicial discretion. 
Hart did not say that his account only specified the conditions for a 
legal system.  His claim seems to be that a legal system is an 
institutionalized normative system with the features he specified.  A legal 
system of a state with a defined geographic territory could be seen as a 
central case for Hart.293  Raz accepts Hart’s two-part description of law 
as the union of primary and social rules, and further specifies what 
makes a legal system unique.294  Raz’s legal philosophy is much more 
than what is to follow, which covers only what is directly relevant to the 
task at hand. 
 292. Raz writes of “systemic validity.”  RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS, supra 
note 12, at 127. 
 293. MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART, supra note 11, at 33. 
 294. RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS, supra note 12, at 126-27. 
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Raz specifies three unique features of a legal system.  First, legal 
systems are comprehensive.295  They claim authority to regulate any and 
all behavior within their jurisdictional competence.  Other 
institutionalized normative systems, according to Raz, do not make this 
claim.  Second, legal systems claim to be supreme, to regulate even other 
institutionalized normative systems.296  Despite the claim of supremacy, 
Raz concedes that two or more legal systems can co-exist in a single 
community, depending on their compatibility.  Third, legal systems are 
open systems, which means that they contain norms the purpose of which 
is to supply authority to norms from outside of the system.297  Legal 
systems thus “maintain and support other forms of social grouping.”298  
They meet the open system requirement “by upholding and enforcing 
contracts, agreements, rules and customs of individuals and associations, 
and by enforcing through their rules on conflict of laws the laws of other 
countries, and so on.”299  Raz further claims that legal systems are the 
most important institutionalized normative system to which people are 
subject.300 
In Raz’s account of incorporation, or to use Raz’s more general 
term, “adoption” is not of normative significance.  Law sometimes 
supports other social arrangements.  Raz specifies two tests, either of 
which a legal system must meet for adoption:  (i) when the norms in 
force in another normative system are to be accepted by the legal system 
–an example is how conflict of laws rules recognize the laws of other
countries; and (ii) when power-conferring rules in a legal system accept 
norms made by or with the consent of persons.  The second test applies 
to “contracts, the regulation of commercial companies, and the like.”301  
In other words, the second test applies to the law merchant.  Only if a 
norm meets either of these two tests can it be recognized in a legal 
system, but they do not become part of it.  Raz advises that it would be 
imprecise to conceptualize legal systems around spheres of activity, but 
he does not say why.302  He also claims that we should not be concerned 
with rules for particular groups, unless the grouping is “normatively 
relevant.”303 
A final point that confirms Raz’s political conception of legal 
positivism is his claim that the most important institution in an 
295. Id. at 152-55. 
296. Id. at 153-54. 
297. Id. at 154-56. 
298. Id. at 153. 
299. RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS, supra note 12, at 153. 
300. Id. at 154. 
 301. Id. at 153. 
302. Id. at 150. 
303. Id. at 107. 
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institutionalized normative system is “systematic and institutionalized” 
methods of norm-applying, in the form of norm-applying organs that 
have the power to determine the “normative situation” of persons, and 
issue binding “authoritative evaluations” or “authoritative applicative 
determinations,” binding regardless of whether they are correct.304  These 
organs have “momentous importance” in any normative system.305  They 
resolve disputes, particularly in a system that has power-conferring rules 
recognizing voluntary obligations.  They are a “defining characteristic of 
an important class of normative systems.”306  Raz argues that the rules of 
primary norm applying organs are “not a simple addition to a normative 
system.  Their introduction radically transforms the system adding to it a 
whole new dimension, that of authoritative evaluation of behavior.”307 
In Raz’s account of a legal system, rules permitting arbitration do 
not result in the production of norm applying organs.  These rules are 
simply power conferring rules supporting social groupings.  Arbitral 
institutions are not “primary” norm applying organs because they get 
their power through power conferring rules.308 
Other legal positivists may disagree, but Raz provides a 
“conservative” account that gets as close as possible to specifying the 
requirement of a municipal legal system in all but name.  In his book 
Practical Reason and Norms, published in 1990, Raz specified the above 
conditions for the law’s uniqueness, but curiously, he provided a similar 
account in the Modern Law Review in 1975, which he included in his 
book, The Authority of Law, published in 1983, which explicitly limited 
his account of the uniqueness of law to a description of the features of a 
municipal legal system.309  Raz included no such limitation in Practical 
Reason and Norms.310 
2. The Concept of Commercial Law in the Political Conception
The concept of commercial law in the political conception of legal 
positivism is well understood.  In the political conception, commercial 
law is a discrete category of state law in a municipal legal system.  We 
304. RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS, supra note 12, at 134-37. 
 305. Id. at 137. 
306. Id. 
307. Id. at 142. 
308. Id. at 136. 
 309. RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 43, at 103; Joseph Raz, The 
Institutional Nature of Law, 38 MOD. L. REV. (1975). 
 310. Brian Tamanaha has already shown Raz’s restrictive conditions for a legal 
system to be problematic generally.  TAMANAHA, supra note 24 at 139-42.  I show below 
why Raz is wrong in the context of commercial law. 
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can identify here the secondary rules associated with the primary rules 
identified in Part II. 
The rules of recognition for municipal legislation are the rules that 
legislatures and executives use to enact legislation, usually rules 
associated with the passage of legislation by a legislature and signature 
by a chief executive, though these institutional details vary across 
countries.  The rules of recognition for case law in legal systems that 
accept precedent are those relating to the practices of courts in producing 
and following precedent. 
The rules of recognition for international conventions are easy to 
understand if one looks at the law from a state-based perspective. 
Governments use municipal rules of recognition to ratify or accede to a 
convention.311  Upon ratification or accession by the state’s government, 
the convention becomes municipal law.  Ratification or accession 
typically involves a state’s executive in some form being involved with 
other state executives in the production of the convention text, and then 
state legislatures and executive departments act to ratify or accede to the 
convention so that it becomes valid legal rules in the municipal legal 
system.  In American terminology, if the convention is not self 
executing, then ratification and accession binds the United States to the 
convention but the additional step of municipal implementing legislation 
is necessary to produce valid legal rules to be used in municipal courts 
by private parties.  If the convention is, in American terminology, self-
executing, then upon ratification or accession, the convention 
immediately becomes valid municipal law.  In a political conception of 
positivism, no recognizing acts for these conventions exist to extend the 
legal validity of the convention beyond the state.  There are no 
transnational acts of recognition for any legal system beyond the state. 
International law scholars postulate a customary rule of recognition such 
as pact sunt servanda to bind states to conventions, but not private 
persons.  The state-based limitation is reflected in the fact that 
conventions are law only for states that ratify or accede to them, as Hart 
famously pointed out in chapter X of The Concept of Law.312 
In the political conception of legal positivism, similar state-based 
limitations restrict a transnational conception of model laws.  The rules 
of recognition for model laws are municipally based.  They are the rules 
of legislative enactment of the model law.  Without legislative 
enactment, model laws are simply persuasive theoretical authority on 
 311. Ratification and accession are commonly accepted terms in most municipal legal 
systems.  I use them here to avoid unneeded abstraction.  A more general term might be 
“acceptance.” 
 312. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 8, at 213-237. 
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what good rules in the particular area should be.313  They have no 
practical authority over persons’ actions.  Model laws coming from 
UNCITRAL would be no different in terms of legal status than a UCC 
Article or uniform act that no state enacts. 
In the political conception of legal positivism, the above categories 
of state-recognized law are the main sources of primary rules.  In the 
political conception, the law merchant never becomes the law of the 
state.  In the political conception, the law merchant is no more than 
contract terms.  Incorporation does not convert non-state norms into state 
law.  Incorporation is not an act of recognition.  Rather, it is an act of 
adoption in Raz’s terminology, a way the supreme but open legal system 
of the state supports other subordinate social groupings.  Just as a state 
may support religious communities within its borders, so to it may 
support commercial communities. 
Legal rules permitting citizens of the state to enter into legally 
significant arrangements even though they rely on non-state norms such 
as the law merchant are power-conferring rules.  Power-conferring rules 
are rules of change, not rules of recognition.  They are means by which 
the state confers power on citizens to alter relationships among 
themselves in the form of voluntary obligations.  Power-conferring rules 
include contract formation rules, trust formation rules, and property 
transfer rules.  That they are rules of change and not rules of recognition 
is normatively significant.  They are not an act of recognition converting 
non-state law into state law.  They are, rather, permission to deviate from 
default rules in the municipal legal system. 
The reason states have power-conferring rules of change is that 
states often have an interest in supporting the private activities of their 
citizens.  But municipal legal systems maintain claims of supremacy and 
comprehensiveness as well as openness, and limits are thus imposed on 
such private activities.  These limits are seen in ways the state legal 
system asserts supremacy when necessary for reasons of public policy or 
ordre public.  Public policy sometimes justifies overriding support for 
social groupings.  Public policy reasons for rejecting rules that are not 
the state’s rules are often found in legislation or in case law.314  Public 
policy reasons for refusing to support social groupings is a way for a 
state to assert that the state’s interest must predominate, that the state’s 
interest is too important to permit the social grouping to do something 
that fails to further that interest. 
313. See supra note 10 on the difference between theoretical and practical authority. 
 314. See ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 96-98 (2004). 
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In a political conception of legal positivism, the laws of other states 
are treated similarly to the law merchant but with important differences. 
If parties to commercial arrangements do not use power-conferring rules 
to choose the law merchant or foreign law to govern, then the relevant 
rules are supplied either by an international convention or by a conflict of 
laws analysis.  In a political conception of legal positivism, conflict of 
laws analysis is important.  And the law merchant has no place in that 
analysis.315  The only laws recognized in a conflict of laws analysis are 
the laws of other states.  The reason why conflict approaches are seen as 
so strongly nationalistic and hence firmly within the political conception 
of legal positivism is because the animating principle underlying conflict 
of laws is the supremacy and comprehensiveness of state law.  Conflict 
of laws is about selecting the law of a state when a commercial event 
crosses a political border and the law of more than one state arguably 
applies.316  It is a competition between competing state orders.  The 
logical conclusion of any conflicts approach is that all legal vacuums 
must be filled with state law.  A contract or commercial transaction 
simply cannot exist without state law.  A cosmopolitan conception of the 
law, as we shall see below, moves the questions of supremacy and 
comprehensiveness out and beyond the state.  An approach that 
recognizes overarching norms valid beyond state borders presents 
conflicts lawyers with a fundamental contradiction. 
Finally, in the political conception of legal positivism, norm-
applying organs, in Raz’s words, “radically transform” a normative 
system.317  In Raz’s account, Hart’s rules of adjudication take on special 
significance.  In a political conception of legal positivism, courts 
dominate the task of adjudication.  Legal order simply cannot exist 
without institutions to provide authoritativeness in the form of 
evaluations of the conduct of persons subject to the law. 
Moreover, the political conception facilitates a distinction between 
courts and “alternative” dispute resolution, ignoring the obvious fact that 
courts are alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in many 
commercial relationships that cross state borders.318  Arbitration is the 
 315. BERGER, supra note 146, at 78; Ralf Michaels, The Re-state-ment of Non-State 
Law: The State, Choice of Law, and the Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism, 51 
WAYNE L. REV. 1209 (2005); Michaels & Jansen, supra note 30. 
 316. See Frederick Juenger, Some Random Remarks from Overseas, in BERGER, THE 
PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW, supra note 30 at 81. 
317. See supra note 307 and accompanying text. 
 318. I use the concept of alternative dispute resolution loosely here, as alternative 
dispute resolution specialists might not classify arbitration as alternative dispute 
resolution, since arbitration results in a legally enforceable award.  GOODE, KRONKE, & 
MCKENDRICK, supra note 116, at 627. 
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preferred method of dispute resolution in commercial transactions that 
cross state borders. 
Let’s try to understand how to describe the role of courts and other 
norm-applying organs in the political conception when transactions cross 
state borders.  In the political conception, arbitral panels conduct 
arbitrations within the territory of a state and are subject to the arbitration 
law of that state.  Parties to the arbitration may seek assistance from 
municipal courts to enforce the arbitration agreement and the policies of 
the state on arbitration.  This judicial action is generically referred to as 
supervision of arbitration by national courts.319  In the political 
conception, supervision is uncontroversial, indeed necessary.  The idea 
of delocalization—the detachment of international arbitration from the 
law of the site where it is held—has no place, even if the parties so 
provide in their arbitration agreement.320  And the detachment of the 
arbitral award from the substantive law any state is impossible.321  
Without state law no contract can exist between the parties, either for the 
underlying contract or for the arbitration.  Arbitrators are bound to apply 
contractual choice of law provisions or conflict of law principles in 
making awards.  Once the arbitrators issue an award, it may be 
recognized and enforced in any state that will recognize and enforce it. 
The 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Arbitral Awards, ratified by 137 states, facilitates recognition and 
enforcement by states.322  Convention Article V provides that states are 
not required to recognize and enforce arbitral awards in certain 
circumstances related to public policy.  In the political conception of 
legal positivism, “public policy” means that the public interests of the 
state trump the private interests of the parties.  Article V is an agreement 
between states on the form of permissible exceptions to recognition and 
enforcement.  In these state-driven normative practices of supervision, 
recognition and enforcement, states claim their supremacy over the 
arbitral process. 
 319. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 314, at 13, quoted in id. at 628.  Supervision 
is not the actual doctrine found in the law.  The terms refers to several legal doctrines. 
320. For an explanation of delocalization, see id. at 649-63. 
 321. Jan Paulsson, Declocalisation of International Commercial Arbitration: When 
and Why it Matters, 32 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 53, at 54-57 (1983), quoted in GOODE,
KRONKE, & MCKENDRICK, supra note 116, at 659.  Paulsson quotes the English arbitrator 
that has been influential in stating the case rejecting the notion of delocalization as well 
as the notion of a contemporary law merchant.  F.A. Mann, Lex Facit Arbitrum, in 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LIBER AMICORUM FOR MARTIN DOMKE (1967). 
 322. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/ 
uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention html (last visited Nov. 19, 2009). 
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B. Cosmopolitan Legal Positivism and Transnational Commercial Law 
This section puts the political conception under scrutiny.  The 
account to follow suggests that the political conception of legal 
positivism is too restrictive and produces an incomplete and inaccurate 
description of a legal system.  If positivism is truly independent of the 
existence of the state, then it should be able to describe a legal system 
independent of any requirement of a state.  To be more precise, the 
question is whether a unified conception of a transnational legal system 
is possible.  The political conception of legal positivism can already 
describe valid legal rules operating internationally but owing their 
validity to distinct municipal legal systems.  We can see from the 
presence of important non-state rules, however, why such a description 
might be inadequate.  As explained below, a positivist description that 
does not require a state is possible, but whether commercial law complies 
with that description is a separate question, the answer to which may be 
no. 
1. The Cosmopolitan Conception of Legal Positivism
The cosmopolitan and political conceptions of legal positivism are 
in agreement that force or command is not the source of the practical 
authority of the law.  Both approaches accept that a legal system can 
originate in what is essentially custom, or in Waldron’s terminology, 
“custom like practices”323 in the form of secondary rules that the norm 
users of the given normative community accept.  The rejection of force 
or command opens up the possibilities for revising positivism into a 
cosmopolitan account. 
A cosmopolitan conception of legal positivism, one which removes 
the state as an enabling condition for a legal system, would require that 
five conditions be met:  (1) acceptance by the participants in the legal 
system of the rules of the system as valid, binding, and authoritative; 
(2) systemic qualities of normative consequence within the putative legal 
system that make the normative order the system represents intelligible 
or comprehensible to the participants; (3) secondary rules and secondary 
rule officials, though they can be distributed across different state and 
non-state hierarchies; (4) shared agency between secondary rule officials 
demonstrating sufficient mutual responsiveness and joint commitment to 
a legal system; and (5) primary rules dealing with issues that legal 
systems usually deal with, such as property, contract, and dispute 
resolution.  I will explain why each of these conditions is required for 
 323. Waldron, supra note 1, at 93. 
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any state-less legal system, or a legal system in which state rules are 
included but do not comprise the entire legal system. 
As to the first condition, acceptance by the participants in the legal 
system of the rules of the system, this would seem not to be an important 
requirement in the political conception of legal positivism.  The political 
conception places minor significance on the reasons why subjects in a 
community governed by common norms, which would be citizens of a 
state in the political conception, obey primary rules.  Citizens of a state 
could have any number of reasons for obedience.  What matters most for 
purposes of understanding the concept of a legal system deriving solely 
from the state is the internal reflective attitude of the officials who 
produce valid law.  Though Hart and other legal positivists might deplore 
obedience based on habit as “sheeplike,”324 that persons have a number 
of reasons for obedience does not matter very much in the political 
conception.  The hermeneutics of the political conception focuses on the 
norm givers, the officials who produce the rules and make them valid in 
the legal system.  The beliefs and attitudes of norm users have more 
significance, however, when the normative community is not a state, 
because states maintain a longstanding arbitrary and involuntary 
association of persons who happen to find themselves within their 
political and geographical borders.  In communities that are not formed 
by political borders, membership in the community is often voluntary 
and by design, if we accept some level of autonomy in life choices.  For 
example, the reason why the UCP has practical authority to bankers is 
because bankers have accepted the UCP as law.  Members of the banking 
community have an internal reflective attitude about the primary rules 
known as the UCP.  It is not only the members of the ICC Banking 
Technique and Practice Commission that have a critical reflective 
attitude about secondary rules associated with the UCP.  In a normative 
community that is not determined by state boundaries, the internal 
reflective attitude exists in both norm givers and norm users, towards 
both secondary and primary rules.  In this sense, the concept of “in 
force” has a more stringent meaning than what one applies to a municipal 
legal system.325 
Why is this so?  Role or identity seems to be key in understanding 
the practical authority of rules in normative communities not formed by 
political borders.  For example, if a person accepts a role or identity of a 
merchant, then the law merchant rules relevant to that merchant grouping 
apply to her. 
 324. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 8, at 117. 
 325. Bhala, supra note 22, at 203-04 makes a similar point about the importance or 
acceptance of the law merchant by merchants, but his discussion differs from mine. 
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What about the case where a merchant decides not to follow these 
rules? After all, they are default rules.  The answer is that opting out is 
equivalent to a breach of the rules.  It is a deviation from an established 
practice about which the norm users have a critical reflective attitude. 
Opting out of the rules will evoke a critical negative attitude from other 
merchants in the same grouping.  For example, if a confirming bank on a 
letter of credit advises the issuing bank that it will not adhere to the UCP, 
that is essentially a breach of binding and authoritative rules that banks 
are supposed to follow.  The idea of default rules has less relevance in 
such contexts. 
As to the second condition, legal systems have systemic qualities of 
normative consequence that make them identifiable to both norm givers 
and norm users.  Hart found these systemic qualities in the relationship 
between primary and secondary rules.  Norm givers use secondary rules 
to identify valid legal rules for norm users.  Norm users use rules of 
recognition to identify valid legal rules that norm givers create. 
Secondary rules of change work in a similar way.  Secondary rules of 
adjudication give law-applying organs the authority to apply primary 
rules to resolve disputes for participants in the legal system.  The bottom 
line is that in a legal system, secondary and primary rules relate to one 
another in a way that is readily identifiable to the participants in the legal 
system, and the participants have beliefs and attitudes about an 
identifiable legal system in which these primary and secondary rules 
operate. 
States usually provide these systemic qualities.  Other groupings do 
as well, but it is not just any grouping that counts.  The grouping has to 
have normative consequences to the order being described.  These 
systemic qualities give the system order and qualify it to be called a 
normative system.  We need these systemic qualities for comprehension 
and identification of the normative order.  We cannot understand a set of 
norms as a normative order without it.  There has to be a reason for 
grouping the rules together as a legal system, such as in the need for a 
complete order regulating an area of importance to norm users. 
As to the third condition, secondary rules and secondary rule 
officials may be distributed across different state and non-state 
hierarchies.  The idea of a distributed environment comes from computer 
science, to refer to the spread of computer functions across different 
computers.  The Internet is an example of a distributed normative 
environment, in which no comprehensive hierarchies claim supremacy 
over the entirety of the Internet, not even ICAAN.326  The Internet is 
 326. See generally Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of 
Laws: Redefining Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819
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governed not in a hierarchical structure of “top-down” formal authority, 
but through the coordinative actions of governments and private 
networks maintained by operators globally.  No one entity regulates all 
of it.  States are substantially involved in Internet governance, but so are 
non-state actors.  I do not mean to suggest that the cosmopolitan 
conception of positivism or transnational commercial law neatly 
analogizes to Internet governance.  The basic point here is that of 
distribution of functions in a decentralized way across various 
government and other hierarchically driven institutional structures, over 
a unified field of activity. 
The cosmopolitan version of legal positivism acknowledges 
multiple rules of recognition, change, and adjudication in this distributed 
normative space.  Even in a political conception of positivism, rules of 
recognition are multiple to reflect the fact that primary rules come with 
different content, form different categories of the law, come in different 
legal forms such as constitutional text and principle, legislation, and 
common law, and may reflect various levels of decentralization within a 
state or other community.  For example, a local ordinance will be 
produced from rules of recognition differing from a constitutional 
principle.  Matthew Adler supports his account of citizen groups as 
forming recognitional communities in U.S. constitutional law partly from 
Raz’s claim that judges may have divergent rules of recognition yet still 
work within the same municipal legal system.327 
As for the fourth condition, shared agency between secondary rule 
officials, law can be understood from the standpoint of planning.  Some 
of the new thinking in analytical jurisprudence is in trying to understand 
the law as, in Scott Shapiro’s phrase, “massively shared agency.”328  I 
can only introduce here the way the philosophical materials on plans and 
intentions could be employed to conceptualize a system of transnational 
commercial law.  This approach might yield the most fruitful results in 
any future work on the concept of transnational commercial law.  Legal 
philosophers have based most of their shared agency inquiry on the work 
of Michael Bratman.  I do the same. 
Suppose you and I are law students and we agree to form a study 
group with two other law students.  Our aim is to produce an outline for 
(2005); Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 312
(2002); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in 
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); David Post, Governing Cyberspace, 43 
WAYNE L. REV. 155 (1996). 
 327. Adler, supra note 304, at 746. 
 328. Scott J. Shapiro, Legal Practice and Massively Shared Agency, available at  
http://www.law.yale.edu/yclp/papers/shapiro_paper.doc (last visited October 12, 2008). 
This work is based on MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, FACES OF INTENTION: SELECTED ESSAYS OF
INTENTION AND AGENCY 94 (1999). 
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our Corporations course.  It is an accurate description of the action of our 
group that we produced the outline.329  It would not be accurate to say 
that I produced the outline, and so did you and the other two students. 
We did it together.  It is not a simple aggregation of parts of an outline. 
It cannot be, because we planned.  There may be cases in which we do 
not plan ahead of time and simply share or aggregate parts of our own 
individual outlines, but that is a different situation.  Shared agency 
accounts for the cases not involving only an aggregation of individual 
actions.  An example of aggregation of individual agency is if all of us in 
the study group all happen to come from Los Angeles and we all 
individually decide to fly back to Los Angeles for the Thanksgiving 
holiday.  It is true here to say that you are flying to Los Angeles, and I 
am flying to Los Angeles, and so are our two colleagues, but we are not 
flying together. 
Bratman has argued that shared agency arises in two ways, either as 
a shared intentional activity or as a shared cooperative activity.  A shared 
intentional activity meets the following two conditions: 
(1) Mutual responsiveness:  In SCA each participating agent attempts 
to be responsive to the intentions and actions of the other, knowing 
that the other is attempting to be similarly responsive.  Each seeks to 
guide his behavior with an eye to the behavior of the other, knowing 
that the other seeks to do likewise.330 
(2) Commitment to the joint activity:  In SCA the participants each 
have an appropriate commitment (though perhaps for different 
reasons) to the joint activity, and their mutual responsiveness is in the 
pursuit of this commitment.331 
So, we can all agree on how to divide up our outline coverage, with me 
taking fiduciary duty of care, you taking insider trading, and so on. 
These actions involve cooperation in the forms of mutual responsiveness 
and joint commitment, but an even stronger form of commitment exists 
in some forms of shared agency.  To reflect the stronger form of 
cooperation, Bratman adds a third condition to describe the concept of a 
shared cooperative activity: 
 329. Shapiro, supra note 328 provides a good summary of Bratman’s work. 
 330. Bratman cites to Chapter 4 of the classic game theoretic text of THOMAS C.
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960), in support of the first condition. 
BRATMAN, supra note 328, at 94-95.  The citation to Schelling is revealing, in that the 
support for the first condition might be in a coordination game, in the nature of a Nash 
equilibrium. 
 331. BRATMAN, supra note 304, at 94-95. 
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(3) Commitment to mutual support.  In SCA each agent is committed 
to supporting the efforts of the other to play her role in the joint 
activity.  If I believe that you need my help to find your note (or your 
paint brush) I am prepared to provide such help; and you are similarly 
prepared to support me in my role.  These commitments to support 
each other put us in a position to perform the joint activity 
successfully even if we each need help in certain ways.332 
In the law school outline example, if you are prepared to help me with 
my fiduciary duty material and I to help you with your insider trading 
material, our outline preparing is a shared cooperative activity. 
Some who work within the political conception of legal positivism 
have argued that all or some of these conditions describe legal practices. 
They do not explicitly limit their accounts to municipal legal systems, 
but what they actually refer to are the practices of municipal legal 
systems.333  A cosmopolitan conception of legal order can also employ 
Bratman’s conditions to argue for a transnational legal order.  The focus 
here is on the work of officials who make and apply the law. 
Finally, the fifth condition, primary rules dealing with social 
problems that legal systems usually deal with, such as property, contract, 
and dispute resolution, is necessary to tell the difference between 
secondary rules in a legal system from those in other institutionalized 
normative systems.  To my knowledge, no one has tried to answer that 
question.  In his account of institutional normative order, MacCormick 
seems to assume that a municipal legal system is but one kind of 
institutional normative order but does not go beyond that conclusion.334  
It just might be that looking for secondary rules unique to a legal system 
is the wrong way to go.  The features of norm creation, application, and 
enforcement are common to our everyday language of normative 
practices and also of institutionalized systems we ordinarily do not think 
of as law.  Churches, universities, sporting organizations, business 
entities, and civic clubs all have secondary rules of recognition, 
adjudication, and change.335  This is simply how life forms around 
institutionalized normative orders.  Law makes no special claim on these 
features, just as it makes no claim to any special form of reasoning 
unique to it. 
To conclude, we can describe a cosmopolitan version of legal 
positivism and find a legal system that does not require the state as an 
enabling condition if systemic qualities exist between primary rules and 
332. Id. 
 333. Adler, supra note 304, at 729-45 summarizes this work. 
334. See generally MACCORMICK INSTITUTIONS OF LAW, supra note 33; 
MACCORMICK, QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 279, at 1. 
335. See, e.g.,RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS, supra note 12 at 150. 
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secondary rules in groupings with normative consequences, in which the 
primary and secondary rules have practical authority, which means they 
are binding and authoritative on norm users and norm givers 
respectively, and which govern social problems that the law typically 
deals with.  The secondary rules can be used by institutional actors 
within different hierarchies, with some coming from states and others 
not. 
2. The Concept of Commercial Law in the Cosmopolitan
Conception
Is there a commercial law order that meets the above five features of 
a legal system?  Possibly so, but objections arise.  I will go through each 
of the above five conditions for a transnational legal order and apply 
them to commercial norms. 
As for the first condition, the above discussion elucidated the notion 
of the critical reflective attitude of the merchant or professional about 
commercial law rules not limited to source.  In the political conception, 
the law merchant becomes reasons for action as law when incorporated 
into the state’s legal system.  In the political conception, merchants use 
state legal systems to give binding force to their social rules.  Raz 
described incorporation as support by a legal system of social groupings 
other than those of the state.  Incorporation can be accomplished 
legislatively, judicially, or contractually.  By legislative incorporation I 
refer to legislation, like the UCC, supporting the notion that rules made 
by non-state actors, such as the law merchant, may apply to a given 
transaction.  Legislative incorporation is simply a means to describe one 
way in which incorporation is accomplished.  These same considerations 
apply to the other forms of incorporation, contractual and judicial. 
Courts may engage in a form of judicial incorporation, as we see in 
Harlow and Jones,336 BP Oil International,337 and St. Paul Guardian 
Insurance,338 although the latter two American cases may be seen as a 
form of “legislative” incorporation prompted by CISG Article 9.339  
These courts hold that incorporation is required because of widespread 
merchant acceptance. 
 336. Harlow and Jones LTD. v. American Express Bank LTD., [1990] 2 Lloyd’s L. 
Rep. 343. 
 337. BP Oil Int’l, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador, 332 F.3d 333 (5th 
Cir. 2003). 
 338. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. Neuromed Medical Sys. & Support, 2002 WL 
465312 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002). 
 339. CISG Article 9, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/treaty.html 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2008). 
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The political conception fails to account for the way commercial 
actors, judges, and legislators understand the normative force of law 
merchant rules.  In the cosmopolitan conception, the law merchant does 
not become reasons for action through incorporation into a state’s legal 
system.  The social rules of merchants do not acquire practical authority 
through and in the municipal legal system alone.  Incorporation, or 
incorporation alone, is not what makes the law merchant valid legal rules 
in a cosmopolitan normative order.  Rather, participants in the relevant 
normative community accept the law merchant before any contract is 
entered and regardless of whether any form of incorporation into a 
contract or municipal legal system has occurred.  Acceptance in the 
relevant merchant community comes well before any incorporation. 
Incorporation is evidence of acceptance and authoritativeness.  For 
example, the UCP acquires its authority because the ICC Commission on 
Banking Technique and Practice produces it.  Banks are bound to the 
UCP not because it is incorporated, but because they accept it as law.  To 
banks, the UCP is in many instances more important even than municipal 
banking law.  The UCP is not accepted in this way as municipal law, but 
rather as transnational law unhinged from the state as an enabling 
condition for its existence. 
The second condition, systemic qualities among primary and 
secondary rules, seems to have significant relevance to commercial law. 
Here we see what has become known as a governance gap, in which 
states do not regulate for whatever reason, either inability, unwillingness, 
or lack of interest to do so.340  State interests are determined by the 
political order in which they are situated, and commercial activity 
sometimes falls outside of this political order, or it is at least not apparent 
that it is the proper subject of the political order.  Governments may not 
care about law relevant only to merchants who freely accept it, and 
which does not have the potential to harm non-merchant citizens. 
Moreover, it is sometimes the case that state-produced commercial law is 
inadequate without the law merchant.  States claim a more significant or 
decisive role in regulating areas they have historically or traditionally 
deemed closely connected to their sovereignty or to the protection of 
their citizens.  In other areas, non-state actors who represent the most 
cohesive and significant of normative communities tend to step into 
provide norms.  For example, the UCP regulates a number of banking 
practices relating to documentary letters of credit.  The UCP is 
authoritative on the strict compliance and independence principles in 
letter of credit law.  States play an important role, however, in regulating 
 340. I borrow the “governance gap” terminology very loosely from the development 
studies literature.  See, e.g., M.S. GOGAN, THE GOVERNANCE GAP (2009). 
2009] THE CONCEPT OF COMMERCIAL LAW 203
fraud on financial institutions and their customers in letters of credit.341  
Here we see substantial coordination and mutual support.  If we are to 
accept an American conception of commercial law, which includes 
consumer transactions, the role of the state becomes much more 
significant in consumer transactions, as the state and the political order it 
represents remains the primary source and justification for duties of 
justice, which have an important place in consumer transactions. 
The same sort of systemic qualities of normative consequence 
among primary and secondary rules exist in transnational adjudication of 
commercial disputes.  Unless state-run courts develop special expertise 
in areas of transnational commercial law, their main task is to recognize 
and enforce arbitral awards.  Of course, for many wholly domestic 
commercial disputes, courts tend to be the primary rule-applying organs, 
but this may be changing as arbitration and alternative dispute resolution 
become preferred methods to avoid congested and under-funded courts 
that are too busy with criminal and other matters in which states have a 
substantial interest.  At the transnational level, courts must be involved in 
enforcement because enforcement is about transferring assets to satisfy a 
decision by an authoritative person or body, usually by an arbitrator or 
arbitral panel.  Asset identification and transfer is about property rights, 
and states maintain a dominant role in allocating these rights.  But the 
authoritative evaluations themselves in commercial contexts—Raz’s 
important norm applying organs—are often arbitral and not judicial in 
character.  Each institution, judicial and arbitral, needs the other to 
perform coordinating and supporting functions. 
Raz’s political conception of legal positivism reaches the wrong 
conclusion from these examples.  Raz claims that a legal system is open, 
that it supports other social groupings, but that it also claims supremacy 
over other social groups.  He also says that legal systems claim to be a 
comprehensive normative order, which seems to contradict the openness 
condition.  But Raz’s claim fails for reasons other than this contradiction. 
Raz’s legal positivism is an extreme version of the political conception. 
Its focus is almost entirely on the state’s perspective.  It is not that state 
support for other social groups is the relevant normative consequence 
associated with state acceptance of the law merchant.  It is, rather, that 
the state needs the law merchant to support commercial law as a system. 
The supporting features of the relationship go both ways and reflect 
coordination between complementary normative domains and not 
support of a superior normative system for an inferior one.  Legislated 
law merchant in particular supports state-based commercial law in areas 
in which the latter is deficient. 
341. See JOHN DOLAN, THE LAW OF LETTERS OF CREDIT 55-56 (4th ed. 2007). 
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The third condition, distributed secondary rules across different 
community hierarchies, deals with the work that secondary rules do and 
on the practices that effectively function as secondary rules.  When we 
look at commercial law with the understanding of the functions of the 
secondary rules at hand, we find two related kinds of problems with the 
political conception of commercial law.  First, the political conception 
offers an incomplete description of secondary rules that match up to 
primary rules.  Second, the political conception offers an inaccurate 
description of the secondary rules of commercial law.  Going through 
each of the main sets of primary rules makes these points. 
It is true that municipal legislation requires the enactment of 
legislation by a state-based procedure.  Those rules of recognition are 
included in the cosmopolitan version of legal positivism, but they are not 
the only rules of recognition, and some rules of recognition come from 
outside of formal state-run institutions.  The state often does not work 
alone in creating valid legislation.  Consider model laws and uniform 
acts.  No legislature of any state, together or alone, can enact the UCC or 
its official revisions or any legislative product known as a uniform act or 
their official revision.  Rather, the American Law Institute and the 
National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws must 
jointly agree on what is to receive their imprimatur through collaborative 
effort.342  Several institutions jointly hold and apply the rules of 
recognition for uniform acts in the United States.  It is an incomplete 
characterization of how rules of recognition actually operate to claim that 
uniform acts do not become law until enacted by a state legislature.  To 
get an accurate description, we have to add the role of a non-state 
institution, the ALI, and a quasi-state institution, the NCCUSL.343  No 
uniform acts exist to ratify without their production by two non-state 
institutions.  A similar analysis applies to model laws at the international 
level.  No one can provide revisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency, for example, except UNCITRAL, an IGO. 
So far, we have considered only state or state sponsored secondary 
rule officials.  Going further, municipal legislatures depend on non-state 
actors to produce valid rules that they do not produce.  States may forego 
legislation in a particular area because non-state actors fill the gap.  For 
example, in the latest UCC Article 2 revision, the UCC drafters decided 
not to regulate delivery terms in sale of goods contracts, knowing that the 
ICC has produced superior terms in the form of INCOTERMS, and the 
preference of the drafters is for uniformity between transnational and 
 342. See Introduction—About NCCUSL, http://www nccusl.org/update/ (last visited 
May 27, 2009). 
343. Id.; About ALI, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm (last visited May 27, 2009). 
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national practices.344  It is not that the state accepts primary rules of other 
institutionalized normative systems to support the norm users in that 
other system.  Rather, it is the combination of recognizing acts by state 
and non-state actors that bring transnational validity to these forms of the 
law merchant.  That municipal law permits incorporation does not mean 
that municipal law maintains supremacy, but that it coordinates with 
merchant acceptance of rules in distributed normative space to support 
the transnational validation merchant rules through multiple acts of 
recognition. 
A perhaps unusual practice is the use of FIDIC books as standard 
terms and conditions, often by developing country governments.  Major 
construction almost always involves substantial sets of contract terms 
and conditions to fill gaps left by contract default rules.  While FIDIC 
presents a troublesome example of the legislated law merchant because 
its substantial terms and conditions must be expressly agreed to as part of 
any construction contract, which makes them seem descriptively more 
like standard terms and conditions in a political conception, they must be 
understood also for their coordinating and supporting functions.  States 
forego the production of their own valid rules for their own private and 
public contracts—their own standard contract terms and conditions—and 
instead rely of the production of valid rules by a non-state actor.  It is 
true that FIDIC terms and conditions do not have normative force 
without contractual incorporation, but it is also true that they have no 
normative force without FIDIC promulgation.  Multiple recognizing acts 
across different normative communities are required for FIDIC terms and 
conditions to be valid. 
It is normatively significant that governments, particularly 
developing country governments, mandate the use of FIDIC terms and 
conditions in their public contracting.  The development banks, in 
particular the World Bank and the regional development banks, mandate 
their use in their loans.345  They also require INCOTERMS.  Here we see 
the distributed features of the secondary rules in action—governments, 
 344. UCC Sections 2-319 through 2-324 were “eliminated because they are 
inconsistent with modern commercial practices.”  U.C.C. § 2-324 leg. note (2003). 
Delivery terms “must be interpreted in light of any applicable usage of trade and any 
course of performance or course of dealing between the parties.”  U.C.C. § 2-319 leg. 
note (2003). 
 345. Development banks so mandate by making it a loan condition that the borrower 
use the bank’s standard bidding documents in projects funded by the loan.  The standard 
bidding documents require the use of FIDIC terms or conditions.  Indeed, the terms and 
conditions usually are incorporated directly into the text of the documents.  See World 
Bank Standard Bidding Documents Procurement of Works (May 2006, rev. March & 
April 2007), http://web.worldbank.org/Wbsite/external/projects/procurement/ (last visited 
May 27, 2009). 
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IGOs, and a non-state actor perform different acts of recognition.  Each 
of these validating acts is necessary for FIDIC to be law in the 
transnational commercial law order. 
Next consider international conventions.  In the political conception, 
international conventions are creatures of state law.  No international 
legal system exists to provide rules of recognition to validate their 
existence in that system.  Rather, in the political conception, the rules of 
recognition serve to validate conventions for the municipal legal system. 
When we apply the cosmopolitan conception, we search for a set of 
mutually coordinating rules of recognition that validate conventions as 
transnational law.  Though states have the power to negotiate 
conventions directly without the involvement of IGOs, this has not been 
state practice for commercial law conventions.  Commercial law 
conventions almost always do not come into existence without 
substantial IGO involvement.  They are produced by IGOs.  Without 
IGO involvement there is nothing for a municipal government to ratify. 
The IGO’s procedures are rules of recognition as well.  As explained 
above, IGOs are government constituted, and so their actions may be 
seen as a delegation of state authority and thus supporting the political 
conception.  But when we reconceptualize conventions in the 
cosmopolitan conception, we see conventions as part of the distributed 
normative space, in which IGOs, municipal governments, and merchant 
associations mutually support one another.  The content of commercial 
law conventions coordinates just as municipal legislation does around the 
gaps left by the law merchant, and vice versa—the content of the law 
merchant coordinates around the two essentially state produced 
normative products of legislation and convention.  Reflecting a high 
degree of coordination, the ICC has special consultative status with 
UNCITRAL.346 
What to make of Honnold’s “homeward trend” in the interpretation 
of commercial conventions?  A political conception of legal positivism 
would reject autonomous interpretations of conventions while the 
cosmopolitan conception would accept them, and perhaps even require 
them.  We can distinguish two cases.  First, there will be cases in the 
zone of reasonable interpretation, in which judges in good faith fill gaps 
with competing reasonable but differing interpretations.  These 
differences in the exercise of judicial discretion are inevitable.  They do 
not defeat the cosmopolitan conception.  But judges who refuse to apply 
a convention, as in Beijing Metals, or who refuse to examine the judicial 
decisions of other states when interpreting conventions, may be said to 
 346. Coordination of Work on International Trade Law, http://www.uncitral.org/ 
uncitral/en/tac/coordination html (last visited May 27, 2009). 
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support the political conception as an adequate descriptive account.  If 
officials are not committed to the cosmopolitan conception, then it will 
be a difficult case to make. 
As for model laws mainly produced by UNCITRAL and 
UNIDROIT, these organizations provide a partial set of rules of 
recognition, but not enough to place the primary rules of these products 
“in force” in either the cosmopolitan or the political conception of legal 
positivism.  They do, however, have persuasive authority and serve in an 
advisory capacity, and are thus more in the nature of theoretical 
authority.  From these model laws we have reason to believe good law 
has the content these model laws have.347  A similar characterization 
applies to the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts, but since they are not legislative in nature, or at least not 
primarily so,348 they do not become law until they are in force as a result 
of frequent use by contract parties and arbitrators.  The major difference 
the political versus the cosmopolitan conception makes for the 
UNIDROIT Principles is that the cosmopolitan conception accepts in 
principle that recognizing acts can occur outside of formal state 
enactment as law.  Model Laws cannot claim such abilities.  The 
UNIDROIT Principles are not law merchant unless commercial parties 
use them on a consistent and ongoing basis.  They are in this sense like 
the UCP and INCOTERMS, but those clearly legislatively modeled 
products go through a formal and rigorous process of recognition by a 
normative community, which the UNIDROIT Principles do not. 
Finally, within the discussion of the third condition, we should 
address secondary rules of adjudication.  Raz has claimed that law-
applying institutions are “of momentous importance” and “radically 
transform” a normative system because they supply authoritative 
evaluations of actions by persons governed by the normative system.349  
If this claim is meant to support the broader claim that legal systems are 
only state-based, it fails.  It is in secondary rules of adjudication where 
we find that the cosmopolitan conception of a transnational commercial 
law makes its central case.  With rules of adjudication we have a number 
of legal rules supporting a distributed normative space in which state and 
non-state actors coordinate and are mutually dependent on each other for 
authoritative evaluations.  The cosmopolitan conception leads to a more 
 347. But see supra notes 112 and accompanying text (the political economy literature 
on “private” legislatures finds otherwise). 
 348. The drafters commend them as a possible model or guide for contract legislation. 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, Preamble (“They may 
serve as a model for national and international legislation.”), http://www.unidroit.org/ 
english/principles/contracts/main html (last visited May 27, 2009). 
349. See supra notes 307 and accompanying text. 
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neutral and descriptively accurate form of the Razian openness feature of 
a legal system when it comes to rules of adjudication.  Here we see a 
horizontal and not a hierarchically based conception of how all of the 
parts of commercial dispute resolution cohere. 
An example is the FIDIC norm applying organs.  FIDIC specifies an 
extensive array of norm-applying organs to make authoritative 
evaluations of the conduct of parties to their contracts.  In some of the 
more widely used books, the consulting engineer serves as the front-line 
norm applying organ, issuing authoritative evaluations that the parties to 
the contract are bound to follow, to continue work, and to pursue 
arbitration.350  If the dispute makes it to an arbitral award, that arbitral 
award may be recognized and enforced in state courts under the New 
York Convention.351  With FIDIC we have a substantial set of rules of 
adjudication, with norm applying organs all the way down to routine 
contract operations. 
In the political conception of legal positivism, states claim 
supremacy over international commercial arbitration.  In the 
cosmopolitan conception, courts and arbitrators coordinate and are 
mutually supportive in a normative space that distributes over numerous 
state-based and other normative communities.  Arbitral proceedings may 
be delocalized and detached from the law of the state in which the 
arbitral proceedings are being held if that is what the parties to the 
arbitration agreement intend.352  Parties to international commercial 
arbitration are almost invariably professionals or merchants, so state 
interests in consumer protection tend to be lessened.  Since only states 
control territories, the arbitral site must necessarily be in a state, but 
geography or territory alone should have no normative consequences. 
Ironically, though English lawyers tend to stridently support the 
political conception of legal positivism,353 their own courts provide an 
example of coordination and mutual support of rules of adjudication in 
the cosmopolitan conception.  The United Kingdom has designated its 
Queens Bench Division of the High Court as the “Commercial Court.”354  
The Commercial Court is partly intended to serve as a forum for the 
resolution of international commercial disputes, even where the parties to 
the dispute have no connection to the United Kingdom.  The Court has 
350. See supra notes 200-232 and accompanying text. 
 351. New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConven-
tion html (last visited May 27, 2009). 
352. See supra note 336 and accompanying text. 
353. See, e.g., Mustill, supra note 19; Mann, supra note 172; Lord Kerr, Modern 
Trends in Commercial Law and Practice, 41 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1978). 
 354. HM Courts Service, http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/infoabout/ 
admiralcomm/ (last visited May 27, 2009). 
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existed for over 100 years.355  The Court’s work focuses significantly on 
litigation relating to carriage of goods and charter parties, insurance and 
reinsurance, commodity transactions, and litigation of issues relating to 
arbitral proceedings.356  It essentially serves as an international tribunal 
for these matters.  The Court and the profession generally have been 
accommodating to foreign parties.  In Lord Denning’s words in The 
Atlantic Star: 
No one who comes to these courts asking for justice should come in 
vain. . . .  This right to come here is not confined to Englishmen.  It 
extends to any friendly foreigner.  He can seek the aid of our courts if 
he desires to do so.  You may call this “forum-shopping” if you 
please, but if the forum is England, it is a good place to shop in, both 
for the quality of the goods and the speed of service.357 
On appeal, the House of Lords disavowed Lord Denning’s dictum,358 but 
the dictum does reflect a tradition in English law.  In Amin Rasheed 
v.Kuwait Insurance Corp., Lord Diplock noted that the Commercial
Court was the preferred forum for nationals from a wide range of 
countries.359  An influential English conflict of laws treatise asserts that 
“there is a public interest in favour of trial in England in that when 
foreigners litigate in England, this forms a valuable invisible export and 
confirms judicial pride in the English legal system.”360  In Miliangos v. 
George Frank (Textiles) Ltd., the House of Lords held that English 
courts could render judgments in money damages in foreign currency, in 
order to maintain the institutional advantages of English courts in 
resolving international disputes.361  As Lord Kerr explained in an article 
discussing the Miliangos case: 
Foreigners have confidence in our legal system.  But they no longer 
have confidence in sterling.  They can now continue to contract in 
stabler currencies, but continue to come here for the resolution of 
 355. GOODE, COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 89, at 1170. 
356. Id. 
357. The Atlantic Star, [1973] 1 Q.B. 364, 381-82, quoted in Friedrich K. Juenger, 
Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV. 553, 565 (1989). 
358. The Atlantic Star, [1974] A.C. 436, 454 (per Lord Reid). 
359. Amin Rasheed v.Kuwait Insurance Corp., [1984] A.C. 50. 
 360. JAMES FAWCETT & JANEEN M.  CARRUTHERS, CHESHIRE, NORTH & FAWCETT 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 440 (14th ed. 2008) (citation omitted); see also J.J. 
Fawcett, Forum Shopping: Some Questions Answered, 35 NR. IR. LEGAL Q. 141, 146 
(1984), cited in Juenger, supra note 357, at 565-66. 
361. 1976 A.C. 443. 
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disputes, without the danger of having to accept payment in sterling 
at a devalued rate.362 
These policies are cosmopolitan.  They serve to maximize choice 
for parties in dispute resolution, who may choose either the Commercial 
Court or arbitration.  They support the notion that multiple rules of 
adjudication operate in a distributed fashion across multiple normative 
communities to promote a transnational commercial legal order. 
As for the fourth condition, shared agency among secondary rule 
officials, a transnational commercial legal order is plausibly a shared 
intentional activity.  Mutual responsiveness and joint commitment seem 
to exist with groups of officials who operate both within and outside of 
states.  Those officials are municipal legislators, municipal judges, IGO 
representatives and IGO bureaucratic personnel, non-state institutions 
and their officials involved in the making of the legislated law merchant, 
international commercial arbitrators, and non-state institutions involved 
in managing international commercial arbitration.  These officials who 
have the task of using secondary rules, though they are in different 
normative communities, do seem to be engaged in a shared intentional 
activity, at least when a commercial matter crosses a state border.  They 
are mutually responsive and engage joint commitment.  We at least have 
shared intentional activity.  They respond to each other’s actions, either 
in law making or in adjudication.  As we have seen above, they regulate 
normative spaces in a complementary way.  Also, these state and non-
state actors exhibit a joint commitment to regulating commercial activity, 
but for different reasons, and those reasons do not defeat the fact of joint 
commitment.  They have different reasons to support the transnational 
commercial law order because they work for different principals.  State 
officials work for citizens of the state.  Business association 
representatives work for industry.  IGO officials work for the community 
of states.  But their commitment to the transnational normative order is 
joint. 
A transnational commercial legal order is unlikely a shared 
cooperative activity.  It is doubtful that secondary rule officials working 
in different normative communities support each other’s activities in the 
strong sense of helping each other do their jobs.  An argument can be 
made that an arbitral panel, for example, might avoid certain rulings on 
antitrust law so that the arbitral award will be enforced.  As another 
example, FIDIC might avoid regulating workplace safety so as to give 
the state an opportunity to do so.  These actions or inactions are not 
mutual support.  One norm applier or norm giver is simply avoiding 
 362. Quoted in Lord Kerr, Modern Trends in Commercial Law and Practice, 41 MOD. 
L. REV. 1, 10 (1978) and Forte, supra note 64, at 59. 
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conflict and their complementary positions coincide or coordinate, but 
they do not cooperate in the strong form of cooperation that the SCA 
condition requires.  There is no mutual support.  FIDIC is not helping a 
state regulate workplace safety.  The arbitrators are not helping the state 
restrict anti-competitive practices. 
That it is unlikely that a transnational commercial legal order is a 
shared cooperative activity does not mean that it is not a legal order. 
Even municipal legal orders are unlikely to be shared cooperative 
activities.363  A shared cooperative activity is unnecessary to finding a 
legal order.  It would be, at best, nice to have that condition fulfilled, but 
the necessity condition is some lesser form of shared agency, perhaps a 
shared intentional activity.  What actually is necessary in a legal system 
is a large question which is the subject of ongoing debate, and whose 
resolution is beyond our scope here.364 
The fifth condition, the presence of primary rules regulating social 
problems that legal systems usually regulate, is easily met in the 
description of the transnational commercial law order.  The rules in 
question have mainly to do with contract, property, and dispute 
resolution. 
3. Objections
A number of objections may be raised against the cosmopolitan 
conception and against my use of it to attempt to conceptualize a 
transnational system of commercial law.  I identify and address two: 
(a) the incompleteness or limited domain objection, that specifying a 
legal order around one legal category—commercial law—is untenable; 
and (b) the unity objection, arguing that it seems more plausible to claim 
that transnational commercial law is comprised of rules of distinct and 
multiple normative communities, which are interdependent and which 
coordinate, but to claim that they form a unified legal system may go too 
far. 
a. The Limited Domain Objection
Law, like other social rules, is group relative.365  For example, social 
norms governing manner of dress, eating and sexual behavior are group 
relative, that is, they vary with groups and over time.366  Law does not 
address many aspects of life.  Moral philosophers spend most of their 
 363. Shapiro, supra note 328. 
 364. Adler, supra note 304, at 750-64 discusses the literature. 
365. Id. 
 366. Adler, supra note 304. 
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effort understanding a normative sphere outside of the law.  Morality 
does not threaten law’s existence.  Group relativity is not a feature of a 
rule that makes it something other than law.  It is not a necessary 
condition for law’s validity that it not be group relative.  In fact many 
norms that no one would disagree are official state law are group 
relative.  Constitutional law on freedom of religion applies only to people 
who practice religion.  Commercial law applicable to merchants applies 
only to merchants.367  UCC Article 2 applies only to the sale of goods. 
Law certainly is group relative, but we cannot describe a legal 
system around one of the groups identified by such group relativity.  We 
might not be able to describe a transnational legal system around 
commercial law alone.  Law is not comprehensive in the Razian sense, in 
that law does not purport to regulate (or be able to regulate) all aspects of 
our lives, but it does not purport to cover a single field or limited fields 
of human action.  How can we have a legal system that addresses only 
one area of life, commerce? 
There are two replies to the limited domain objection.  First, it 
might be possible to describe a legal system around a group in which 
such a description has the right sort of normative consequences.  The 
systemic unity and shared intentionality features of the transnational 
commercial law order suggest a relationship between commercial law 
norms to justify the classification as a legal system.  Some groups are not 
normatively relevant.  For example, it would be implausible to describe a 
legal system around all left handed people because the feature of left-
handedness has no or perhaps insufficient normative importance.  Some 
groupings would indeed be repugnant, such as groupings in separate 
apartheid-like legal systems for different citizens of a state.  But that 
some groups are not normatively relevant or normatively repugnant does 
not condemn all groups from being able to form legal systems around the 
pervasive and important social practices that regulate their action beyond 
state borders. 
The second reply is that commercial law itself may be incomplete as 
a concept without a transnational conception.  This reply runs the risk of 
being circular.  The point here is only that when we examine how 
 367. Harold J. Burman & Felix J. Dresser, The “New” Law Merchant and the “Old”: 
Sources, Content, and Legitimacy, in CARBONNEAU, supra note 57, at 53 (The law 
merchant is not a complete legal system; it was never meant to be, even in medieval 
times); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Lex Mercatoria: An Arbitrator’s View, in CARBONNEAU,
supra note 238, at 71 (The law merchant “supplies the solution to a particular issue, 
without necessarily governing all aspects of the transaction.”  The law merchant is an 
alternative to conflict of laws analysis, which is often “artificial and inconclusive,” and a 
way out of applying rules ill-suited to international transactions.); BERGER, CREEPING
CODIFICATION, supra note 146 at 93 (law merchant not a “self contained” system, but 
domestic commercial law is incomplete). 
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commercial law operates in the world, we need an account to capture its 
essential cosmopolitan features. 
b. The Unity Objection
The unity objection might seem difficult to overcome.  It is actually, 
however, just an old “law is politics” claim.  A way to dissolve the unity 
objection might be to try to remove politics from the analysis.  Is there 
something unique about a legal system apart from its place in a political 
order?  Scholars of analytical jurisprudence have been asking similar 
sorts of questions for a long time.  When we get precise about our claims 
and remove from the discussion the political allegiances that lawyers, 
legislators, and judges might naturally associate with their municipal 
legal system, we can attempt a description of a transnational legal order 
in which the unity objection becomes a political fact with some, but not 
decisive or fatal, force over the legal order we purport to describe. 
CONCLUSION 
In this article I have tried to use conceptual analysis to articulate a 
cosmopolitan conception of legal positivism and to develop it into a 
concept of commercial law as a transnational normative order.  This 
article is only a start of such an account and no doubt it will benefit from 
scrutiny and counterargument.  And the account of a stateless or 
cosmopolitan conception of legal positivism has relevance beyond 
commercial law. 
This article offers no prescriptions.  It does not ask whether a 
transnational commercial legal order is just.  Analytical jurisprudence is 
a search for the existence conditions for a legal system and the validity 
conditions for legal rules.  It is not about the evaluation of a legal system 
using principles of justice or other substantive moral values.  The focus 
is on what is a legal system not what is a just legal system.368  These are 
important limitations.  This article offers no evaluation of the content of 
the principles of justice that may or may not be reflected in the law 
merchant or the transnational commercial law order.  It might just help 
us expose the considerable concerns we might have when consumers 
transact in a normative order in which the state has limited power to 
protect them.  Concerns about the justice of such an order resonate across 
a diverse assemblage of scholars working in divergent traditions.  The 
first quote by Hal Scott to start off the article was from an article about 
 368. For an explanation of the differences in the analysis, see RAZ, PRACTICAL 
REASON AND NORMS, supra note 12, at 10-13. 
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how banks use the law merchant to shift risk to customers.369  Thomas 
Carbonneau and François Janson, who write on international commercial 
arbitration, explain: 
Law will be generated within the confines of a fully privatized 
system that is unaccountable to any public organization or process. 
Arbitrators, lawyers, arbitral institutions and law firms will become 
the de facto government and the courts of international trade and 
commerce.370 
Seyla Benhabib explains: 
To be distinguished from the influence of cosmopolitan human rights 
norms is the undermining of state sovereignty through the demands 
of global capitalism.  Global capitalism is indeed creating its own 
form of “global law without a state” (Gunther Teubner), as well as 
sabotaging the efforts of legislators to conduct open and public 
deliberations on legislation impacting the movements of capital and 
other resources. . . .  My thesis is that whereas cosmopolitan norms 
lead to the emergence of generalizable human interests and the 
articulation of public standards of norm justification, global 
capitalism leads to the privatization and segmentation of interest 
communities and the weakening of standards of public justification 
through the rise of private logics of norm generation.  This results in 
the deterioration of the capacity of states to protect and provide for 
their citizens.371 
Law and economics scholars like Bruce Benson argue to the contrary, 
because, they claim, governments do not make good commercial law 
because of rent seeking and other pathologies of the political process.372  
But the focus of law and economics scholars is on efficiency, not justice. 
Questions of justice are beyond our scope here.  But once we get 
clear on what is going on, we can more effectively focus on questions of 
justice because we have improved our understanding of the norms that 
we want to investigate.  The normative order I have tried to identify in 
this article certainly should be subjected to normative evaluation. 
 369. Scott, supra note 2. 
 370. Thomas E. Carbonneau & François Janson, Cartesian Logic and Frontier 
Politics: French and American Concepts of Arbitrability, 2 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 193, 
221-22 (1994), quoted in Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Out of National Law: An 
Empirical Look at the New Law Merchant, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 523, 525 (2005). 
 371. Seyla Benhabib, Twilight of Sovereignty or the Emergence of Cosmopolitan 
Norms?  Rethinking Citizenship in Volatile Times, CITIZENSHIP STUDIES, Feb. 2007, at 
19-36 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
 372. Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, 55 S. ECON. J. 
644, 644 (1989).  See also supra note 110 for the political economy literature on 
unification, supporting Benson’s argument. 
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One question that seems to follow from this article is whether we 
can have a cosmopolitan account of the law and a political account of 
justice.  It might just be that states are the primary spaces for justice. 
Thomas Nagel certainly has it right when he says that “the need for 
workable ideas about the global or international case [for justice] 
presents political theory with its most important current task. . . .”373  
While this article fills one gap in the literature, others remain open, and 
one that certainly needs critical attention is the critique, from the 
standpoint of justice, of any transnational commercial law order we may 
find. 
 373. Nagel, supra note 14, at 113. 
